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INTRODUCTION' 
The past fifteen years have seen international criminal law ("ICL") develop in an 
astonishing way. 
ICL has metamorphosed from a backwater of public international law related to the criminal 
process (concerning jurisdiction, extradition, and—as a "small and not very significant 
category"—the development of a corpus of 'international crimes' 2) into a robust field in its 
own right. Its contribution to the elucidation and entrenchment of substantive international 
human rights and humanitarian law is self-evident.3 It provides a valuable contribution to 
the further elucidation and strengthening o f fair trial rights, modelling (mostly) good 
practice and extending the application of such rights beyond the direct scope of the 
international treaties.4 It also manifests the early development of an international approach 
to criminal procedure and prosecutions, and the law of evidence. In short, it is making the 
transition, although by no means yet complete,5 into a legal system rather than a convenient 
heading for a body of law, or field o f academic study. 
The ICTY/R have undoubtedly been the engine of modern I C L . 6 Closely related in their 
constitutions, legitimacy, and jurisprudence, 
[they] have uncovered literally dozens of rules, principles, criminal offences, and forms of liability 
which they said are now part of customary international law and therefore of potentially universal 
1 With thanks to K.Ambos, W.J.Fenrick, D.K.Piragoff, D.Robinson, and O.Triffterer for advanced copies of 
their work. Personal respect and gratitude to L B , AJ, and many others. 
2 The Changing Structure of International Law, F R I E D M A N N , W., 1964, pp. 167-169. 
3 Principles of [ICL], W E R L E , G . , 2005, p.42; The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, S C H A B A S , W., 2006, p.73. 
4 Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, Z A P P A L A , S., 2003, p. 13; also 'The E C H R and 
international law,' WiLDHABER, L . , 2007, pp.230-231; 'International criminal proceedings and the protection 
of human rights,' S L U I T E R , G . , 2003, p.935. The system is not perfect: 'Introduction and Overview,' 
B O H L A N D E R , M., in Defense in International Criminal Proceedings: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 
B O H L A N D E R , M., B O E D , R., & W I L S O N , R.J. (eds.), 2006, p.5; 'International criminal courts and fair trials: 
difficulties and prospects,' C O G A N , J.K.., 2002, pp.116-119; c f . 'Rights of suspects and accused,' 
WLAD1M1ROEF, M., in Substantive and Procedural Aspects of ICL: the Experience of International and 
National Courts, Vol. I: Commentary, K l R K M C D O N A L D , G . , & S W A A K - G O L D M A N , O. (eds.), 2000, p.450. 
5 C.f An Introduction to [ICL] and Procedure, C R Y E R , R., ET A L , 2007, p.451. 
6 In assessing the development of contemporary practice, this study largely confines itself to that of the 
I C T Y / R and I C C . The proliferation of criminal tribunals in the late 1990s has, with the exception of the S C S L , 
not resulted in a similar proliferation of judgments touching on the topic considered here. 
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application... [T]he Tribunals have taken stock of the numerous developments that have taken 
place in the field over the past sixty years and have promoted a more human-oriented reading of 
international humanitarian law, hardening in passing many quasi-legal norms standards [sic] into 
clear legal prohibitions. While Nuremberg might have been the cradle of the law of international 
crimes as we know it today, the ad hoc Tribunals may be lauded for getting it out of the 
Museum... 7 
The ICC w i l l consolidate and develop this work. The relationship between the law of the 
ICTY/R and the ICC wil l be one of the defining aspects o f ICL in the years to come; the 
extent to which this relationship wi l l be a sympathetic one is an important theme in this 
study. 
Bassiouni observed that the international illegality of certain types of conduct does not 
necessarily entail its criminality. 8 Beyond the definition of substantive offences, criminality 
emanates—at least in part—from the doctrines by which responsibility for that conduct is 
attributed,9 as an expression of the notion of personal culpability. ICL was born in the 
historic statement that "[cjrimes against international law are committed by [individuals], 
not by abstract entities..." 1 0 This notion is the foundation of modern prosecutions, as 
defined by the ICTY: "[b]y trying individuals on the basis of their personal responsibility, 
be it direct or indirect, the ICTY personalizes guil t ."" The mechanism of this process is the 
1 2 
subject of this study. 
It is the author's position that perhaps the most significant contribution of the ICTY/R has 
been the development of an enumerated doctrine of individual responsibility, truly making 
the unlawful 'criminal'. It has achieved this by the use o f 'modes of liability', a body of 
doctrines by which the acts of an accused may be related to a wider criminal consequence 
7 International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, M E T T R A U X , G , 2005, pp.364-365. 
8 Crimes against Humanity in [ICL], B A S S I O U N I , M . C . , 1999, p.l 13. Also, 'Will the judgment in the 
Nuremberg Trial constitute a precedent in international law?' K . E L S E N , H., 1947, p. 156. 
9 'Bridging the conceptual chasm: superior responsibility as the missing link between state and individual 
responsibility under international law,' R E I D , N.L. , 2005, pp.807-808. 
10 Goering, IMT, p.41. Also, International Law and Human Rights, L A U T E R P A C H T , H., 1968, p.40. 
" 'Bringing justice to the Former Yugoslavia: the Tribunal's core achievements,' ICTY at a Glance, available 
at http://www.un.org/ictv/glance-e/index.htm. 
1 2 As such, it is not a study of individual responsibility as a whole, but only its attribution. Following Eser's 
logic, related but distinct concepts such as attempt and abandonment are not considered: 'Individual criminal 
responsibility,' E S E R , A., in The Rome Statute of the [ICC]: a Commentary, C A S S E S E , A., G A E T A , P., & J O N E S , 
J . R . W . D . (eds.), 2002, p.771; c.f. 'Article 25: individual criminal responsibility,' A M B O S , K . , in Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, T R 1 F F T E R E R , O. (ed.), 2008 forthcoming, mn.3. 
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(the substantive offence, often 'committed' by another actor). The influence which the 
ICTY/R's practice wi l l have in general international law is the subject of this study; the 
answer likely depends on the extent to which the various devices manifest the related 
qualities o f precision, determinacy and legality—in Pellet's terms, the characteristics of a 
' rule ' . 1 3 Relatively speaking, questions concerning the general legal force of these devices, 
and their relationship with one another, have not received the degree of academic 
examination they deserve.14 
This thesis seeks to contribute to this process by: 
a. ) evaluating the true demands of the principle of legality in international law, the 
demands of which any rule of attribution must meet; 
b. ) presenting the existing practice in attributing responsibility in a coherent way, with a 
view to assessing the ICTY/R's role in creating a body of 'rules'; 
c. ) identifying key areas of consonance and contention in present practice, as a tentative 
guide for the ICC. 
This is an ambitious agenda for a study of this size. However, such ambition is important: 
much of the criticism of this area of the law is focused on the legitimacy of its development; 
any proper consideration of it must thus be grounded in the cardinal doctrines of criminal 
and international law. It is no coincidence that Eser places legality at the centre of his 
discussion of individual responsibility.1 5 
1 3 'Applicable law,' P E L L E T , A., in C A S S E S E ET AL.(2002).op.cit., p. 1072; 'Codification and development of 
international law,' L A U T E R P A C H T , H., 1955, p. 17. C.f the Gentini case, 10 RIAA 551, in which the Italian-
Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission contrasted rules and principles: "a principle expresses a general truth, 
which guides our action, serves as a theoretical basis for the various acts of our life, and the application of 
which to reality produces a given consequence." 
1 4 'General principles of liability in I C L , ' C R Y E R , R., in The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal 
and Policy Issues, M c G O L D R I C K , D., R O W E , P., & D O N N E L L Y , E . (eds.), 2004, p.233; Prosecuting 
International Crimes: Selectivity and the ICL Regime, C R Y E R , R., 2005, pp.308-309, 325. For two notable 
exceptions, see: in English, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, V A N S L I E D R E G T , E . , 2003; in German, Der Allgemeine Teil des Volkerslrafrechts. Ansdtze 
einer Dogmatisierung ['The 'General Part' of ICL—Towards a Dogmatic System of Rules of Attribution'], 
A M B O S , K . , 2001. The emphasis on J C E in the 2007 JICJ may also suggest that academic interest is moving in 
this direction. 
1 5 ESER.(2002).op.cit.,p.771. 
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Correspondingly, insofar as it is feasible, a loosely inductive—rather than deductive— 
analytical approach is applied. The deductive approach has long lent itself to the ICL 
project, and for understandable reasons. However, standing as we do at the threshold 
between the ICTY/R's and ICC's dominance of ICL, it is a good time to examine more 
closely the origin and meaning of those propositions which have come to be generally 
accepted. This process is a necessary prerequisite to considering the existence (or otherwise) 
of general international 'rules'. 1 6 
Finally, before beginning, a brief comment on the context in which ICL operates is vital to 
understand the great stress placed on responsibility doctrines. This thesis is concerned with 
legal technicality—but it is foolish to ignore the considerable pressures within which those 
technicalities must be moulded. 
The challenge of 'complex crimes' 
'Complexity' is an over-used term, 1 7 yet it is ventured that it has a particular relevance to 
the present topic: it relates to "parts or elements not simply co-ordinated, but some of them 
involved in various degrees of subordination; complicated, involved, intricate; not easily 
analysed or disentangled." The crimes with which ICL is primarily concerned have both 
their means and malignancy bound up in their complexity 1 8—and hence place particular 
demands on any doctrine which seeks to attribute individual responsibility. 
16 See 'The inductive approach to international law,' SCHWARZENBERGER, G., 1947, especially pp.566-569. 
1 7 E.g., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, FRANCK, T.M., 1995, p.5 (describing the international 
community); The Common Law of Mankind, JENKS, C.W., 1958, p.8 (describing the international community); 
International Law in Theory and Practice, SCHACHTER, O., 1991, p. 4 (describing the relationship between 
'rules' and behaviour); 'The sources and content of [ I C L ] : a theoretical framework,' BASSIOUNl, M.C. , in The 
New [ICL], K.OUFA, K. (ed.), 2003, p.29 et seq (describing the relationship between I C L and its sources); 'The 
Rome Conference on the establishment of [the I C C ] : a fundamental step in the strengthening of [ I C L ] , ' 
L E A N Z A , U. , in Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, L A T T A N Z I , F. , & SCHABAS, 
W. (eds.), 1999, p. 10 (describing I C L enforcement mechanisms); 'Applicable law,' C A R A C C I O L O , I . , in 
L A T T A N Z I & SCHABAS.(1999).op.cit., p.211 (describing I C L enforcement mechanisms). There are many more 
examples. 
18 Erdemovic.AJ, per Judges McDonald and Vohrah, para.2. 
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ICL "deals with the categories of crime frequently associated with the collective moral guilt 
of nations"1 9—national or regional influences normally too remote to be causally relevant to 
criminal adjudication possess a unique significance to the 'system'-type crimes 2 0 with 
which ICL is primarily concerned.21 
The connotations of central authority and state involvement in Roling's definition o f system 
crime prevent the term from being entirely apt—the state is central to one manifestation of 
the phenomenon but recent decades have illustrated others. The key quality is that these 
crimes are committed largely through social activity, an aggregation of shouts, whispers, 
self-interest, and unthinking compliance, a succession of incremental steps that gain 
momentum and violence. Not only hard to prove, much of this process is legally intangible. 
It is this abuse, functionally and symbolically, of the community that locates these crimes in 
a "different dimension from ordinary criminality" 2 2 and makes them a threat to international 
peace and security. 
Even small multi-actor crimes are necessarily more complex in their evolution and 
execution than their single-actor counterparts.23 Truly 'complex' crimes, however, may 
depend heavily—if counter-intuitively—on the low-level contributions of the many rather 
than the bloody excesses of a notable few. 2 4 Mere 'accomplices' to the crime may play far 
1 9 'Reclaiming fundamental principles of criminal law in the Darfur case,' F L E T C H E R , G.P., & O H L I N , J.D., 
2005, p.547. See further 'Liberals and romantics at war: the problem of collective guilt,' F L E T C H E R , G.P., 
2002, p. \ 514 etseq. 
2 0 'Aspects of the criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war,' ROLING, B . V. A., in The New 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, C A S S E S E , A. (ed.), Vol. I, 1979, pp.203-204. Other commentators have 
used the term "crimes of state" in this context: e.g., 'The normative framework of International Humanitarian 
Law: overlaps, gaps and ambiguities,' B A S S I O U N I , M.C., 1998, pp.202-203. This term is unhelpful for the 
confusion it provokes with state responsibility: both individual and state responsibility may at times reflect an 
event but their bases are quite distinct. See generally RElD.(2005).op.cit.; 'Issues of complexity, complicity 
and complementarity: from the Nuremberg trials to the dawn of the International Criminal Court,' C L A P H A M , 
A, in From Nuremberg to the Hague: the future of international criminal justice. S A N D S , P. (ed.), 2002, pp.33-
34; 'Concurrence between individual responsibility and state responsibility in international law,' 
N O L L K A E M P E R , A., 2003, pp.618-620. See further Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), 
Judgment (ICJ), 2007, paras. 171-174, 181-182. 
2 1 WERLE.(2005).op.cit., pp.27-29; 'The United Nations system: a place for criminal courts,' W A R B R I C K , C , 
1995, pp.260-261. 
2 2 Crimes Against Humanity: the Struggle for GlobaUustice, R O B E R T S O N , G. , 2002, pp.258-259. 
2 3 'Three conceptual problems within the doctrine of [JCE] , ' O H L I N , J.D., 2007, pp.69-70; 
'The general principles of [ ICL]: the viewpoint of a national criminal lawyer,' M A N T O V A N I , F . , 2003, p.31. 
2 4 Generally, Modernity and the Holocaust, B A U M A N , Z . , 1989. 
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more important roles than those who would ordinarily be considered 'perpetrators'. The 
social and organisational structures which define system crime are thus crucial to its 
practical consummation, as well as camouflaging those most responsible. Wider social 
involvement is important both for functional/logistical reasons, and to 'neutralise' 2 6 
individuals' perceptions of their actions.2 7 Insulation from the end result, and the fostering 
of a community which redefines the nature of normal and acceptable conduct (normative 
28 
distortion), is vital in 'reframing' atrocities. Even where an individual has plainly made a 
significant personal contribution to the most horrific acts, this process plays a significant 
conditioning role: Eichmann's greatest crime, in Arendt's words, lay not in "any monstrous 
evil intentions, but in his incapacity to think; it resided literally in the thoughtlessness with 
which he could, with a stroke of his pen, condemn thousands to death."2 9 
As a consequence, the legal task is also complex, particularly in the paramount (yet 
paradoxical) need to develop a meaningful rationale to make responsibility for such crimes 
"personal",3 0 clearly grounded in an individual's conduct rather than their status or 
affiliation. Not only does the fact o f a just conviction matter,31 sentencing should also be "a 
ritual o f manifest moral significance". 3 2 As Sloane notes, this goal accordingly requires a 
rational scheme which accounts for the defendant's individual circumstances and role 
within any collective entity implicated. 3 3 Doing otherwise, especially internationally, fosters 
only further hatred and i l l - w i l l . 3 4 This challenge is enhanced by the greater risk inherent in 
the use o f innovative models of prosecution.3 5 
2 5 'Enforcing international humanitarian law: catching the accomplices,' S C H A B A S , W . , 2001, p.440. 
2 6 'How can it happen that horrendous state crimes are perpetrated?' N E U B A C H E R , F . , 2006, pp.792-796. 
2 7 Furundzija.TJ, para.253. 
2 8 'Becoming a hit man: neutralization in a very deviant career,' L E V I , K. , 1981, pp.61-62; further Frame 
Analysis: an Essay on the Organization of Experience, G O F F M A N , E . , 1974. 
2 9 See 'Possible islands of predictability: the legal thought of Hannah Arendt,' K . L A B B E R S , J . , 2007, pp.12-15. 
3 0 Alun Jones Q . C . to the House of Lords, R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, 
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) (UK) , 2000, p. 152; Krupp (NMT), p. 1448. Also, 'The judgment of the I C T Y 
Appeals Chamber on the merits in the Tadic case,' S A S S O L I , M., & O L S O N , L . M . , 2000, p.9. 
3 1 Necessary "to defend the honour or the authority of him who was hurt by the offence so that the failure to 
punish may not cause his degradation". Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil, A R E N D T , H. , 
2006, p.287. Further, e.g., DARCY.(2007).op.cit., pp.395^t02; 'Reflections on the trial of Paul Touvier for 
Crimes against Humanity in France,' S A D A T W E X L E R , L . , 1995, pp.191, 213. 
3 2 Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines and the Federal Courts, ST1TH, K. , & C A B R A N E S , J.A., 1998, p.81. 
3 3 'The expressive capacity of international punishment: the limits of the national law analogy and the potential 
of [ I C L ] , ' S L O A N E , R.D., 2007, p.89. 
34 re Yamashita (US), 1946, pp.28-29. 
3 5 E.g., 'The prosecutor's toolbox: investigating and prosecuting organized crime in the United States,' 
NARD1NI, W.J.,2006, pp.535-536; 'The crime of being a criminal,' L Y N C H , G . E . , 1987, pp.955-961. 
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Many of the traditional aims of international criminal justice (whatever one may consider 
them 3 6) place further pressure on this balance. Particularly, ICL may often be required to 
model the best of due process while manifesting a sufficient conviction rate to restore the 
normative distortion 3 7 inherent to the social crisis which precipitated the criminality in the 
first place. 
Finally, it must also be recalled that the just 'personalization' of any crime, whatever its 
type, may be regarded as a "hidden fundamental question of virtually monumental 
proportions." 3 8 Indeed, some critics—albeit from a rather narrow theoretical perspective— 
would argue that social forces so overcome the law's core assumption o f a 
rational/intentional/voluntary actor that it places the ostensible values of the whole project 
in question. 3 9 Even doubting this counsel of despair, it is true that the question of 
responsibility—no matter how advanced the legal system—inevitably touches on 
uncomfortable and difficult political, social, moral and legal questions. In the international 
context, questions of responsibility necessarily foreground the different approaches taken by 
the various legal traditions. 4 0 
For all these reasons, it is unsurprising that any doctrine of attribution is racked by a certain 
degree of uncertainty and conflict. There is a significant political and moral imperative to 
target for prosecution only those who reach a certain threshold of responsibility4 1 but these 
figures are frequently not proximate to the practical, visceral conclusion of the crime. There 
is no escaping, therefore, the need for sophisticated principles of liability—a necessity 
E.g., 'Restraining the barbarians: can [ ICL] help?' F A R E R , T.J . , 2000, pp.91-92; further 'Imputed criminal 
liability and the goals of international justice,' D A R C Y , S., 2007, p.403; 'The banality of good: aligning 
incentives against mass atrocity,' O s i E L , M., 2005, P. 1751 el seq; 'From indifference to engagement: 
bystanders and international criminal justice,' F L E T C H E R , L . E . , 2005, especially pp. 1092-1095; 
FLETCHER.(2002).op.cit., pp.1542-1544, 1572-1573; Transitional Justice, T E 1 T E L , R . G . , 2000, pp.44-46, 66-
67. 
3 7 SLOANE.(2007).op.cit„ pp. 41-42; also NEUBACHER.(2006).op.cit., p.789. C.f Kvocka.TJ, para.310. 
3 8 'Establishing a basis for criminal responsibility of collective entities,' ALWART, H, in Criminal 
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, E S E R , A, HEINE, G, & HUBER, B (eds.), 1999, p. 145. 
3 9 'Criminal law,' NORRIE, A., in The Critical Lawyer's Handbook, G R I G G - S P A L L , I . , & IRELAND, P. (eds.), 
1992,pp.76-78, 82. 
4 0 'Symposium. Guilty by association: [JCE] on trial—Foreword,' SLUITER, G. , 2007, pp.67-68. 
4 1 'Prosecuting the individuals bearing the highest level of responsibility,' D E L PONTE, C , 2004, p.517. Also 
'Reflections on the prosecution of war crimes by international tribunals,' M E R O N , T., 2006, p.563; The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: an Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy, 
K E R R , R., 2004, pp.70-72, 175-177, 179-185, 189, 208, 213; Resolution 1503 (2003), UN SC, 2003. 
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which appears to have the unfortunate consequence of making the prosecution of system 
offences as complex as the crimes themselves. 
Clapham put it best, when he wrote: 
[W]e are faced with the myriad of connections that obscure the relationship between the [...] actor 
and the [...] victim... This complexity has generated demands to 'lift the lid' and 'pierce the veil' 
to highlight the responsibilities of those who assist others to commit human rights violations. Part 
of the response to this complicated situation has been to develop legal responsibility through 
charges of complicity—and it is worth recalling that the etymology of complicity can be traced to 
the Latin word complicare, and, as noted in the Oxford English Dictionary, the second listed 
meaning for complicity is: 'state of being complex.' 4 2 
4 2 Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, C L A P H A M , A., 2 0 0 6 , p.563. 
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PART I: T H E L E G A L I T Y O F A ' J U R I S P R U D E N C E O F DOUBT' 
A JURISPRUDENCE OF DOUBT 
"[LJiberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt", wrote Justice O'Connor. 
The use of jurisprudence in developing the law has long been treated with suspicion. Almost 
two centuries ago, Robert Rantoul described the common law as a "sublimated perversion 
of reason" which "bewilders and perplexes" and which permits a judge creatively to extort 
"from precedents something which they do not contain". 4 4 Although the separation of 
powers issue may be less apposite,45 Rantoul's criticism has considerable modern resonance 
to ICL. Various commentators have noted the challenges of judicially-developed law in 
general, and voiced concerns4 6 about the uncertain and self-referential origins of many 
attribution doctrines in particular. 4 7 
At the same time, the essential role of jurisprudence in developing ICL is well-recognised. 
Until the advent of the ICC Statute, the law governing international criminal prosecutions 
was—unusually48—almost entirely a creature of the courts themselves.49 The ICTY/R 
Statutes have formed elegant skeletons but ones upon which the judges have placed 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (US), 1991, p.844. 
4 4 Cited in American Legal History: Cases and Materials, H A L L , K . L . , 1991, pp.317-318. 
4 5 Although not entirely so: 'Third world approaches to international law and individual responsibility in 
internal conflicts,' A N G H I E , A., & C H I M N I , B.S., 2003, pp.93, 95; Galic.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, para.21. 
4 6 E.g., OllLIN.(2007).op.cit., p.70; Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the ICL Regime, C R Y E R , 
R . , 2005, p.312; METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit. , pp.16, 18; 'Article 21: applicable law,' M c A U L l F F E D E G U Z M A N , 
M . , in TRIFFTERER.(1999).op.cit . , pp.436-439. 
4 7 This is not a problem originating solely from a common law approach: although civil and common law 
traditions reflect a different emphasis, it is wrong to suggest that one is necessarily more prone to bouts of 
'judicial creativity' than the other. Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, A T I Y A H , P., 1987, pp.3, 17-18, 
27-28, 32-33, 44, 50, 68, 90-92; 'Conceptualism, pragmatism and courage: a common lawyer looks at some 
judgments of the German Federal Court,' M A R K . E S IN IS, B, in Essays in Memoiy of Professor F.H. Lawson, 
W A L L 1 N G T O N , P., & M E R K I N , R . M . (eds.), 1986, pp.62, 68-69; 'It is wise not to take the Civil Codes too 
seriously,' T U N C , A., in W A L L I N G T O N & M E R K . I N ibid., pp.71-85; Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 
H A R T , H . L . A . , 1983, pp. 127-131; 'Utopias of rationality in the development of the idea of codification,' 
V A R G A , C , in Law and the Future of Society, H U T L E Y , F . C . , E T A L (eds.), 1979, pp.27—41; The Common Law, 
H O L M E S , O.W., 1881, p. 1. 
4 8 The [ICC] and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium, S A D A T , L N, 
2002, p. 173; c f . Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. 
Spain), Judgment (Second Phase) (ICJ), per Judge Fitzmaurice, 1970, p.64. 
4 Furundzija.TJ, para.227. 
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considerable flesh, in whatever light it is regarded. Jurisprudence under the ICC Statute, 
although an instrument far less skeletal,5 1 may not mark a significant departure from this 
approach.52 It is true to say that the majority of the very characteristics which make modern 
ICL a system, rather than an object of study, have originated in or been developed by the 
professional reasoning of judges. 
The very characteristics which make jurisprudence such an effective tool for the progressive 
development of the law in the politically-charged international context (independence, 
evolutionary reasoning, scholarship) are those which render it prone to uncertainty of 
content and direction. 5 3 As such, in order to assess the legality of the various attribution 
doctrines, the true nature of a 'jurisprudence of doubt' must be examined. This tension 
cannot be resolved by a purely pragmatic approach—legitimacy is something more than 
mere expediency54—yet the law must be realistic in its aspirations.55 In Allott 's terms, even 
i f the origins of ICL are something of a myth, it must be asked whether it is a "bad myth" . 5 6 
As a "double-structured" field,57 ICL is shaped by both influences evident in its title, the 
'international' and the 'cr iminal ' . 5 8 Much of the technical aspect o f this thesis requires close 
attention to the former. However, systematic adherence to the protections and principles 
embodied in criminal law (as a "foundational" 5 9 field of law) should be the very cornerstone 
of ICL's legitimacy, 6 0 as well as a source of legally enforceable individual rights and thus a 
'The Statute of the [ICC]: some preliminary reflections,' C A S S E S E , A . , 1999, p. 148. 
51 An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, S C H A B A S , W . A . , 2004, p.25. 
5 2 'Judicial policy-making at the International Criminal Court: an institutional guide to analyzing international 
adjudication,' W E S S E L , J . , 2005, pp.450-451. C.f. PELLET.(2002).op.cit., pp.1053, 1084. 
53 Evolution and the Common Law, H U T C H I N S O N , A C , 2005, pp.275-276. Also In re Yamashita (US), 1946, 
p.43. 
™ 'The legacy of the I C T Y : the [ I C C ] , ' S A D A T , L.N.,2003, p. 1076. Expediency is, however, a relevant 
consideration. 
5 5 'International criminal courts and fair trial,' W A R B R I C K , C , 1998, p.62. Further Bruton v. United States 
(US), 1968, p. 135; Delaware v. Van Arsdall (US), 1986, p.681: a criminal defendant is entitled to "a fair trial, 
not a perfect one". 
5 6 'Language, method, and the nature of international law,' A L L O T T , P., 1971, pp. 128-129. 
5 7 An Introduction to ICL and Procedure, C R Y E R , R., F R I M A N , H. , R O B I N S O N , D., & WlLMSHURST, E . , 2007, 
p.12. 
'Foreword,' A R B O U R , L , in K I R K M C D O N A L D & SWAAK-GOLDMAN.(2000) .OP. cit., p.x. 
5 9 'Constitutional dignity and criminal law,' B A K E R , J .E . , 2002, pp.127-128, 131. 
6 0 Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995, para.45. For the 
comment of other courts, e.g., Slobodan Milosevic v. the Netherlands, Admissibility Decision (ECtHR), 2002; 
Slobodan Milosevic v. the Netherlands, (Netherlands), 2001, para.3.4; Mladen Naletilic v. Croatia, 
Admissibility Decision (ECtHR), 2000. On the Security Council's intent, Rutaganda.AJ, per Judge Pocar, 
2003, p.2. Also AMBOS.(2006).op.cit., p.669; FLETCHER/OHLIN.(2005) .op.c i t . , pp.540-541; 
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guarantee of fairness.61 These notions are bound up in the rule of law, 6 2 a "meta-legal 
doctrine" 6 3 which comprises "the values to which the law should aspire"6 4 and guarantees 
the consistency and generality of a legal system.6 5 
T H E PRINCIPLE OF L E G A L I T Y 
In the criminal context, the most common encapsulation of the rule of law is the principle of 
legality, 6 6 known also by the maxim nullum crimen sine lege.61 Widely entrenched in 
modern international and national legal systems,68 it is frequently conceived as a prohibition 
of the retroactive application o f the law. However, it also extends to 
...the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty... and the principle 
that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused's detriment, for instance by 
analogy; it follows from this than an offence must be clearly defined in law. This condition is 
satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, 
with the assistance of the courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make [them] 
liable. 6 9 
The principle may be interpreted to connote a "legislative duty to provide fair warning of 
punishable conduct", 7 0 including a duty upon judges to "tamper neither with the categories 
of exculpation nor with the categories of inculpation." 7 1 Reconciling the principle of legality 
with a vigorous and evolutionary jurisprudence on the attribution of criminal 
WERLE.(2005).op.cit., pp.24, 32; 'Applicable law,' CARACCIOLO, I, in LATTANZI & SCHABAS.(1999).op.cit., 
p.230; 'Evidence in the I C C Statute,' B R A D Y , H . , in LATTANZI & SCHABAS.(l999).op.cit., p.282. 
6 1 Questions of 'fairness' and 'legitimacy', although closely related in their application to individuals, are 
nonetheless conceptually distinct in public international law: e.g., The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 
F R A N C K , T.M., 1990, pp.208-210. Modern customary law may now include a general fair trial requirement: 
e.g., Aleksovski.AJ, para.l 13; Semanza, [Appellate] Decision, 31 May 2000, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.21. 
6 2 Practice Statement of the House of Lords (UK) , 1966. 
6 3 The Constitution of Liberty, VON H A Y E K , F .A . , 1976, p.206. 
6 4 Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, SlMESTER, A.P., & SULLIVAN, G.R., 2003, p.37. 
6 5 HART.(l983).op.cit., p.81. 
6 6 Puhk v. Estonia (ECtHR), 2004, para.24. 
6 7 In civil law jurisdictions, it is commonly conceptualised four-fold: lex praevia, lex certa, lex stricta, lex 
scripta. However, the extent to which all of these elements truly inform the practice of I C L is uncertain, even 
under the ICC Statute: AMBOS (2006) op.cit., pp.670-671. 
6 8 E.g., ICC Statute, Arts.22-24; ECHR, Art.7(l); ICCPR, Art. 15(1); ACHR, Art.9; US Constitution, Art. l ; 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 103 Abs.II.GG; French Criminal Code, Arts . 111-113. 
6 9 Kokkinakis v. Greece (ECtHR), 1993, para.52. 
7 0 Rethinking Criminal Law, F L E T C H E R , G.P., 2000, p.629, emphasis added. 
71 Ibid., p.569. 
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responsibility—and a dearth o f legislation—is thus a significant challenge. On the other 
hand, the precise meaning of the principle is not necessarily as it seems. 
One of the core ideas apparently embodied within the principle is "certainty". 7 2 However, 
such a goal can be little more than a general aspiration: the law cannot live or die solely by 
its achievement. Indeed, a measure of uncertainty is endemic to the law itself, and this 
73 
applies to the principle of legality as much as any other norm. As a consequence, the 
principle of legality is better understood as a requirement only for "sufficient clari ty" 7 4 — 
which in turn necessitates an assessment of 'sufficiency', informed by meta-legal notions of 
'fairness'. Underlining this point, at least four factors can briefly be listed to illustrate the 
extent to which any notion of legal certainty (and, indeed, any unbending notion of a 'rule') 
represents a hidden compromise. 
The law is not, and can never be, entirely precise. Even with the most exhaustive criminal 
code, there is always a margin of ambiguity, either with regard to what the drafters 
'intended' (itself a relative concept 7 5) or the precise way in which that intention is 
communicated. This is not just a function of 'analogue' human nature but a necessary 
consequence of the open texture of language.76 This problem of indeterminacy should not be 
exaggerated but neither can it be in good conscience ignored. 7 7 
Second, the application of the principle of legality differs not only between types o f legal 
system (civil law systems tend to adopt an apparently stricter approach),7 8 but also within 
them. For example, although the common law of both the United Kingdom 7 9 and the United 
States is united in requiring non-retroactivity and clarity sufficient for 'fair warning' , 8 0 
contemporary jurisprudence differs with regard to the extent that judicial construction may 
'Does the principle of legality stand in the way of progressive development of the law?' S H A H A B U D D E E N , 
M., 2004, p. 1008. 
7 3 'Retroactive criminal liability and international human rights law,' JURATOWICH, B., 2004, p.337. 
7 4 Vasiljevic. TJ, para.201. 
7 5 Generally 'The forum of principle,' DWORKIN, R., 1981, especially pp.476-500. 
7 6 'The codification of the criminal law,' DE B U R C A , G. , & G A R D N E R , S., 1990, p.560; 'Codification of the 
criminal law—Part 4: restatement or reform?' W E L L S , C , 1986, pp.320-321. 
7 7 H A R T . ( 1994).op.cit., pp. 130-131. 
7 8 Fn.67 supra; also WERLE.(2005).op.cit., p.33; CASSESE.(2003).op.cit., pp. 141-142. 
7 9 As a comparison of common law interpretations, it should be noted that this point does not, however, take 
into account the recent incorporation of the E C H R via the Human Rights Act 1998. 
8 0 E.g., United States v. Harris* (US), p.617. 
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permissibly amplify statutory language.81 This reflects the fact that consideration of the 
principle of legality involves striking a balance between competing interests. In the context 
of international criminal procedure, although the legal origin of a given principle is not itself 
significant, 8 2 the fact that ostensibly the same norm is applied in differing ways across 
multiple traditions is important, at the very least in highlighting the degree of judicial care 
required in approaching the issue. 
Third, the way in which the principle can be applied in the specific context of international 
law may be different from some or all national law. 8 3 This is not to detract from the 
importance of the rule of law itself, or the need for the progressive elucidation and 
clarification of international law, 8 4 but to highlight the fact that careful account needs to be 
taken of the nature of international law in assessing the appropriate standards of legality. 8 5 
Jescheck reaches the same conclusion, considering that the traditional understanding o f the 
principle of specificity is only satisfied ful ly in conventional international law: for law 
derived from the other formal sources, "the principle can only serve as a guiding doctrine, to 
be observed when interpreting the rules produced by these sources o f law." 8 6 This does not 
mandate the conclusion drawn by one commentator that "[c]ustomary rules cannot, as a 
matter o f principle, be a direct basis of incrimination". 8 7 
Fourth, the principle of legality is a key theoretical battleground between (broadly speaking) 
'positive' and 'natural' lawyers. 8 8 Given the paradox within which the principle is 
inevitably called upon to operate,89 it would not be surprising i f judicial outcomes are 
81 Shaw v. DPP (UK) , 1962, p.267; c.f. Bouie v. City of Columbia (US), 1964, p.352. See also R. v. R (UK) , 
1992, p.599. 
8 2 'International criminal procedure: 'adversarial', 'inquisitorial' or mixed?' A M B O S , K. , 2003, pp.34-35. E.g., 
Delalic.AJ, para.611. 
8 3 'Crimes against humanity: the need for a specialized convention,' B A S S I O U N I , M.C. , 1994, pp.468-471. 
8 4 lbid.,pA12 etseq. 
8 5 See further 'The adequacies of contemporary theories of international law—gaps in legal thinking,' F A L K , 
R.A., 1964, p.233. 
8 6 'The general principles of [ ICL] set out in Nuremberg, as mirrored in the I C C Statute,' JESCHECK, H., 2004, 
p.41. 
8 7 'On the sources of I C L , ' D J U R O - D E G A N , V., 2005, p.67. C.f. C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p. 14; 
PELLET.(2002).op.cit., pp. 1055-1056, 1071-1072; c.f. LAMB.(2002).op.cit., pp.734, 749; and especially 
ICCPR, Art.l5(2). C.f. 'Applicable law,' C A R A C C I O L O , I, in L A T T A N Z I & SCHABAS.(1999).op.cit., p.229. 
8 8 See, e.g., 'Positivism and the separation of law and morals,' H A R T , H .L .A. , 1958, p.593; 'Positivism and 
fidelity to law—a reply to Professor Hart,' F U L L E R , L . L . , 1958, p.630. 
8 9 Fn. l 59 infra. 
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swayed as much by the general jurisprudential outlook of the judge as any 'right' answer. 
Given the practical focus of this study,9 1 no great attention wi l l be paid to the more 
theoretical jurisprudential debate, other than to recognise the significance of its existence. 
Beyond these natural limitations, it is also true to note that certainty is not even always an 
aspiration. The well-established lex mitior exception, mandating the retrospective 
application of a more lenient penal law, 9 2 is a good example of a circumstance in which a 
competing objective (recognition o f a new, more 'progressive' law) outweighs the need for 
certainty. A similar balance is commonly struck with regard to procedural law. 9 3 There is 
thus an implicit balance in the principle of legality between certainty and flexibility; the 
relative weight given to each varying in the light of the particular context. 
In formulating the demands o f the principle of legality, a number of commentators have 
reached similar conclusions. Writing extra-judicially, Justice O'Connor has expressly 
declared what has been hinted above: the rule of law requires primarily that "legal rules be 
publicly known". 9 4 Boot, more precisely, concludes that the principle of legality has two, 
mutually sustaining purposes: to ensure that an individual may foresee the consequences of 
their actions, and to ensure that no person is subject to arbitrary prosecution.9 5 Simester and 
Sullivan agree.96 Legal certainty, and thus legal legitimacy, thus seems to be founded on the 
notion of ex ante guidance. At the same time, even this modest goal is subject to various 
practical limits. As noted at the Supreme Court of Canada, 
E.g., 'Recognition in theory and practice,' B R O W N L I E , I., 1982, p. 197. C.f. Pragmatism and Theory in 
English Law, AT1YAH, P., 1987, p.143; The Common Law of Mankind, JENKS, C . W . , 1958, p.413. 
9 1 For himself, the author declares membership of the 'English tradition'. 'The theory of international law: is 
there an English contribution?' W A R B R I C K , C , in Theory and International Law: an Introduction, A L L O T T , P., 
E T A L , 1991, p.61 
9 2 E.g., Deronjic Sentencing.AJ, paras.93-99; Dragan Nikolic Sentencing.AJ, paras.77-86; ICCPR, Art. 15 (1); 
ACHR, Art.9. C.f. 'The uncertain scope of Article 15(1) of the [ ICCPR] , ' O P S A H L , T., & DE Z A Y A S , A . , 1983, 
pp.243-253. 
" TRESCHEL.(2005).op.cit., pp.110-111; Coeme v. Belgium (ECtHR), 2000, paras. 102-103; Tadic, 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, per Judge Sidhwa, para. 11. 
9 4 'Vindicating the rule of law: the role of the judiciary,' O ' C O N N O R , S.D., 2003, p.l . 
9 5 Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullem Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction of the [ICC], B O O T , M., 2002, pp. 176, 611, 616. Further, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford (US), 
1972, pp.108-109. 
9 6 SlMESTER/SULLlVAN.(2003).op.cit., p.40; further Principles of Criminal Law, A S H W O R T H . , A . , 1999, p.67; 
The Authority of Law, R A Z , J . , 1979, pp.214-215. 
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Absolute precision in the law exists rarely, if at all. The question is whether [there is] an 
intelligible standard according to which the judiciary must do its work. The task of interpreting 
how that standard applies in particular instances might always be characterized as having a 
discretionary element, because the standard can never specify all the instances in which it 
applies.9 7 
Subjective knowledge/understanding of the relevant law thus cannot be presumed. In any 
event, from a common law perspective, 'ignorance of the law is no excuse'—it need not be 
shown that an individual was acquainted with the precise legal mechanism relevant to their 
conduct. As reasoned by Justice Gonthier, 9 8 what must be shown however is the "core 
concept of notice": 
. . .a subjective understanding that the law touches upon some conduct, based on the substratum of 
values underlying the legal enactment and on the role that the legal enactment plays in the life of 
i 99 
the society. 
Only when this core notice is missing—for example, with regulatory offences—must steps 
be taken to foster actual notice by the public. The test for unconstitutional vagueness under 
the Canadian Charter—and thus lack of notice to the accused—depends, therefore, on a 
relatively high test: whether the law "so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance 
for legal debate". As the Justice shrewdly commented, 
Legal rules only provide a framework, a guide as to how one may behave, but certainty is only 
reached in instant cases, where law is actualized by a competent authority. In the meanwhile, 
conduct is guided by approximation. The process of approximation sometimes results in quite a 
narrow set of options, sometimes in a broader one. Legal dispositions therefore delineate a risk 
zone, and cannot hope to do more, unless they are directed at individual instances. 1 0 0 
On closer examination, therefore, it appears that the principle of legality in the common law 
tradition is interlaced with a profound recognition of the ambiguities and difficulties in 
prescribing the law for hypothetical cases. Even when ex ante guidance is acknowledged to 
9 7 Irn'in Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General) (Canada), 1989, p.983. Further, United Nurses of Alberta v. 
Alberta (Attorney-General), per McLachlin, J. (Canada), 1992, p.930.; R. v. Jobidon, per Gonthier, J. 
(Canada), 1991, p.714. 
9 8 R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, per Gonthier, J. (Canada), 1992, pp. 639-643. 
9 9 Ibid. 
1 0 0 Ibid. 
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be one of the principal goals underlying the legality principle, the degree of notice or clarity 
actually required is nonetheless minimal. It must be asked whether this apparent 
discrepancy is merely a creature of the Anglophone tradition, or a wider trend. 
...as an international human right 
The principle of legality has been considered by a number of the significant international 
and regional human rights bodies. Nonetheless, given the general importance of the concept, 
it has been litigated less than might be expected. Consideration by the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, for example, has been very straightforward. 1 0 1 Although it upholds quite a 
strict interpretation of the principle of legality, the simplicity of the definition seems to 
presuppose a purely legislative development of the law, rather than recognising the balance 
that ICL and other fields must strike between flexibility and fairness. 
In the leading cases of S.W. and C.R., the ECtHR had opportunity to consider more 
precisely this question, in the context of the common law. It held: 
However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, including criminal law, 
there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation 
of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, 
as in the other Convention states, the progressive development of the criminal law through judicial 
law-making is a well entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition. Article 7 [...] of the 
Convention cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability 
through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development is 
consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen. 1 0 2 
In rejecting the petition, the Court noted that 
The decisions of the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords did no more than continue a 
perceptible line of case-law development... [T]here was an evident evolution, which was 
consistent with the very essence of the offence, of the criminal law through judicial 
101 Castillo Petruzzi et al (IACtHR), 1999, para. 121. 
102 S. W. v. UK (ECtHR), 1995, para.36; C.R. v. UK (ECtHR), 1995, para.34. Also Streletz, Kessler & Krenz v. 
Germany ("Streletz v. Germany") (ECtHR), 2001, para.82. 
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interpretation... This evolution had reached a stage where judicial recognition of the [relevant law] 
had become a reasonably foreseeable development... 1 0 3 
In a nod to natural law/moral notions, the Court also added that "[t]he essentially debasing 
character of rape is so manifest that the result of the decisions of the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords [ . . . ] cannot be said to be at variance with the object and purpose of 
Article 7" . 1 0 4 Such an approach contradicts the 'strict' approach to legality—Boot observes 
that "arbitrary punishment cannot be atoned by moral judgment about the conduct 
concerned, as the principle of nullum crimen sine lege exactly protects against such 
weighing of interests"105—yet, as wi l l be demonstrated, it is a common resort for courts 
faced with hard cases. It is also true that Boot's criticism does not answer the point that a 
widespread and common moral understanding might provide the requisite warning of the 
wrongfulness of conduct—thus the likelihood of criminal sanction—and so may not be truly 
arbitrary in the first place. 
In a similar vein, the European Commission had noted some years earlier that: 
[The] constituent elements of an offence such as, e.g., the particular form of culpability required 
for its completion may not be essentially changed, at least not to the detriment of the accused, by 
the caselaw of the courts. On the other hand, it is not objectionable that the existing elements of 
the offence are clarified and adapted to new circumstances which can reasonably be brought under 
the original concept of the offence. 1 0 6 
The ECtHR has an established jurisprudence on the "quality of law". It has recognised that, 
in light of "the need to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing 
circumstances[,] many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser 
extent, are vague." 1 0 7 The law must be "accessible to the persons concerned and formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable them—if need be, with appropriate legal advice, to 
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given 
S.W. v. UK, para.43. 
Ibid, para.44. 
BoOT.(2002).op.cit., p. 177. 
XLtd. &Yv. UK (EComHR), 1982, para.9 
Cantoni v. France (ECtHR), 1996, para.31. 
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action may entail ." 1 0 8 However, the standard of foreseeability and accessibility is related to 
the legal context, depending "to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in 
issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is 
addressed."109 
The Human Rights Committee has been far more enigmatic. Retroactive criminal law is 
plainly prohibited by Article 15(1) of the ICCPR,U0 and there is good cause to believe that 
the prohibition o f excessive vagueness incorporated within the principle o f legality should 
be read in to the provision. 1 1 1 Indeed, the HRC has recently described Article 15 as "the 
principle of legality, i.e., the requirement [that] criminal liability [is] limited to clear and 
precise provisions in the law". 1 1 2 However, when confronted with such issues in individual 
communications, it appears to have gone to some lengths to avoid express, formal 
consideration o f the point. 
In 1992, the HRC was presented with a communication in which the author had been 
charged under relevant domestic legislation with holding a "public meeting" without prior 
notification. The author's submissions turned to a great extent on the "unacceptably broad" 
nature of this term. The Committee upheld violations o f Articles 19 (freedom of expression) 
and 21 (peaceful assembly) but dismissed the Article 15 claims on the basis that "no issues 
under this provision arise in the present case", even though they had previously been ruled 
admissible." 3 Dissenting to the decision on the merits, one Committee member drew 
attention to this "surprising" measure. Even so, despite rejecting the retroactivity argument 
on the merits, he failed to address the vagueness point ." 4 
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. UK (ECtHR), 1995, para.37; Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden (ECtHR), 
1992, para.75. 
1 0 9 Groppera Radio A G and Others v. Switzerland (ECtHR), 1990, para.68. 
1 1 0 Weinberger Weisz v. Uruguay (HRC), 1980, para. 16. 
1 1 1 E.g., CCPR Commentary, N O W A K , M , 1993, p.276; 77ie International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, JOSEPH, S., S C H U L T Z , J., & C A S T A N , M., 2004, pp.462, 475. See 
further Concluding Observations: Portugal (Macao) (HRC), 1999, para. 12: "The Committee is concerned at 
certain aspects of [the] law [...], namely the creation of a vague and insufficiently defined (or "abstract") 
offence..."; also Concluding Observations: Israel (HRC), 2003, para. 14; Concluding Observations: Estonia 
(HRC) , 2003,para.8. 
112 General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4) (HRC), 2001, para.7. 
113 Kivenmaa v. Finland (HRC), 1994, paras.2.1, 6.2, 8.3-8.4, 9.4, 10. 
114 Kivenmaa v. Finland, per Mr. Kurt Herndl (HRC), 1994, paras.4.1-4.2. 
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As Opsahl and de Zayas note, the HRC pronounces its views in an "economical" fashion, 
considering legal issues only to the extent demanded by the facts." 5 The extension of this 
general policy—"it is not its task to decide in the abstract whether or not a provision of 
national law is compatible with the Covenant""6—seems to be in tension with a fu l l reading 
of Article 15, which requires broad consideration as to the necessary quality of law. The 
outworking o f this dilemma seems evident in a case from 1996, in which the Committee 
declined to admit a communication which argued that a criminal provision was 
unforeseeably broad. It stated: 
...interpretation of domestic legislation is essentially a matter for the [domestic] courts. Since... 
the law in the present case was not interpreted [...] arbitrarily... the Committee considers that the 
communication is inadmissible."7 
It is clear that the concept of "'arbitrariness' is not to be equated with 'against the law', but 
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and 
lack of predictability."" 8 By resorting to a notion of arbitrary interpretation, the HRC was 
able to avoid the necessity of examining the clarity of the particular law while maintaining 
the formal principle that the law must be sufficiently certain for the guidance of a particular 
person's conduct. However, in reality, this is a very different issue from the question of 
whether the law itself is legitimate within the context of the principle of legality. 
This brief review of international (quasi-)judicial consideration of the principle o f legality 
suggests that the tension inherent in ICL has received serious consideration only from the 
ECtHR. Further, the Court's reference to the importance of context in assessing reasonable 
foreseeability and accessibility—and especially the nod towards questions of 'moral 
notice'—suggests that the approach of international human rights bodies to the principle of 
legality is in some respects looser than may be supposed. 
1 1 5 O P S A H L & DE ZAYAS.(1983).op.cit., p.242. 
1 1 6 E.g., Maclsaac v. Canada (HRC), 1982, para. 10. 
117 Kruyt-Amesz et al v. the Netherlands (HRC), 1996, para.4.2; Maroufidou v. Sweden (HRC), 1981, 
para. 10.1. 
Van Alphen v. the Netherlands (HRC), 1990, para.5.8. Also General Comment No. 16: the Right to Respect 
of Privacy (Article 17) (HRC), 1988, para.4. 
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The GDR border guards (or "Mauerschiitzen") cases offer an interesting range of 
perspectives on these issues. In the 1990s, various individuals from the former East 
Germany were indicted by the authorities o f the unified Germany for offences pertaining to 
the shooting of approximately 600 1 1 9 GDR citizens trying to cross into the West. 
Prosecutions were conducted by FRG courts, 1 2 0 applying the substantive law of the GDR 
insofar as it was compatible with the Basic Law {Grundgesetz).m Inter alia, the 
Grundgesetz commits the FRG to the rule of law, which includes the prohibition of legal 
vagueness and retroactivity. 1 2 2 The general defence was raised by the accused that their acts 
were not unlawful—in the GDR—at the time they were committed. This was arguable, both 
under municipal 1 2 3 and international law. 1 2 4 The German courts were thus presented with a 
new version of the Nuremberg dilemma: an apparent inconsistency between recognised 
international standards and enforceable national law, upon which the criminal responsibility 
of individuals depended.1 2 5 
Although international law was tangentially relevant in substantiating the courts' approach, 
the question was resolved domestically on the basis of German constitutional doctrine. 
Article 20 of the Grundgesetz provides that "[legislation shall be subject to the 
constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and justice". The 
Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) has interpreted the provision to mean that 
[t]he generally prevailing view implies the rejection of a narrow reliance upon [formally] enacted 
laws... Justice is not identical with the aggregate of the written laws. Under certain circumstances, 
law can exist beyond the positive norms which the state enacts—law which has its source in the 
' 1 9 'After the wall: the legal ramifications of the East German Border Guard trials in unified Germany,' 
G O O D M A N , M., 1996, pp.728, 733. C.f. 'Rejecting Radbruch: the [ECtHR] and the crimes of the East German 
leadership,' MILLER, R., 2001, p.655, fn.6. 
1 2 0 GOODMAN.(1996).op.cit., pp.756-765. 
121 Federal Republic of Germany—German Democratic Republic: Treaty on the Establishment of German 
Unity, 1990, Art.9. C.f 'What is just? The rule of law and natural law in the trials of former East German 
border guards,' A D A M S , K .A . , 1993, p.294. 
1 2 2 ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., p.280. See also Grundgesetz, Arts.20, 103(2). 
1 2 3 'Coming to terms with the East German border guards cases,' GABRIEL, M.J., 2000, pp.390-391; 
GoODMAN.(1996).op.cit., pp.745-749; ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., pp.291-293. Further, 'Freedom of movement,' 
BRUNNER, G. , in Before Reforms: Human Rights in the Warsaw Pact States 1971-1988, BRUNNER, G. , ET AL 
(eds.), 1990, p.217, cited in ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., p.285, fn.60. 
1 2 4 ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., pp.284-285. It is arguable that the shootings amounted to a violation of obligations 
under the ICCPR (Art. 12(2)) but such violations do not automatically entail individual criminal responsibility. 
1 2 5 GOODMAN.(l996).op.cit., pp.742-744; 'Unjust laws, human rights, and the German Constitution: 
Germany's recent confrontation with the past,' HERDEGEN, M., 1995, pp.591-592. 
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constitutional legal order as a meaningful, all-embracing system, and which functions as a 
corrective of the written norms.. . 1 2 6 
The general preference for legal certainty limits this doctrine to "gross and evident 
violations of elementary justice". 1 2 7 The most notable formulation was struck by Radbruch, 
who suggested that an "unjust law" cannot be upheld where the conflict with justice is so 
intolerable as to make its invalidity necessary.128 The approach is inescapably subjective, 1 2 9 
but is characterised more as a doctrine of "natural injustice (Unrecht)" rather than "natural 
law (Recht)" proper. 1 3 0 Nonetheless, such reasoning has been described as the self-
destruction of legal positivism. 1 3 1 
In a number of guises (express and impl ic i t ) , 1 3 2 this formula was used by the German courts 
to uphold the convictions o f relevant individuals. 1 3 3 In a leading case, the Federal Court of 
Justice (BGH) found itself able to apply the GDR law but only on a narrow basis, drastically 
limiting the apparent justification for the relevant shoot-to-kill incidents. 1 3 4 In so doing, as 
Herdegen notes, 
...the Court invoked the international commitments of the G D R and resorted to a rather strained 
understanding of the East German constitution. These considerations weighed more heavily in the 
Court's reasoning than did the normative reality of the East German regime. In short, it seems fair 
to call the Federal Court's judgment an example of natural law jurisprudence disguised as 
enlightened positivism. 1 3 5 
Although an instinctively laudable approach in moral terms, it seems difficult to reconcile 
with a strict application of the principle of legality. Nonetheless, it was upheld by the 
BVerfG, which reasoned that the German conception of the rule of law (which, as noted 
1 2 6 ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., pp.299-300. 
1 2 7 HERDEGEN.(1995).op.cit, p.599. 
1 2 8 'Gesetzliches Recht und iibergesetzlichcs Unrecht,' RADBRUCH, G. , 1946, p. 107, cited ibid. 
1 2 9 HERDEGEN.(1995).op.cit., p.600. 
1 3 0 GABRlEL.(2000).op.cit., p.406. 
1 3 1 'The self-destruction of legal positivism,' GOLDSWORTHY, J.D., 1990, pp.485^486. 
1 3 2 MlLLER.(2001).op.cit., pp.657-658. 
133 See, e.g., ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., pp.297-298, 314. For an alternative general summary of the Landgericht, 
B G H and BVerfG decisions, see Streletz v. Germany, paras.65, 19-20, 22. 
n * GABRIEL.(2000).op.cit., pp.394-395; HERDEGEN.(1995).op.cit„ pp.600-602. 
1 3 5 HERDEGEN.(1995).op.cit., p.602. See also 'The German border guard cases and international human rights,' 
GEIGER, R., 1998, pp.544-545. 
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above, embodies the concept of substantive justice) presupposes a democratic and 
substantially just society. In the GDR, this was not the case: its law as traditionally 
interpreted thus created a conflict between the positive laws of the FRG (which sought to 
apply it) and the notion of justice itself. Accordingly, a novel reading of the law to uphold 
convictions was in fact a vindication of the rule of law, not an attack upon i t . 1 3 6 The echo of 
the IMT's reasoning almost f i f ty years before ("so far from it being unjust to punish [ . . . ] , it 
would be unjust i f [the] wrong were allowed to go unpunished" 1 3 7) is unmistakable. 
This strand of litigation illustrates, therefore, a number of themes. From the silence of the 
various courts on the subject, it must be assumed that they saw a natural law conception of 
ex ante guidance, rather than a positive law one, as entirely sufficient, or at least that the two 
are complementary. Although the interpretation of the GDR law may have been legally 
defensible, it could hardly have been predicted at the time the shootings took place. 
In 2001, the ECtHR Grand Chamber upheld the legality o f the border guards convictions, 
but supposedly on the basis of a "different approach". 1 3 8 It has been suggested that this 
rather studied distinction was based more on an awareness of the "broader socio-political 
implications of the case"1 3 9 than legal factors—although, i f that is correct, it is passing 
strange that the ECtHR was more concerned on these lines than the German courts 
themselves. 
The Court (rightly) took care to emphasise the relevance of its holding in S.W.: in 
examining the compatibility of the German decisions with ECHR Article 7(1), its mission 
was to consider whether the "applicants' acts, at the [relevant] time [ . . . ] , constituted 
offences defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability by the law of the GDR or 
international law." 1 4 0 The case thus represents an unparalleled opportunity to measure the 
Court's approach to the application of the S. W. standard. 
1 3 6 E.g., GABRlEL.(2000).op.cit., pp.409-411. 
137 Goering (IMT), p.39. 
138 Streletz v. Germany, para.65. 
1 3 9 MlLLER.(2001).op.cit., pp.661-663. 
M 0 Streletz v. Germany, paras.50-52. 
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Undertaking a close scrutiny of GDR law, the Court discerned a requirement for the 
proportional use of force. 1 4 1 Even accepting this finding arguendo, it seems hard to escape 
Rudolfs conclusion that "[t]he Court's approach involved not just a simple change in the 
interpretation of GDR law, but rather the creation of new law." 1 4 2 Noting that border 
shootings were not prosecuted under the GDR, the Court nonetheless emphasised that the 
controlling question was the degree to which the criminal nature of the offence—not the fact 
of prosecution—was foreseeable to the applicants, who were all senior members of the 
National Defence Council. The Court rejected the applicants' argument for unforeseeability 
on the basis that "[t]he broad divide between the GDR's legislation and its practice was to a 
great extent the work of the applicants themselves":143 "according to the general principles 
of law, defendants are not entitled to justify the conduct which has given rise to their 
conviction simply by showing that such conduct did in fact take place and therefore formed 
a practice." 1 4 4 It continued: 
The Court, accordingly, takes the view that the applicants, who, as leaders of the GDR, had 
created the appearance of legality emanating from the GDR's legal system but then implemented 
or continued a practice which flagrantly disregarded the very principles of that system, cannot 
plead the protection of Article 7(1) of the Convention. 1 4 5 
The judgment hardly settles the issue, however. In basing its ruling on the fact that the 
appellants could not rely upon the un-foreseeability of prosecutions which they themselves 
were preventing (an elegant side-step), it does not explain how prosecution was foreseeable 
for the 85 or so other individuals (primarily of junior rank) who were also convicted 
(admittedly with light sentences). The law, as perceived by them, was derived as much from 
experience as statute, and they played no part in the policy of non-prosecution. The Court 
was, of course, not mandated to consider this implication—the other convicts were not 
parties to the ECtHR application—but it remains nonetheless. 
The foreseeability point for low-ranking individuals was considered in the companion 
judgment in K-H.W. v. Germany. Applying identical reasoning with regard to the 
141 Ibid., paras.56-64. 
1 4 2 'International decisions,' RUDOLF, B., 2001, p.909. 
143 Streletz v. Germany, para.78. 
144 Ibid., para.74. 
145 Ibid., para.88. 
23 
substantive content of GDR criminal l aw, 1 4 6 the Court acknowledged that the applicant's 
capacity to foresee the risk that he was committing a criminal conviction was at least 
sufficiently in doubt to merit fu l l consideration. It noted his youth, his indoctrination, his 
orders, and the risk of military prosecution or investigation i f individuals succeeded in 
crossing the border on his watch. 1 4 7 Nonetheless, it upheld his conviction by the German 
courts. This finding seems to have been based primarily on the fact that the relevant, written 
criminal provisions were published and publicly accessible, and that "even a private soldier 
could not show total, blind obedience to orders which flagrantly infringed not only the 
GDR's own legal principles but also internationally recognised human rights". 1 4 8 The first 
of these arguments does not seem sound—although the relevant legal provisions were 
published, the broad interpretation placed on the relevant justification for border shootings 
was also well known. Given the ECtHR's own jurisprudence that the evolutionary 
development of the written law is in principle permissible, it seems wrong to require the 
applicant to have come to an independent assessment of the merits of the law as applied (or, 
more precisely, as not applied) in the face of what seemed a decisive interpretation, albeit 
executive rather than judicial. Judges Barreto, 1 4 9 Pellonpaa and Zupancic, 1 5 0 dissenting, 
upheld a violation of Article 7(1) on this basis. Judges Bratza and Vajic also seemed to 
share these misgivings (as did the BVerfG); they concurred with the majority with regard 
only to the second argument. 1 5 1 In the BVerfG's words "the killing [was] such a dreadful 
and wholly unjustifiable act that it must have been immediately apparent and obvious even 
to an indoctrinated person that it breached the principle of proportionality and the 
elementary prohibition on the taking of human life." In essence, therefore, despite the 
different outward manifestation o f its reasoning, the ECtHR too could only find a 
sustainable solution via a natural law approach. 
It should be noted that, in both cases, the ECtHR had also considered whether, at the 
relevant time, the applicants' acts constituted offences defined with sufficient accessibility 
H 6 K-H.W. v. Germany (ECtHR), 2001, paras.44-67. 
147 Ibid., para.71. 
1 4 8 Ibid., paras.73, 75-79. The Court's observation (para.74) that in voluntarily enlisting, he "ran the risk" of 
committing an unlawful shooting seems to be off point: that argument only stands if it could be otherwise 
shown that the criminal offence was foreseeable. 
1 4 9 Ibid., per Judge Barreto. 
1 5 0 Ibid., per Judges Pellonpaa & Zupancic. 
151 Ibid., per Judges Bratza & Vajic. 
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and foreseeability "under international law, particularly the rules of international law on the 
protection of human rights". 1 5 2 Citing to the UDHR, ICCPR, and one bilateral treaty, 1 5 3 the 
Court considered that a violation o f international law sufficient for state responsibility was 
proven. It found that these provisions sufficiently defined an offence for which an individual 
may be held responsible on the simple basis that: 
Even supposing that such responsibility cannot be inferred from the above-mentioned international 
instruments on the protection of human rights, it may be deduced from those instruments when 
they are read together with Article 95 of the GDR's Criminal Code, which explicitly provided... 
that individual criminal responsibility was to be borne by those who violated the GDR's 
international obligations or human rights and fundamental freedoms.1 5 4 
I f this finding was genuinely intended, as the sub-title and introduction suggested, to 
establish a crime under international law, the Court applied a markedly relaxed approach. 1 5 5 
Further, if—as the judgments purport—it was such a simple matter to establish criminality 
under GDR law in this manner, it seems hard to understand why this argument was not 
accorded greater priority. The minimal consideration given to subjective foreseeability in 
this context—the junior ranking soldiers, after all, were not necessarily more likely to have 
thought along these lines than they were to have so interpreted domestic law—leaves open 
the possibility that the ECtHR construe the S. W. standards even more loosely for crimes 
under ICL than domestic law. 
In 2003, the HRC was also required to consider the approach taken by the BGH et al. In a 
typically concise opinion, it did not engage directly with the mechanics of the domestic 
decisions but upheld the (effectively retroactive) reading of the proportionality requirement 
into GDR law in the context of the GDR's international obligations. As the Border Act was 
itself legally established at the relevant time, it dismissed the petitioner's application under 
ICCPR Article 15. 1 5 6 It further hedged its bets by finding that the "disproportionate use of 
1 5 2 Streletz v. Germany, para.9I, emphasis added; K-H.W. v. Germany, para.93. 
1 5 3 Streletz v. Germany, paras.92-103; K-H. W. v. Germany, paras.94-101. 
Streletz v. Germany, para. 104; K-H.W. v. Germany, para. 103. 
1 5 5 FLETCHER/OHLlN.(2005).op.cit., pp.543-544. In both Streletz and K-H.W., Judge Loucaides acknowledged 
the ambiguity in the majority opinion, and argued that the policy operative in the G D R amounted to murder as 
a crime against humanity, as defined in orthodox 1CL. Also Streletz v. Germany, perJudge Levits. 
1 5 6 Baumgarten v. Germany (HRC), 2003, para.9.5. 
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lethal force" was in fact criminal under the law of nations at the relevant t ime, 1 5 7 paving the 
way (although superfluously) for reliance on the exception in Article 15(2). 1 5 8 
This line of decisions illustrates the tensions that remain in measuring the principle of 
legality in cases of this nature. Although the German courts, the ECtHR, and the HRC all 
upheld the importance and relevance of the principle, the decisions reflect the degree to 
which practical solutions represent compromises. Outwardly different in their reasoning, the 
core conclusions o f all three bodies are the same: either, that there is an exception to the 
principle of legality for prosecutions brought under ICL (which, it is suggested, should be 
doubted, i f only for policy reasons), or that 'moral notice' of criminality in fact satisfies the 
principle of legality, even when the entire panoply of the state suggests otherwise. Even i f 
one fundamentally disagrees with both these conclusions, the fact that none of these 
prestigious bodies could come up with better is telling. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, when presented with an analogous issue, demonstrated 
that there is a school of thought still committed to a strict interpretation of legality, even for 
the most emotive crimes. Nonetheless, it recognised what may be termed the "paradox of 
the 'revolution of the rule of law'" (the basic principle of law is certainty, yet the principle 
of substantive justice is the law's raison d'etre):lS9 in reality, weighing the principle of 
legality in the context of ICL is as much a policy choice as a legal one. 
This observation—and the Hungarian and German decisions themselves—perhaps reflects 
the extent to which decisions of this nature are socially and politically situated. The two 
countries have taken different approaches to the transition from periods of state-perpetrated 
crime: criminal prosecution has formed the principal element of the latter's approach 
whereas it forms a subsidiary part of the former's. The fact that the approaches adopted by 
the German and Hungarian courts reflect these broader social trends may be no coincidence. 
That said, the Hungarian court's strict adherence to the principle of legality cannot be 
explained solely on the basis of the country's general inclination to make a break with the 
157 Ibid, para.9.4. 
1 5 8 Pp.30-31 .infra. 
1 5 9 'Paradoxes in the revolution of the rule of law,' T E I T E L , R., 1994, p.240. 
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past: the same forces were marked in Poland and the Czech Republic, yet their 
Constitutional Courts reached the opposite conclusion. 1 6 0 
In sum, although the foreseeability/core notice principle is well established, even those 
bodies charged with protecting human rights have found the tensions raised in ICL 
prosecutions difficult to resolve. In their tacit reliance on the concept of 'moral notice', they 
seem to have reached a similar conclusion to Justice Gonthier but by stealth, rather than 
with his commendable straightforwardness. 
...as applied in I C L 
At whatever level it is applied, there is even some doubt about whether the principle applies 
to ICL at all or, i f it does, applies in the same way. ICCPR Article 15 and ECHR Article 7 
are typically interpreted as establishing the absolute nature of the rule in the initial 
paragraph, and supplementing it in the second paragraph (perhaps superfluously) with an 
exclusion o f the lex scripta principle. 1 6 1 However, there is a rival view. 
Juratowich suggests that the provisions establish 
only a prima facie prohibition on retroactive criminal liability [...], whereby the conviction must 
accord with national or international law at the time of commission, but subject to an exception 
[...] that 'nothing [shall] prevent' a conviction which accords with recognized general principles 
of law, whether or not the law on which the conviction is founded is retroactive or not. 1 6 2 
By 'general principle of law', he means not just the formal source specified in Article 
38(1 )(c) of the ICJ Statute but also customary international law. 1 6 3 He suggests that this 
view is preferable interpretatively and normatively. In this regard, it is interesting to note 
1 6 0 Criminal Law in Reaction to Slate Crime—Comparative Insights into Transitional Processes: A Project 
Report, ESER, A . , ARNOLD, J., & K R E I C K E R , H . , trans. S I L V E R M A N , E . , 2002, pp.6-7, 14-15. 
1 6 1 NoWAK.(1993).op.cit., pp.276-281. 
1 6 2 JURATOWICH.(2004).op.cit., pp.340-341. Further BoOT.(2002).op.cit., pp. 177-178; 'Crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind and the recalcitrant third state,' T O M U S C H A T , C , in War Crimes in 
International Law, DiNSTEIN, Y . , & T A B O R Y , M. (EDS ), 1996, p.52; 'Nulla poena sine lege in English criminal 
law,' SPENCER, J .R. , in The Cambridge-Tilburg Law Lectures, MARKESIN1S, B . S . , & W i L L E M S , J . H . M . (cds.), 
Vol. 3, 1980, p.35. 
1 6 3 JURATOWICH.(2004).op.cit., p.339. 
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that Geiger considered the German courts' reasoning in the border guards cases to be 
compatible with these provisions. 1 6 4 Mantovani also seems to believe that the ICCPRIECHR 
standards are weak, suggesting that Article 22 of the ICC Statute establishes a higher 
standard of protection. 1 6 5 
In this context, it is interesting to note the statement in the U K Manual on the Law of Armed 
Conflict that "[i]gnorance of the law is no excuse, but i f the law is unclear or controversial, 
an accused should be given the benefit of that lack of clarity by the award of a lesser or 
nominal punishment." 1 6 6 Going rather beyond the ambit of the relevant international rule 
(which provides only for the exclusion of responsibility in certain circumstances1 6 7), this 
clearly illustrates that the UK, at least, accepts a degree o f uncertainty in the evolution of 
international humanitarian law, and does not regard it as an absolute bar to liability. 
It is nonetheless clear, whatever its origin, that a commitment to the principle of legality has 
evolved in ICL. Cassese identifies two distinct legal traditions ("substantive justice", 
placing the principle of legality in tension with social values, and "strict legality", 
privileging the principle of legality) in the evolution o f the law. Placing most modern 
democracies in the latter category, he suggests that ICL has only been able to adopt a 
similar approach in its more fully-systematised, post-1993 renaissance.168 Although the 
broad trend he discerns in consideration of the principle of legality may be correct, it is 
suggested that the distinction between the two traditions remains far murkier, 1 6 9 both in ICL 
and in domestic jurisdictions. 1 7 0 
For the past 60 years, defendants have relied heavily on the principle of legality to contest 
the jurisdiction of various tribunals. 1 7 1 However, for much of this period, the argument has 
I M GElGER.(1999).op.cit., pp.548-549. 
1 6 5 MANTOVANI.(2003).op.cit., p.30. He seems to ignore the possible effect of Article 22(3) in saving the law 
which forms the exception in Article 15(2): CARACClOLO.(1999).op.cit., pp.231-232. C.f. 
FLETCHER/OHLIN.(2005).op.cit., p.552. 
1 6 6 Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict, U K MINISTRY OF D E F E N C E , 2005, p.443. 
1 6 7 ICC Statute, Art.32; WERLE.(2005).op.cit., pp. 151-152 
1 6 8 CASSESE.(2003).op.cit., pp. 139-145. 
1 6 9 E.g., '"Unless otherwise provided": Article 30 of the I C C Statute and the mental element of crimes under 
[ I C L ] , ' W E R L E , G . , & JESSBERGER, F . , 2005, p.46; PELLET.(2002).op.cit., p. 1058. 
1 7 0 C.f. FLETCHER/OHLlN.(2005).op.cit., p.552. 
1 7 1 E.g., inter alia, Eck (UK), 1945, pp.4, 8, 10, 12, 15; Klinge (Norway), 1946, pp.2^, 6-11, 13-14; Buck 
(UK), 1946, p.44; Goering (IMT); Flick (NMT), pp.32-39; Araki ( I M T F E ) , 1948; Ranter (Netherlands), 1949, 
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been avoided rather than confronted; 1 7 2 the general trend of judicial responses has been to 
deny that any legal uncertainty existed, or even to deny the relevance in the circumstances 
of the legality principle at all. Decisions which have explored the true extent of the 
guarantee of legal 'certainty', and then assessed their own practice in that context, have 
been few and far between. 
As early as 1944, Lauterpacht acknowledged the legality argument but rapidly dismissed it: 
the very fact that a prosecution arose from international law was sufficient to immunize it 
from a charge o f "vindictive retroactivity". 1 7 3 The I M T , considering "that the maxim nullum 
crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle o f justice", 
stressed that "in [the] circumstances the attacker must [have] know[n] that he [wa]s doing 
wrong". 1 7 4 The N M T took a broadly similar approach, 1 7 5 although also hinting that—by its 
largely customary and uncodified nature—international law is in any event exempt from the 
strict principle. It is striking that these two basic arguments continue to underpin, 
expressly or tacitly, almost all subsequent examinations of the issue. 
Similarly, the German Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone, anticipating the 
reasoning of the Mauerschiitzen cases f i f ty years later, held that: 
Retroactive punishment is unjust when the action, at the time of its commission, falls foul not only 
of a positive rule of criminal law, but also of the moral law. This is not the case for crimes against 
humanity. In the view of any morally-oriented person, serious injustice was perpetrated, the 
punishment of which would have been a legal obligation of the State. The subsequent cure of such 
dereliction of a duty through retroactive punishment is in keeping with justice. This. . . does not 
pp.118-123; Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 139-141; 
Tadic.TJ, paras.557, 623; Aleksovski.AJ, paras. 126-127; Delalic.AJ, paras. 157-158, 174, 179; Kordic.AJ, 
paras.44, 46, 117, 296-305, 310-313; Stakic.AJ, paras.99-103, 302, 313-317, 322, 396, 398. 
7 2 'Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege in I C L , ' L A M B , S., in C A S S E S E ETAL.(2002).op.cit., p.739. 
1 7 3 'The law of nations and the punishment of war crimes,' L A U T E R P A C H T , H., [1944] 11 BYIL 58, 65-67. 
1 7 4 Goering (IMT), pp.38-39. 
1 7 5 Altstoetter (NMT), pp.974-979; OWe«rfor/(NMT), p.459. It should be noted, however, that the NMT—at 
least in some decisions—directed itself to an appropriate (even progressive) formulation of the legality 
principle: von Leeb (NMT), p.510. 
1 7 6 In Altstoetter, the NMT considered it "sheer absurdity" to apply the legality principle to international law, a 
field so heavily dependent on custom. However, this view was consciously predicated on the (now incorrect) 
assumption that it similarly does not apply to the common law: see generally Altstoetter (NMT), pp.974-975; 
Ohlendorf(NM7), p.458; Flick (NMT), p. 1189; Krupp (NMT), p. 1331. 
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entail any violation of legal security but rather the re-establishment of its basis and 
presuppositions.177 
These decisions did not receive critical consideration in the post-war years. Indeed, they 
tended to be further entrenched by the actions of a number of national courts (and 
legislatures) who chose to apply retroactive legislation on the further justification of the 
"extraordinary" nature of Nazi crimes. For example, justifying the retroactive Nazis and 
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, which it acknowledged to be "fundamentally 
different in its characteristics, in the legal and moral principles underlying it, and in its 
spirit", the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals, stated: 
What is the reason for all this? Only one answer is possible: the circumstances in which the crimes 
were committed were extraordinary, and therefore it was only right and proper that this Law, its 
application, employment, and the purpose which the State had in mind in enacting it—that these 
too should be extraordinary.178 
Some years later, the Israeli courts had further opportunity to recall the comparatively 
sounder argument that, since the prohibited acts were "crimes under the law of all civilised 
nations", the statute did not impermissibly create new crimes but merely gave "reality to the 
dictates of elementary justice". 1 7 9 The U.S. District Court took the same view in 
Demjanjnk.m Australia was among other countries to take steps,181 as Green minimally 
describes it, "to introduce a new nomenclature for long recognized offences" 1 8 2 
In Finta,m a 4-3 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, both minority and majority 
concurred that crimes against humanity were not themselves retroactive in 1944 or 
impermissibly vague. Although the minority opinion articulated what might be the best 
view against retroactivity (that crimes against humanity were unlawful by virtue of the 
'Case against Bl . ' , Judgment, in Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes fiir die Britische Zone in 
Strafsachen (1950), Vol. 1, p. 5, unofficial translation cited in LAMB.(2004).op.cit., p.738. 
1 7 8 Honigman v. Attorney-General (Israel), p.543. 
1 7 9 See Eichmann v. Attorney-General (Israel), 36 ILR 5, pp.22-23; 36 ILR 277, p.281. Also 'The maxim 
nullum crimen sine lege and the Eichmann trial,' G R E E N , L . C . , 1962, pp.461, 471. 
1 8 0 In the matter of the Extradition of John Demjanjuk (US), 1985, p.567. 
181 War Crimes Act 1945 (Australia), as amended; Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth of Australia and Another 
(Australia), 1991. 
1 8 2 GREEN.(1962).op.cit., p.461. 
1 8 3 R. v. Finta [\994] 1 S.C.R. 701. 
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'general principles of law' common to the nations), it continued to note that the prohibited 
conduct "is considered so obviously morally culpable that it verges on being malum in se". 
By and large, although there is a line of these early decisions evidencing a 'substantive 
justice' approach, there is also a strong line o f jurisprudence which acknowledges the 
principle of legality but considers its demands met by natural law or 'moral notice' . 1 8 4 It is 
notable that even committed positivists had occasion to fall back to something akin to this 
approach. 
References to the principle of legality, including a prohibition of vagueness in some 
186 
measure, certainly litter the jurisprudence of the ICTY/R: it cannot be doubted that the 
tribunals are committed—in formal terms—to compliance. Indeed, the Delalic Trial 
Chamber recognised the principle of legality as "fundamental" to the notion of 
"criminali ty". 1 8 7 However, it acknowledged that the extent to which the principle operates in 
international legal practice is uncertain, and suggested that a sui generis approach must be 
adopted, distinctive for the balance it strikes "between the preservation of justice and 
fairness to the accused and... the preservation o f world order". In mapping the contours of 
the relevant approach, the Chamber held that regard should be had, inter alia, to the nature 
of international law and the absence of international legislation. 1 8 8 It then went on to set out 
rules of strict construction and non-retroactivity in the interpretation of criminal statutes or 
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other written instruments. Interestingly, other Chambers have drawn their own 
conclusions as to the appropriate outworking of these principles. In Stakic, for example, the 
Chamber noted merely that it would "interpret any relevant convention in conformity with 
the general rules of interpretation of treaties set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the [ V C L T ] " , 1 9 0 
an approach not necessarily so strict. 
ADAMS.(1993).op.cit., p.279. 
1 8 5 'Will the judgment in the Nuremberg trial constitute a precedent in international law?' K E L S E N , H. , 1947, 
p.165. Further 'Kelsen's contribution to I C L , ' G A T T I N I , A., 2004, pp.797, 800-801, 808. 
1 8 6 BoOT.(2002).op.cit., pp.176, 305. 
1 8 7 Delalic.TJ, para.402. 
1 8 8 Delalic.TJ, paras.403, 405. 
1 8 9 Delalic.TJ, paras.408-418. 
mStakic.TJ, para.411. 
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In Aleksovski, the Appeals Chamber established that the principle o f legality does not 
preclude the evolution of the elements of a crime through a process of 
interpretation/clarification. 1 9 1 Similarly, in applying the law, the approach of the ICTY/R 
judges may be characterised as an examination not of whether a particular set of 
circumstances was ever concretely recognized by the existing law, but whether those 
circumstances fall reasonably within the law's scope.1 9 2 In Judge Shahabuddeen's words, 
since an interpretation of the law is not an extension of that law but a statement of what that 
law has always meant, no question arises of any violation of [ . . . ] nullum crimen sine lege." 
For himself, he suggests that the principle protects only those who reasonably believed their 
conduct lawful, not as a shield from latter legal formulations for those who nonetheless 
knew at the time that they committed some sort of crime. 1 9 3 
Nonetheless, in Vasiljevic, the Trial Chamber had applied the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to 
require that: 
...the Trial Chamber must further satisfy itself that the criminal conduct in question was 
sufficiently defined and was sufficiently accessible at the relevant time for it to warrant a criminal 
conviction and sentencing under the criminal heading chosen by the Prosecution... From the 
perspective of the nullum crimen sine lege principle, it would be wholly unacceptable for a Trial 
Chamber to convict an accused person on the basis of a prohibition which, taking into account the 
specificity of customary international law and allowing for the gradual clarification of the rules of 
criminal law, is either insufficiently precise to determine conduct and distinguish the criminal 
from the permissible, or was not sufficiently accessible at the relevant time. A criminal conviction 
should indeed never be based upon a norm which an accused could not reasonably have been 
aware of at the time of the acts, and this norm must make it sufficiently clear what act or omission 
could engage his criminal responsibility.1 9 4 
191 Aleksovski.AJ, para. 127. 
1 9 2 Stakic.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.35-36, 39; Karemera, Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals—Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (hereinafter "Karemera JCE Decision"), para. 15; Karemera, Decision on the Preliminary 
Motions by the Defence of Joseph Nzirorera, Edouard Karemera, Andre Rwamakuba and Mathieu 
Ngirumpatsc Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Joint Criminal Enterprise, 2004, paras. 15, 37, 43-44; 
Hadzihasanovic/Kubura, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command 
Responsibility ("Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal"), para. 12. C.f. 'Revival of customary 
humanitarian law,' M E R O N , T . , 2005, pp.824-826; METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p. 18; 'Presentation de la Heme 
partie,' CONDORELLI, L . , in Droit international penal, ASCENSIO, H., D E C A U X , E . , & P E L L E T , A. (eds.), 2000, 
p.246. 
9 3 Stakic.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.67-68. Also Semanza, [Appellate] Decision, per Judge 
Shahabuddeen, para.21. Further MANTOVANl.(2003).op.cit., pp.28-29. 
m Vasiljevic.TJ,p&ra.m. 
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Under no circumstances, it continued, "may the court create new criminal offences after the 
act charged... by giving a definition to a crime which had none so fa r" 1 9 5 In assessing 
whether an offence is defined with sufficient clarity under international law, it examined the 
extent to which its "general nature, its criminal character and its approximate gravity" were 
foreseeable.196 
On the facts, however, the decision was as much illustrative of what not to do. Given the 
narrow view it took of the relevant state practice, the Chamber acquitted the defendants 
from the charge of doing "violence to life and person" but convicted them (for the same 
conduct) of "inhumane acts", an offence which it regarded as better established in law. As 
Judge Cassese has separately observed, this reasoning reflected a preoccupation with the 
legal nomenclature of the offence rather than the nature of the conduct actually prohibited 
under the law. This had the ironic result that a less apposite conviction was in fact entered 1 9 7 
and may have contributed to the decision's limited following. 
Indeed, the ICTY has not been entirely averse to the development of criminal offences 
through unwritten sources of law. The Appeals Chamber did precisely this in Vujin when it 
confirmed the existence of a general offence of 'contempt' to give effect to its "inherent 
jurisdiction" to safeguard its judicial functions. 1 9 8 Although the RPE provided notice that 
certain conduct was punishable as 'contempt', 1 9 9 the Appeals Chamber upheld a much 
broader "inherent power... to [punish] those who knowingly and wi l fu l ly interfere with 
[the] administration of justice". 2 0 0 This formulation, arguably uncertain in its scope, was 
only introduced shortly after the commencement of the period in which the alleged 
misconduct occurred. 2 0 1 It was correctly stressed that the RPE are not a statutory enactment, 
and thus not the source of obligation, as the judges who adopted them possess no legislative 
power. 2 0 2 Thus, not only was the substantive law drawn from more or less inaccessible 
Vasiljevic. TJ, para. 196. 
6 Vasiljevic. TJ, para.201. See also Galic. TJ, per Judge Nieto-Navia, para. 111. 
7 'Black letter lawyering v. constructive interpretation,' C A S S E S E , A., 2004, pp.272-273. 
8 Tadic, Vujin Contempt Judgment, paras.12-15. 
9 Ibid., paras. 19-23. 
0 Ibid., paras.27-29. 
1 Ibid., para.20. 
2 Ibid., para.24. 
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sources, there was arguably not even core notice in the Statute of the Tribunal's jurisdiction 
to punish such conduct. 
In Furundzija, a relatively relaxed approach was also taken. Confronted with the need to 
give a legal classification to the act of enforced oral sex, the Trial Chamber relied on 
general principles of l aw 2 0 3 to conclude that it fell within the definition of rape. It relied on 
two assertions of principle to forestall any claim that this finding violated the principle of 
legality. 2 0 4 First, it found that as the act in question was necessarily criminal under any of 
the possible classifications, the accused did not lack notice that their intended conduct 
violated criminal law. Although they may have failed to appreciate the stigma of the 
particular offence for which they were to be convicted, the Chamber clearly assumed that 
the basic criminal nature of the conduct was far more significant than its legal classification. 
Rather clumsily, the Chamber also sought to apply the "fundamental principle of human 
dignity"—whether this was a justification for acknowledged retroactivity (the substantive 
justice argument) or a recognition of moral turpitude (the core notice argument) is unclear. 
In its Ojdanic decision, the Appeals Chamber expressly applied the reasoning in S. W. to a 
challenge to the legality of the JCE doctrine. 2 0 5 However, it refrained from engaging too 
closely with the high-water mark of Vasiljevic: in considering the indicia of foreseeability, 
like many of the courts discussed above, it required only that the accused was reasonably on 
notice of the risk of violating the law, and placed heavy emphasis on the role of moral 
notice. 2 0 7 Similarly, in the Hadzihasanovic decisions, it was emphasised that an individual 
need only recognise the potential criminality of their conduct, not appreciate its legal quality 
or relative culpability. 
The approach of the ICTY/R is thus neatly summed up in the words o f Judge 
Shahabuddeen: in matters concerning the principle of legality, it is the "very essence" of the 
Furundzija. TJ, paras. 177-178. 
2 0 4 Ibid., para. 184. C.f. FLETCHER/OHL[N.(2005).op. cit., p.551. 
2 0 5 Ojdanic JCE Decision, paras.37-39. 
2 0 6 para.41. 
2 0 7 Ibid., para.42. C.f. Fofana, Decision, per Judge Robertson, 2004, para.3. 
2 0 8 Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal, para.34; Hadzihasanovic, Decision on Joint Challenge to 
Jurisdiction, 2002, para.62; also Delalic.AJ, paras. 179-180; Delalic.TJ, para.313. 
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offence which governs. Providing that the accused had core notice of that essence— 
which may very often be satisfied in the Tribunals' opinion by the fundamental nature o f the 
norms allegedly breached—the principle of legality is likely to be considered to be met. 
This conclusion raises the question whether the principle of legality must apply to 
attribution doctrines at all. After all, it could be reasoned that—provided the accused was 
aware that their conduct was sufficiently associated with the commission of the criminal 
'essence'—the mechanism by which their liability is assessed is one of those legal details 
which has been held irrelevant. 
...as applied to the attribution of responsibility 
It has been clearly stated that the principle of legality applies not just to the definition of a 
substantive offence, but to all the (inculpatory and exculpatory) elements that determine 
l iabi l i ty . 2 1 0 The ICTR Appeals Chamber has held that " i t would be both unnecessary and 
unfair to hold an accused responsible under a head of responsibility which has not been 
clearly defined in [ I C L ] " 2 " and the ICTY Appeals Chamber expressly predicates its 
jurisdiction over a mode of liability on the particular doctrine's foreseeability and 
accessibility. 2 1 2 On the other hand, in addition to the dicta previously discussed (particularly 
from Hadzihasanovic) specifying that legal detail is not required to satisfy the principle of 
legality, 2 1 3 it is also striking that when the ICTY rejected the Stakic co-perpetration 
doctrine, it was not done on the basis of the principle of legality but on criticism of the law 
itself. 2 1 4 The application of the principle of legality thus seems to depend upon the extent to 
which attribution doctrines genuinely represent an interface between the individual and their 
awareness of the criminal 'essence'. 
To this end, Boot concludes that ICL, at least as applied by the ICTY/R, "does not always" 
meet the criterion of foreseeability required by the principle of legality. Although he 
acknowledges the argument that 'core notice' of international crimes has been hard to deny 
2 0 9 SHAHABUDDEEN.(2004).op.cit., p. 1017. 
2 1 0 FLETCHER.(2000).op.cit., p.529. 
2 1 1 Bagilishema.AJ, para.34; also Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, para.202. 
2 1 2 Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.21. 
2 1 3 A l s o JURATOWlCH.(2004).op.cit., p.339. 
2 1 4 Stakic.AJ, para.62. 
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for some decades,215 he highlights the role o f the various attribution doctrines in obscuring 
the legal consequences of their actions from individuals. 2 1 6 Such a view indicates his belief 
that these doctrines should thus be regulated by the legality principle, as they materially 
alter an individual's core notice of potential criminality. 
Interestingly, however, Boot reasons that Article 22 of the ICC Statute does not 
straightforwardly extend to Article 25, the provision concerning modes of liability. He 
writes, slightly ambiguously, 
The Statutory provision in Article 22, containing nullem crimen sine lege, does not concern Article 
25 containing provisions on individual criminal responsibility. Article 25 only comes into play 
after it has been established that the "conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court." These requirements do not include an element of 
criminal responsibility or liability. 
Furthermore, Article 22(2), containing a rule of strict construction and prohibition of analogous 
application, only applies to "the definition of a crime," and does not apply to provisions on 
individual criminal responsibility. This latter observation would indicate that provisions on 
individual criminal responsibility may be extensively construed. However, the nullum crimen sine 
lege principle also applies to this provision. This means that Article 25 has to be construed strictly 
as well. This means that, for instance, the concept of "direct and public incitement," included in 
Article 25(3)(e) Rome Statute, only applies to the crime of genocide.2 1 7 
In other words, although he suggests that Article 22 does not govern Article 25 directly, he 
argues that the general principle of nullum crimen sine lege serves to 'read up' the relevant 
passages of the Statute. Thus, in theory, with regard to the extent to which the principle of 
legality regulates the judicial elaboration of responsibility doctrines, the ICC is subject to 
precisely the same regime as the ICTY/R. Van Sliedregt relies on Boot's analysis with 
respect to the limited effect of Article 22 to advocate a looser interpretation of the word 
"commits"; 2 1 8 it is difficult to determine, however, whether this is the result of a 
misinterpretation of his caveat about the application of the general nullum crimen principle, 
2 1 5 E.g., 'Perverse effects of the nulla poena principle: national practice and the ad hoc tribunals,' S C H A B A S , 
W.,2000,p.538. 
2 1 6 BOOT.(2002).op.cit., pp.305-306. 
2 1 7 BOOT.(2002).op.cit., p.395. 
2 1 8 V A N SLlEDR£GT.(2003).op.cit., p.66. Also '[JCE] as a pathway to convicting individuals for genocide,' V A N 
S L I E D R E G T , E . , 2007, p.207. 
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or the outcome of her belief that the restriction in general international law is in fact de 
minimis. 
The approach of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Dyilo seems to support this latter view. 
Certainly, in the context of the Defence submission that a threshold determination must be 
made of the defendant's foresight o f the criminal nature of his acts, the Chamber made a 
finding as to the legality of the substantive offence in question yet remained silent as to the 
modes of liability charged. 2 1 9 
Arguments as to the applicability of the legality principle to modes of liability seem to be 
balanced roughly equally. However, given the principle's relatively limited scope in 
practice and yet its considerable import, it seems inappropriate to exclude attribution 
doctrines from its ambit. In practical terms, most attribution doctrines wi l l in any event 
satisfy the test: arguably, only those doctrines which have such a long reach that they violate 
the principle of culpability wi l l also sufficiently cloud the actor's appreciation of their own 
risk of criminality so as to fall foul of the principle of legality. Accordingly, even before 
progressing to a substantive analysis of judicial practice on the attribution of responsibility, 
it can tentatively be suggested that its development does not violate the principle of legality. 
A NOTE ON SOURCES 
Judge Meron comments, extrajudicially, that any meaningful notion of 'notice' in the law is 
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largely a legal fiction, suggesting instead that the principle of legality is better preserved 
by a cautious judicial attitude to the origin of alleged norms in the formal sources of law. 2 2 1 
Although his comment cannot be wholeheartedly accepted—legality should not solely be 
guaranteed by the judiciary—he is entirely right about the importance of the question of 
2 1 9 Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (hereinafter "Dyilo Charges Decision"), paras.294, 297, 
301-302. 
2 2 0 MERON.(2005).op.cit., pp.818, 821. 
2 2 1 This is a significant challenge: c.f. Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, HlGGlNS, 
R., 1994, pp.37-38; also 'The [ICJ] and the sources of international law,' MENDELSON, M . , in Fifty Years of 
the [ICJJ: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, L O W E , V. , & FlTZMAURlCE, M . (eds.), 1996, pp.63-64; 
generally International Customary Law and Codification, T H I R L W A Y , H . , 1972. 
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sources, which is fundamental to an understanding of the true legal quality o f established 
223 
norms. 
The commitment to customary law evident in his remarks, however, underlines a persistent 
ambiguity in the practice of the ICTY/R. A whole paper can be written on this subject alone 
but, very briefly, it is suggested that the ICTY/R's determination, originating from the fear 
of allegations of judicial creativity, to purport to root every aspect of the law in customary 
international law has led to the very criticism they sought to avoid when this could not be 
done altogether convincingly. 2 2 4 For the reasons briefly referenced here, this failure is not 
culpable (indeed, perhaps even inevitable), although it cannot be denied that the rigour with 
which the test for custom has been applied has varied considerably with circumstance.2 2 5 
Very simply, any attempt to apply customary law in circumstances outside its classic, state-
based context is likely to court discussion. The true meaning and test for custom remains 
much more controversial than is popularly assumed. Although ICL scholars tend to treat it 
with great concision, 2 2 6 almost every aspect of it remains the subject o f debate and 
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competing opinion. 
2 2 2 For definition, SHAW.(2003).op.cit., p.66. 
2 2 3 ALLOTT.(1971).op.cit., p. 105. A proper grounding in the formal sources may also be an aspect of the right 
to a reasoned judgment: ICTY Statute, Art.23(2); ICTR Statute, Art.22(2); ICC Statute, Art.74(5); Kvocka.AJ, 
paras.23-24; Kunarac.AJ, paras.41-42; Kupreskic.AJ, para.39; Furundzija.AJ, para.69; Ruiz Torija v. Spain 
(ECtHR), 1994, para.29; Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands (ECtHR), 1994, para.61. Also 
TRESCHEL.(2005).op.cit. , p.103; METTRAUX.(2005) .op .c i t . , pp. 14-15. 
2 2 4 E.g., C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p. 111; 'Criminal international law and customary international law,' VON 
HEtNEGG, W.H., in ICL and the Current Development of Public International Law: Proceedings of an 
International Symposium of the Kiel Walter Schiicking Institute of International Law, ZlMMERMANN, A., & 
H E I N Z , U .E . (eds), 2003, pp.43-44, 46-47; 'On the sources of I C L , ' D J U R O - D E G A N , V. , 2005, p.75. C.f 
S H A H A B U D D E E N . ( 2 0 0 4 ) . o p . c i t . , p. 1017. 
2 2 5 Contrast, e.g., Simic.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, para. 14, fn.20; Galic.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, paras.6-19. 
2 2 6 C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., pp.7-8; WERLE.(2005) .op.c i t„ pp.46-47; CASSESE.(2003).op.cit., pp.28-30. 
2 2 7 E.g., 'Selected problems in the theory of customary international law,' K O L B , R., 2003, pp.119, 150; 
'Traditional and modern approaches to customary international law: a reconciliation,' ROBERTS, A . E . , 2001, 
p.758; MENDELSON.(l996).op.cit., p.67; 'The subjective element in customary international law,' 
M E N D E L S O N . M . , 1995, pp. 177-178, 181; 'Universal international law,' C H A R N E Y , J.I. , 1993, pp.538, 543-
545; 'Obligations arising for states without or against their will,' TOMUSCMAT, C , 1993, p.309; 'Some 
persistent controversies regarding customary international law,' W O L F K E , K . , 1993, pp.2, 15-16; 'The sources 
of human rights law: custom, jus cogens, and general principles,' SlMMA, B., & ALSTON, P., 1989, pp.88-90; 
'The normative dilemma: will and consent in international law-making,'PELLET, A., 1989, p.22 et seq; 'The 
identification of international law,' JENNINGS, R .Y . , in International Law, Teaching and Practice, CHENG, B. 
(ed.), 1982, p.5; 'Custom as a source of international law,' AK.EHURST, M . , 1974, p.\ ;La Guerre-Crime et les 
criminels de guerre: reflexions sur la justice penale internalionale, P E L L A , V. , 1949, p.82. 
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Secondly, the paradox peculiar to dynamic areas of the law like ICL—while the 
international community largely depends on judicial decisions for the authoritative 
development and clarification of the law, 2 2 8 that process simultaneously distances the 
resulting law from the core elements of mutual consent and state practice to which it must 
supposedly relate229—means that it is almost impossible for ICL tribunals to apply 
customary law in the classic, uncontroversial sense. The problem is further exacerbated by 
the fact that most instances of state practice relevant to ICL occur in "juridical outer space 
and out of sight". 2 3 0 Although it is true to say that the customary method is acknowledged to 
vary, at least in part, according to the circumstances in which it is applied, 2 3 1 this dictum 
w i l l rarely be sufficient to assuage most criticisms. 
As a result of these difficulties, even when claiming to be applying customary law, it is 
possible that courts may in fact be applying other sources, most notably 'general principles' 
within the meaning of the ICJ Statute, Article 38( l ) (c ) . 2 3 2 
Assuming arguendo that this process applies equally to the ICTY/R, it can be demonstrated 
that this does not in fact threaten the legality o f its decisions. Indeed, questions about the 
basis of the law articulated by the ICTY/R are important not so much for the protection of 
the rights of the accused, but the professional esteem in which a given decision or doctrine 
is held (which largely depends on the quality o f the method applied 2 3 3), and thus its ability 
to transcend the confines of a particular institution and be applied as general international 
law. 2 3 4 Given the historic purpose served by the ICTY/R as "living laboratories"2 3 5 of the 
" 'Hersch Lauterpacht—the scholar as judge,' FlTZMAURlCE, G . , 1961, p.19. Also New Jersey v. Delaware 
( U S ) , 1934, p.383. 
2 2 9 International Law in Theory and Practice, SCHACHTER, O., 1991, pp.39-40; The Basis of Obligation in 
International Law, B R I E R L Y , J .L . , 1958, p.98. Further The Nature and Sources of the Law, G R A Y , J .C. , 1931, 
p.297, cited in METTRAUX.(2005)op.cit., p. 15, fn.9. 
2 3 0 METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p. 13. 
2 3 1 WOLFKE.(1993).op.cit., p. 15; North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment (ICJ), per Judge Tanaka, 1969, pp. 175, 177. 
2 3 2 E.g., 'The inherent powers of international courts and tribunals,' B R O W N , C , 2005, pp.203-204; 
WERLE.(2005).op.cit., p.48; International Criminal Law, Vol. I, BASSIOUNI, M . C . , 1999, p.4. 
2 3 3 METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p. 14. 
2 3 4 CRYERETAL.(2007).op.cit . , p.451; METTRAUX.(2005).op. cit., pp.12, 15, 366; BoOT.(2002).op.cit., p.393; 
MENDELSON.(1996).op.cit., p.82. This idea is fully conveyed by the maxim non exemplis, sed legibus 
iudicantum est: Kupreskic. TJ, para.540. 
2 3 5 The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, SCHABAS, 
W . , 2006, p.76. 
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law, and the demands of the 'community of courts' (particularly in the criminal 
context 2 3 7), this is a significant problem. It is thus worth identifying here, even in passing, as 
a spur to further debate and study. 
Challenging the requirement for a customary basis of the ICTY/R's law has become so 
unthinkable that the matter is considered t r i te . 2 3 8 However, risking exposure as a 'stranger in 
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the house', it must be said that the origin of this requirement is doubtful. First articulated 
by the Secretary-General in 1993, a strict reading of the relevant passage demonstrates that 
it was primarily concerned with the issue—which proved moot—of the applicability of 
certain international conventions. 2 4 0 The sole reference to customary law—rather than 
customary law and general principles, which have an established relationship to I C L 2 4 1 — 
appears to have been the result merely of poor drafting. Nonetheless, as a result, the ICTY/R 
have consistently framed the vast majority of their discussion of modes of liability in the 
context o f customary law, 2 4 2 viewing this both as a positive requirement 2 4 3 and 
"fundamental mission". 2 4 4 As demonstrated in one of the lengthier passages of reasoning, 
this requirement remained essentially groundless, however: 
In order to come within the Tribunal's jurisdiction ralione personae, any form of liability must 
satisfy [four] pre-conditions: 
NOLLKAEMPER.(2006).op.cit., p.302. Further, e.g., 'A community of courts: towards a system of 
international criminal law enforcement,' BURK£-WHITE, W . W . , 2002; 'Judicial globalization,' SLAUGHTER, 
A., 2000; 'Towards a theory of effective supranational adjudication,' HELPER, L . , & SLAUGHTER, A., 1997. 
2 3 7 'The proliferation of international tribunals: a chink in the armor,' S P E L L I S C Y , S., 2001, p. 143 et seq; 
MlLLER.(2002).op.cit., pp.483-486. 
2 3 8 Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.39. More remarkably, 
'The Statute's rules on crimes and existing or developing international law,' BENNOUNA, M., in C A S S E S E ET 
AL.(2002).op.cit., p.l 105. 
2 3 9 'The shadow side of command responsibility,' D A M A S K A . M . , 2001, p.484. 
2 4 0 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 ("Secretary-
General's Report"), 1993, para.34; also Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, 2000, para. 12. Further CRYER.(2005).op.cit., pp.235-236. 
2 4 1 ICCPR, Art. 15(2); ECHR, Art.7(2); also FRIEDMANN.(1964).op.cit„ p. 168. 
2 4 2 Brdanin.AJ, paras.363, 373, 405, 410, 415, 431; Simic.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, para. 14, fn.740; 
Stakic.AJ, paras.62, 100-101; Vasiljevic.AJ, para.95; Rwamakuba, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, 2004, paras. 13-15, 31, 
Krnojelac.AJ, para.29; Tadic.AJ, paras.220, 226; Mrksic.TJ, para.544; Martic.TJ, paras. 126, 435; Krajisnik.TJ, 
paras.878, 886; Oric.TJ, para.268; Milutinovic, Decision on Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: 
Indirect Co-Perpetration ("Ojdanic Indirect Co-Perpetration Decision"), paras.22, 40-41; Galic. TJ, per Judge 
Nieto-Navia, paras.111, 113; Kvocka.TJ, para.265; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.373-375; Furundzija.TJ, 
paras.226-227, 234; Aleksovski.TJ, paras.60, 62; Delalic.TJ, paras.321, 325; Tadic.TJ, paras.666, 669. 
~43 Tadic.AJ, para. 194. 
2 4 4 Semanza, [Appellate] Decision, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.20, 29, 31. 
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(i) it must be provided for in the Statute, explicitly or implicitly; 
(ii) it must have existed under customary international law at the relevant time; 
(iii) the law providing for that form of liability must have been sufficiently accessible at the 
relevant time to anyone who acted in such a way; and 
(iv) such person must have been able to foresee that he could be held criminally liable for his 
actions if apprehended.245 
Pre-conditions (i), ( i i i) and (iv) are, respectively, a jurisdictional pre-requisite2 4 6 and 
conventional understandings of the requirement of the principle of legality. Alone, they 
fully satisfy the Chamber's earlier assessment of the necessary standards for the assertion of 
jurisdiction ratione personae.241 Pre-condition (ii) therefore, repeating the need for an 
attribution doctrine to have existed under customary international law, is apparently 
superfluous. It can only be assumed that it was the product o f an assumption that only 
customary law could satisfy the requirements of the principle o f legality. 2 4 8 This assumption 
is questionable, and has recently been disapproved. 2 4 9 
Consistent with this finding, there is some established authority for reliance on general 
principles of law in founding attribution doctrines, or aspects thereof. 2 5 0 Although the 
Appeals Chamber has expressed concern with the use o f general principles on the basis that 
it might require, at least, the major legal systems of the world to agree on the putative 
norm, 2 5 1 a similar impasse can be reached in principle with regard to customary law. 2 5 2 It is 
clear, in fact, that customary law and general principles both have strengths, weaknesses, 
and controversies2 5 3 and reliance on both sources may be to the advantage of the 
Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.21. 
2 4 6 'The proper limits of individual responsibility under the [JCE doctrine],' C A S S E S E , A . , 2007, p.l 14; 
METTRAUX.(2005) .op .c i t . , p.270. 
2 4 7 Ibid., para.9. 
2 4 8 Kordic.AJ, paras.44—46; Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
paras.94, 143; also perhaps Simic.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, para.3. 
2 4 9 Galic.AJ, para.85. C.f. 'Reflections on the treatment of the notions of control of the crime and [JCE] in the 
Slakic [AJj; O L A S O L O , H., 2007, p. 152. 
2 5 0 Tadic, Vujin Contempt Judgment, paras. 13-25; Ojdanic Indirect Co-Perpetration Decision, per Judge 
Bonomy, para.27, citing to Blaskic.AJ, paras.34-42; Blaskic.TJ, para.264; Vasiljevic.TJ, para. 199; Delalic.TJ, 
para.321. Also vonLeeb (NMT), p.510. Further, V A N SLIEDREGT.(2007) .op .c i t . , p.207; 
MANTOVANl.(2003).op.cit., p.37; DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., p.489; Secretary-General's Report, para.58. 
Tadic.AJ, para.225; Ojdanic Indirect Co-Perpetration Decision, paras.7, 31, 39. C.f. Ojdanic Indirect Co-
Perpetration Decision, per Judge Bonomy, para.27; Kunarac.TJ, para.439; Furundzija.TJ, paras. 177, 182 
25~ Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.51. 
2 5 3 With regard to general principles, see generally in this context: C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., p.8; 
AMBOS.(2006).op.cit., p.662; KOLB.(2004).op.cit., pp.274-276; Crimes against Humanity in [ICL], 
41 
international courts and tribunals. For the purposes of this paper, however, it suffices to 
confirm that neither customary law nor general principles, properly applied, necessarily 
violate the principle of legality, and to comment that the articulation of the law on 
attributing responsibility may not be as straightforwardly based on classic 'state-derived' 
customary norms as some sources may suggest. To that end, a very conservative approach is 
adopted to classifying law as 'customary', recognising judicial elucidation as a process 
rather than an end result. 
BASSIOUNI, M . C . , 1999, pp.283, 367; 'Res judicata, precedent and the International Court: a preliminary 
sketch,' SCOBB1E, I., 1999, p.300; 'The [ICC]: some procedural and evidential issues,' S H A W , M . N . , 1998, 
pp.68-69; WElL.(1998).op.cit., pp.111, 114; JENNINGS/WATTS.(1992).op.cit., pp.39-40; 
BASSlOUNI.(1990).op.cit., pp.768-770; FRIEDMANN.(1963).op.cit., pp.287-299; 'General course on Public 
International Law,' W A L D O C K , H. , 1962, p.58 et seq, cited in Furundzija.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, 
para.256, fn.2; 'The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,' M C N A J R , A., 1957, pp. I, 15; 
'Research on the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,' SCHLESINGER, R . B . , 1957, p.736; 
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, CHENG, B . , 1953, pp.xi, 24; 
Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, LAUTERPACHT, H., 1927, pp.69-70, 86, 298-303. 
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P A R T I I : ' O N E A N D A H A L F ' R U L E S O F A T T R I B U T I O N 
This section sets out the doctrines o f attribution that exist in general international law, 
having particular regard to the areas of consonance and conflict between the conventional 
law of the ICC Statute and the international practice articulated by the ICTY/R. Although 
Ambos is correct that ICL does not yet have a truly "comprehensive" concept of individual 
responsibility, 2 5 4 the general degree of doctrinal coherence is nonetheless impressive for 
such a youthful system faced with such a challenging task. 
Given the substantial attempt at codification made by the ICC Statute, and its "advanced 
expression" of the general part of I C L , 2 5 5 a number of authors have chosen expressly to 
explore the doctrines of attribution within the structure of Article 25 . 2 5 6 This paper departs 
from that practice for two reasons. 
First, it is feared that in placing the structure and wording of Article 25 at the centre of this 
study, the impression wi l l be left that the ICC Statute is as revolutionary in the substantive 
law it applies as it is in its procedure. This is not the case. Although the general influence 
of the Statute is undeniable, 2 5 8 it remains (at least presently) but one component in the 
structure of general ICL, a codification of what might be termed the "lowest common 
denominator". 2 5 9 As Judge Shahabuddeen noted, "a codification does not necessarily 
exhaust the principle of customary international law sought to be codified. The fullness of 
the principle, with its ordinary implications, can continue notwithstanding any narrower 
" 'Individual criminal responsibility in I C L : a jurisprudential analysis—from Nuremberg to the Hague,' 
A M B O S , K , in K I R K M C D O N A L D & SWAAK-GOLDMAN.(2000) .op .c i t . , pp.28-30. 
2 5 5 AMBOS.(2006).op.cit. , pp.661-662. C.f. ICL in Germany: Case Law and Legislation, Presentation to 
Combating International Crimes Domestically (3rd Annual War Crimes Conference, Ottawa), WlRTH, S., 2002, 
pp.9-10, fns.41-44. 
E.g. , WERLE.(2005).op.cit., pp. 119-128; VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.65. 
2 5 7 OHLlN.(2006).op.cit., p.70; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.768; CASSESE.(1999) .op.cit„ p.170; 'Article 10,' 
TRIFFTERER, O, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, TRJFFTERER, O, 
1999, p.316. C.f. SADAT.(2003).op.cit., pp.1077, 1079; 'Custom, codification and some thoughts about the 
relationship between the two: Article 10 of the I C C Statute,' S A D A T , L .N. , 2000, pp.919, 923. 
2 5 8 SCHABAS.(2006).op.cit., p.291; Tadic.AJ, para.223; Funmdzija.TJ, para.227. 
2 5 9 SADAT.(2000).op.cit., pp.916, 919; also.AMBOS.(2006).op.cit., p.669. Given this status, some commentators 
make gloomy forecasts of the risk of the I C C inducing stagnation in the law: e.g., PELLET.(2002).op.cit., 
pp.1083-1084. 
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scope suggested by the codification." Indeed, as an 'unsafe' law enforcement mechanism, 
the risk that the ICC negotiators were less will ing to adopt as broad an approach to the 
attribution of responsibility as 'safe' institutions such as the ad hoc tribunals is, at the very 
least, a real one. 2 6 1 
Despite the rhetoric of its 'completeness',2 6 2 the ICC Statute specifically contemplates the 
possibility that certain doctrines were not laid down in the treaty but nonetheless exist in 
general ICL. It takes care to allow ICC judges to refer, "where appropriate", to "the 
principles and rules of international l aw" 2 6 3 outside its text—which includes the law as 
interpreted by the ICTY/R 2 6 4 —and protects this law against attack on the basis of Article 22 
{nullum crimen sine lege).265 As Pellet notes, even without express permission, the ICC 
should have such jurisdiction. 2 6 6 The extent to which the ICC Statute grants authority to 
depart summarily from substantive customary international law is itself questionable.2 6 7 
Although it is highly probable that the ICC can do so where the conflict is manifest (even i f 
this represents a retrograde step 2 6 8), it should otherwise attempt to pursue interpretations 
which are consonant with existing law. 2 6 9 It is particularly likely that reference to law 
beyond the Statute w i l l have to be made with regard to individual responsibility, 2 7 0 i f only to 
interpret the terms employed in Article 25. 
Further, the Statute does not necessarily eliminate or supplant existing law: 2 7 1 Article 10 
provides that "[n]othing in [Part 2, which elucidates inter alia the applicable (substantive) 
2 6 0 Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.38. 
2 6 1 CRYER. (200I ) . op . c i t . , pp.4, 9 -10 , 23 -24 , 30-31; 'International humanitarian law and war crimes tribunals: 
recent developments and perspectives,' BOTHE, M . , in International Law: Theory and Practice—Essays in 
Honour of Eric Suy, W E L L E N S . K . (ed.), 1998, pp.581, 593. 
2 6 2 E . g . , Ojdanic JCE Decision, para. 18. 
2 6 3 ICC Statute, Art.2 l ( l ) ( b ) ; DEGuZMAN.(1999).op.cit . , p.442; CARACClOLO.(1999) .op.cit . , p.225. C.f. 
FLETCHER/OHLrN (2005) op.cit., p.559. Ambos also raises questions about the extent to which extra-statutory 
law may be used for inculpatory or penal purposes, although the interplay between Articles 21 -23 at least 
permits this as a possibility: AMBOS.(2006).op.cit . , p.671. 
2 6 4 BoOT.(2002).op.cit . , pp.392-393. 
2 6 5 ICC Statute, Art .22(3); LAMB.(2002).op.cit . , p.754; CASSESE.( l999) .op .c i t . , p. 157. 
2 6 6 PELLET.(2002) .op.c i t . , p. 1072. 
2 6 7 V A N S L I E D R E G T . ( 2 0 0 7 ) . o p . c i t . , p. 193. 
2 6 8 'The defence of superior orders: the [ICC Statute] versus customary international law,' G A E T A , P. , 1999, 
p. 172 et seq. 
2 6 9 See VCLT, Art .31, especially Art.31(3)(c); also WERLE. (2005) .op .c i t„ p.45; 
WERLE/ jESSBERGER. (2005) .op . c i t . , p.46. 
2 7 0 V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003) .op.c i t . , p.9. A l so CARACClOLO.( 1999).op.cit., pp.231 -232. 
2 7 1 BoOT.(2002).op.cit . , pp.624-626. 
44 
law] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules 
of international law". Although the rules on attributing responsibility are in fact located in 
Part 3, it is submitted that they are better conceived as also falling within the scope of 
Article 10. Bennouna recalls the "negotiators' feeling that in enunciating the general 
principles o f criminal law [in Part 3], it was possible to find a compromise between the 
world's major legal systems"2 7 2 and thus create a new, 'synthetic' (in Hegelian terms) body 
of law. However, in the light of the established international practice and wide divergence 
of national views, he expressly excepts Article 28 (relating to superior responsibility) from 
this observation and, by implication, from Part 3 altogether.2 7 3 For the same reasons,274 this 
approach is also advocated for Article 25. 
Although Article 10 only preserves existing or developing law "for purposes other than this 
Statute", it must be assumed in the light of Articles 21 and 22 that even proceedings at the 
ICC wi l l preserve customary law unless a provision of the Statute conflicts with it in plain 
terms. Of course, these comments are not intended to exaggerate the role of Article 10: the 
ICC Statute must necessarily have a bearing on the evolution of customary law, 2 7 5 
particularly in its expansive rather than restrictive elements.2 7 6 However, neither does it, 
black hole-like, exert an irresistible gravitational force. Even where the Statute does reflect 
or codify existing international law, those apparently identical norms retain a separate 
existence in both customary and conventional law. 2 7 7 
Second, Article 25—quite properly—attributes the different responsibility doctrines equal 
formal status under the Statute. Each mode of liability specified is independently legitimate. 
2 7 2 BENNOUNA.(2002).op.cil., p.l 101. 
2 1 1 Ibid., fn.l. 
2 7 4 SADAT.(2002).op.cit., p. 193. Also ' [ ICL] principles,' S A L A N D , P, in The [ICQ: the Making of the Rome 
Statute, L E E , R . S . (ed.), 1999, pp. 198-200; CRYER.(2004).op.cit . , pp.261-262. It is true that passage through 
the stage of disagreement is often an essential part of the political process of legal codification and may not 
necessarily prejudice the resulting code ( L A U T E R P A C H T . ( 1 9 5 5 ) . o p . c i t . , p.32); however, the ICC Statute shows 
the difficulty of ironing this disagreement out: CASSESE.(1999) .op.c i t . , p. 145; also 170-171. 
2 7 5 WERLE.(2005) .op.cit . , pp.45-46; Furundzija.TJ, para.227. 
2 7 6 SADAT.(2000).op.cit., pp.918, 920. 
2 7 7 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the USA), Judgment (ICJ), 
1986, p.95; also WOLFKE.(1993) .op.c i t . , pp. 10-11, fn.40; c.f. CZAPLlNSKI.(1989).op.cit., pp. 164-165. It is 
interesting to note in this regard that conventional and customary law are subject to different interpretative 
processes: the impact this may have on the future development of 1CL by the I C C may be considerable. 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, M E R O N , T., 1989, p.8. 
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Adopting the structure and wording of Article 25 here would imply a similar position in 
general international law. 
It is the contention of this paper, however, that i f the modes of liability established in non-
conventional ICL (i.e., articulated in international judicial practice) have achieved this status 
of independent legitimacy, they may only have done so recently, with the benefit of at least 
some of the ICTY/R jurisprudence. In other words, specific doctrines such as 'common 
purpose' liability or 'procurement' liability—indeed, any 'rules' other than the most basic— 
can only be said to have crystallised themselves in customary law at some (unknown) point 
in the period 1998-2008. It may have been very recent indeed. 
Thus, in the early 1990s, it is suggested that only 'one and a hal f rules of attribution were 
clearly established in customary law. This structure is borrowed for the organisation of this 
study, in order to highlight the true origin of the various doctrines and their developmental 
nature. The ICTY/R's development of an enumerated doctrine of complicity is more 
accurately construed, at least initially, as a process of interpretation and clarification within 
the 'essence' of these limited rules. 2 7 8 Concerns as to the principle of legality can thus still 
be laid aside—the unenumerated complicity concept in customary law provided sufficient 
core notice to the accused. Such a view, admittedly conservative, also preserves the doctrine 
of formal sources from distortion: it is both accurate to emphasise the general suitability of 
customary law for one or two fundamental norms rather than an 'instant' body of detailed 
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rules, and permits the recognition that further norms can evolve slowly through an 
admixture of interpretation and reliance on general principles without infringing the legality 
principle. The logic-based and self-referential nature of the majority of the ICTY/R's 
reasoning on modes o f liability, demonstrated below, illustrates this truth. In short, 
therefore, it is suggested that the ICTY/R did not discover a customary enumerated doctrine 
of complicity, fully-formed, but have themselves been midwives to it. 
This paper chooses to present the various modes o f liability in the context of 'one and a 
hal f rules of attribution in 1993 customary international law. It does this to underline both 
METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p. 14. 
2 7 9 Case concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States 
of America), Judgment (ICJ), 1984, p.299. 
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the pre-eminence of the unenumerated complicity concept in the law to that point, and the 
continuing ambiguity as to whether the rule on superior responsibility is or is not of distinct 
origins. 2 8 0 As wi l l be demonstrated, that debate continues today. 
R U L E 1: L I A B I L I T Y F O R ' C O M P L I C I T Y ' IN A C R I M E 
[CJriminal liability is not incurred solely by individuals who physically commit a crime, but may 
also extend to those who participate and contribute to a crime in various ways, when such 
participation is sufficiently connected to the crime, following principles of accomplice liability. 2 8 1 
This principle was correctly discerned both in "general principles of criminal law and 
customary international law". As early as 1949, the relevant U N Commission commented 
that "[t]he possible range of persons who may be held guilty of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity is not limited to those who physically performed the illegal deed. Many others 
have been held to be sufficiently connected with an offence to be held criminally 
l iable . . ." 2 8 3 It is suggested here that the very general notion of liability for parties 
'sufficiently connected' to the crime, termed the unenumerated doctrine of complicity, was 
for a long time the only rule on complicity established in customary law. In the following 
pages, the reasoning behind this view, and its implications, are set out. 
It is worth making a preliminary semantic point. "Accomplice liability" (or complicity) is an 
overarching, general phrase to indicate multiple involvement in a crime. 2 8 4 It includes both 
perpetrators and other participants: the rule on complicity has been interpreted to discern 
CRYER.(2001).op.cit., p.24. Superior responsibility has an independent basis in customary international law; 
it is no coincidence that the Statutes of all the international criminal tribunals draw a clear line between the 
two: ICTY Statute, Art.7; ICTR Statute, Art.6; SCSL Statute, Art.6; ICC Statute, Arts.25, 28. Both van 
Sliedregt and Mettraux's works reflect a similar division: METTRAUX.(2005) .op .c i t . , pp.269, 279, 296; V A N 
SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.10, 59-60, 118. Further p.\Q2.infra etseq. As Cryer et al note, "ordering"— 
which is at least in practical, if not legal, terms a related concept—also represents something of an exception 
to the principle articulated here in having something of an independent pedigree as a ground for liability: 
C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., p.312. 
2 8 1 Kayishema/Ruzindana.AJ, para.185; also Tadic.AJ, paras. 188-192; Haradinaj.TJ, para.141; 
Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.373; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.757; Akayesu.TJ, paras.471—475; Tadic.TJ, paras.663-669. 
2 8 2 Blaskic. TJ, para.264; also Delalic. TJ, para.321; Tadic. TJ, para.669. 
2 8 3 [1949] 15 LRTWC, 49. 
2 8 4 Osborn 'x Concise Law Dictionary, B O N E , S. (ed.), 2001; FLETCIIER.(2000) .op.ci t . , p.637. 
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multiple modes of liability. As such, identifying an individual as "complicit" in a crime is 
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in no way determinative of the degree of their culpability (even though it seems— 
unfortunately—to have become a term of art to connote secondary responsibility in 
genocide 2 8 7). The broad scope of the term has been confirmed by the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber. 2 8 8 Accordingly, classifying various perpetratory doctrines as interpretations of the 
rule on complicity for the purpose of this paper does not amount to an argument for a 
"unitary" (as opposed to "differentiated]") model of perpetration/participation. The 
distinction between perpetrative and derivative liabilit ies 2 8 9 remains significant, as it does 
for both the I C T Y / R 2 9 0 and probably the ICC, 2 9 1 in the context of sentencing.2 9 2 
The tendency o f the ICTY/R to assert more or less automatically that a given mode of 
liability has an independent basis in customary law has already been discussed.293 Such 
assertions are not always infal l ible. 2 9 4 Viewed objectively, however, their findings may be 
" Krstic.AJ, para. 139; Krnojelac.AJ, para.70; Tadic.AJ, para.223. 
2 8 6 Ojdanic JCE Decision, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.7-12, and per Judge Hunt, para.29; Tadic.AJ, 
para. 191. 
-87 Brdanin.TJ, paras.725-728; Krstic.TJ, para.643. C.f. Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, paras.776-780. Further 
'"Complicity in genocide" versus "aiding and abetting genocide",' E B O E - O S U J I , C , 2005, p.56 et seq. 
2 8 8 Krstic.AJ, para. 139; Krnojelac.AJ, paras.67-74. It has remained a source of confusion, however: e.g., 
Stakic.TJ, para.432. 
2 8 9 Fl_ETCHER.(2000).op.cit., p.634 et seq; VAN Sl_IEDREGT.(2003).op.cit. , pp.57-60; 'Complicity, cause and 
blame: a study in the interpretation of doctrine,' K . A D I S H , S.H., 1985, pp.337-340. 
2 9 0 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., p.122; C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., pp.310, 313; SCHABAS.(2006).op.cit., p.297; 
also perhaps Semanza.TJ, para.563. C.f. AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.2; ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.781-782, 
786-788; also Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.31. Although both Ambos and Eser suggest that the I C T Y / R 
Statutes reflect a unitary approach, they mistake the relevant provisions as substantive law, when in fact they 
are determinative solely of jurisdiction. In sentencing practice, a differentiated model may be discerned (e.g., 
in the context of aiding and abetting: Simic.AJ, para.265; Kvocka.AJ, para.92; Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 102; Oric.TJ, 
para.281; Brdanin.TJ, para.274; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.71), a fact which Eser acknowledges; the fact that this is 
less clear for procurement liability is, in Eser's terms, largely the result of "crossover" factors (e.g., 
Brdanin.TJ, para.1093; Niyitegeka.TJ, para.486) common even in systems applying a differentiated model. 
Also OHLIN.(2007).op.cit., pp.83-84, 87-88; FLETCHER.(2000) .op .c i t . , pp.640-641. 
2 9 1 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the 
Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Annex 1 {"Dyilo 
Arrest Warrant Decision"), para.78; c.f. MANTOVANl.(2003).op.cit., p.35. 
2 9 2 FLETCHER.(2000) .op .c i t . , pp.645, 649-652. 
2 9 3 Pp.40-45.supra. 
2 9 4 Judges McDonald and Vohrah {Erdemovic.AJ, per Judges McDonald and Vohrah, para.51) were willing to 
concede the existence of "conspiracy" in customary law. However, at least as an inchoate offence, complete 
when the common agreement is reached and not requiring subsequent participation in the agreement's 
execution, this is incorrect. 'The Hamdan case and conspiracy as a war crime,' F L E T C H E R , G.P., 2006, pp.445-
446; METTRAUX.(2005) .op .c i t . , pp.253, 291; Ojdanic JCE Decision, per Judge Hunt, para.23; 
FLETCHER.(2000) .op .c i t . , p.647. Some authorities of the 1990s did, however, illustrated confusion about the 
meaning of conspiracy: CHANEY.(1995).op.cit., p.91. The particular inchoate offence of'conspiracy to commit 
genocide' remains, at least in customary law: ' [JCE]: possibilities and limitations,' VAN D E R W I L T , H., 2007, 
p.95; 'Genocide,' C A S S E S E , A., in C A S S E S E E T AL.(2002).op.cit., p.347; also Seromba.AJ, para.218. 
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read equally happily as interpretations of the single-rule model articulated here. Indeed, this 
very approach was manifest in one of the ICTY's earliest decisions. 2 9 5 
The present argument depends on two premises. First, the authorities cited by the Tribunals 
are insufficient to demonstrate, of themselves, the existence of an independent norm of 
customary law establishing a particular mode of liability. This is evident both from the 
decisions themselves and critical comment. It seems likely, as illustrated by some of the 
more recent conventional law, that these doctrines have only just begun to mature into 
independent customary norms. Second, the authorities cited by the Tribunals do evidence a 
norm of customary law establishing a general rule of liability for complicitous conduct. 2 9 6 
This view places more appropriate demands on those authorities, recognising their 
shortcomings as evidence of independent norms of customary law but their strengths as 
precedents for the interpretation of complicity. 
The pre-1993 authorities do not establish multiple, independent customary norms of 
liability 
Of the six complicity-based modes of liability applied by the ICTY/R, their jurisprudence 
has only expressly sought to provide independent authority for two: common purpose and 
aiding and abetting. With regard to direct perpetration, ordering, planning and instigating, 
the courts have been content to accept the express inclusion of the concepts in the Statutes, 
despite the principle otherwise articulated that the Statutes only establish jurisdiction, not 
the substantive doctrines themselves.2 9 7 It must be assumed, therefore, that the Tribunals 
presumed them to be implicit in some broader acknowledged principle. 
The authorities that have been provided are relatively sparse. With regard to basic JCE, the 
Tadic Appeals Chamber referred directly to six cases allegedly based on common purpose 
liability (four British, one Canadian, one American), 2 9 8 and in passing to nine Italian and 
Gentian authorities on co-perpetration (but did not make clear the extent to which these in 
2 9 5 Tadic.TJ, paras.673-674. 
2 9 6 A similar broad-brush approach was evident in some of the early analyses of the developing law: e.g., 
SCHABAS.(2001).op.cit . , pp.442^46. 
2 9 7 supra. 
2 , 8 Tadic.AJ, paras. 197-200. 
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fact were relevant). Systemic JCE was grounded on three cases (one British, one 
American, one German). 3 0 0 Extended JCE was grounded on eight cases (one British, one 
American, six Italian). 3 0 1 In respect of aiding and abetting, the Furundzija Trial Chamber 
referenced nine cases (three British, four German, two American). 3 0 2 The only other notable 
references were to the ICC Statute (not then in force) and the ILC's (non-binding) 1996 
Draft Codem Even assuming all these authorities to be entirely consistent, they do not 
seem to indicate the breadth of state practice normally required to evidence norms of 
customary law, let alone opiniojuris™ 
The degree to which these various authorities supported the relevant proposition was largely 
a matter of inference rather than necessary implication. 3 0 5 Indeed, an authority for one mode 
of liability was sometimes used to eludicate an element of another. 3 0 6 In Judge 
Shahabuddeen's words, the courts have developed "a judicial construct [from] analysis of 
scattered principles of law gathered together for the purpose of administering I C L . " 3 0 7 The 
attempt to use these authorities to show the existence of discrete, ready-made modes of 
liability has been aptly likened to comparing apples with oranges.3 0 8 
The judgments at Nuremberg were perhaps "the most impressive moral advance emanating 
from World War H " 3 0 9 but, to the extent it is suggested that they established "crucial norms 
of responsibility", 3 1 0 their importance is certainly not to be exaggerated.311 As Damaska 
wryly observes, " [ i ] t does not require deep immersion into [the post-WWII decisions] to 
realize that they are not the most obvious well-spring from which one would expect the 
demiurges of modern international law to drink for inspiration." 3 1 2 Even at publication, it 
was acknowledged that the post-WWII cases "do not lay down rules of law in an 
2 9 9 Ibid., para.201. Further SASSOLl/OLSON.(2000).op.cit., p.6. 
0 0 Tadic.AJ, para.202. 
0 1 7^.,paras.205-219. 
0 2 Furundzija.TJ, paras.200-225. 
0 3/6;W.,paras.227-231. 
0 4 C.f. MERON.(2005).op.cit., p.829. 
0 5 E.g., Furundzija. TJ, para.201. 
0 6 E.g., Furundzija.TJ, paras.205-206. 
0 7 Gacumbilsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.40. 
0 8 SASSOLl/OLSON.(2000).op.cit., p.6. 
0 9 'The judgments and legacy of Nuremberg,' KING JR., H.T., 1997, p.218, emphasis added. 
1 0 'Telford Taylor and the legacy of Nuremberg,' F A L K , R., 1999, p.697. 
1 1 SCHABAS.(2006).op.cit . , p.291. 
1 2 D A M A S K A . ( 2 0 0 1 ).op.cit., p.486; also OHLlN.(2007).op.cit., pp.75-76. 
50 
authoritative way, [although] they are declaratory of the state of the law and illustrative of 
actual State practice." 3 1 3 Their value as a material source is not denied but, even i f perfect, 
they are not conclusive. As it is, the nature of the documents themselves represents a 
significant qualification to their utility. The vast majority o f decisions are very concisely 
reported, and the reasoning upon which they depend—and, indeed, the underlying 
evidence—is generally only a matter of inference from the text. A relatively small number 
of terms was used to cover a wide variety of concepts. At least 1,911 separate prosecutions 
were conducted, but only a tiny fraction (about 5%) is available for general consultation. 3 1 4 
Analogy with municipal law (in semantics and substance) was interwoven with international 
law. 3 1 5 Even in the immediate aftermath, some commentators considered that there was 
good reason "to make a lawyer wish to forget all about them at the earliest possible 
moment." 3 1 6 Subsequently, states have had almost no reason to consider the decisions 
closely and, even i f they did, there is certainly no guarantee of uniform interpretation. Any 
published state consideration that exists is scarce, to say the least. For all these reasons, 
these authorities should be treated with great caution. 3 1 7 
Closer scrutiny of the key decisions illustrates the problem further. 
Post-war British jurisprudence under the charge of being "concerned in" the commission of 
an offence has formed the basis for much of the ICTY/R's reasoning with respect to 
7 I Q 
common purpose and aiding and abetting. The concept was used, however, in such a wide 
context that it connotes little more than a general sense of complicity. 3 1 9 Indeed, this was 
precisely the approach stated by the Judge-Advocate in Golkel et al ("[ i] t is for the members 
of the Court to decide what participation is fairly within th[e] words of the charge]"). 3 2 0 In 
Feitrstein, the Judge-Advocate set out the following definition: 
Annex I: British Law concerning trials of war criminals by militaiy courts, I L R T W C 105, 110; see also 
121-122. 
3 1 4 E.g., Foreword, 15 L R T W C xvi. 
3 1 5 C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p.305, fn.36; Ojdanic JCE Decision, per Judge Hunt, para. 17. 
3 1 6 DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., p.487, citing to 'The problem of [ I C L ] , ' SCHWARZENBERGER, G. , 1950, p.30 et 
seq. 
3 1 7 DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., pp.488-489. 
3 , 8 E.g., Tadic.AJ, paras. 197-199, 202, 207-209; Furundzija.TJ, paras.200-204. 
3 1 9 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.26-31, 88, 96. 
3 2 0 Golkel (UK) , 1946, p.53. 
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[T]o be concerned in the commission of a criminal offence, gentlemen, does not only mean that 
you are the person who in fact inflicted the fatal injury and directly caused death, be it by shooting 
or by any other violent means; it also means an indirect degree of participation, that is to say, a 
person can be concerned in the commission of a criminal offence, who, without being present at 
the place where the offence was committed, took such a part in the preparation for this offence as 
to further its object; in other words, he must be the [sic] cog in the wheel of events leading up to 
the result which in fact occurred. He can further that object not only by giving orders for a 
criminal offence to be committed, but he can further that object by a variety of other means, and 
the person who so furthers an object, the result of which is the commission of a criminal offence, 
can be guilty of that offence not only by an act of commission but also by an act of omission. In 
other words, a person is guilty not only if he does a positive act but he is also guilty if he does 
nothing in a case where there is a legal duty upon him to do something... 
[Wjhether you think that this execution or these executions might have taken place even in their 
absence, that of course does not free them from guilt if you think that they can be said to have 
been concerned in these executions... [l]n each case where you are of opinion that a person was 
concerned in the commission of a criminal offence, you must also be satisfied that when he did 
take part in it he knew the intended purpose of it. 3 2' 
In Killinger et al, the charge was similarly interpreted as requiring, at minimum, that "the 
person concerned must have had some knowledge of what was going on" and must have 
taken some deliberate action. 3 2 2 Accordingly, the loose notion of being "concerned i n . . . " 
would seem most reminiscent of modern aiding and abetting. At the same time, those 
convicted under the charge could clearly be treated as co-perpetrators.323 Variations in 
responsibility were reflected in the sentence handed down, not the particular charge. On this 
basis, it is almost impossible to derive a particular legal rule—other than the general 
prohibition o f complicity—from this line of authorities. The courts' responses to varying 
factual circumstances make the cases useful precedents for the various forms that complicity 
liability may take but they only establish a minimal rule. The following cases illustrate the 
breadth of the "concerned i n . . . " doctrine. 
321 Feur.itein (UK) , 1948, pp.6-7, reproduced in [2007] 5 JICJ 238, 239-240. Also Rohde (UK) , 1946, p.56. 
3 2 2 Killinger (UK), 1945, p.69. 
3 2 3 Jepsen (UK) , 1946, p.240, reproduced in [2007] 5 JICJ228, 229. 
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In the Buck, Wielen, Amberger, Renoth and Kramer cases it is possible to 
perceive a notion of common purpose more or less consonant with the modern one. In 
Schonfeld, the court seemed also to apply a common purpose doctrine, but one in which the 
requirement for individual participation was read down to a vanishingly small level . 3 2 9 
Sandrock, on the other hand, also purports to apply something like common pupose, but 
with only a knowledge-based mens rea.3™ Ironically, the charge in this case was merely that 
the accused 'ki l led ' the victims. 
In Eck, at least one conviction was based on ordering. 3 3 1 Rohde featured a range of potential 
liabilities, including command responsibility, aiding and abetting, and common purpose. 3 3 2 
Gerike, a case significant for depending almost entirely on omissions to act, apparently 
applied liabilities for common purpose and aiding and abetting. 3 3 4 Heyer is extremely 
difficult to interpret as the case was tried without the benefit of a Judge-Advocate, but 
seems to disclose liabilites for acting with a common purpose and instigating. 3 3 5 Similarly, 
the evidence in Rauer is so briefly considered that the basis for conviction is more or less 
indeterminate: it conceivably includes command responsibility, instigating, aiding and 
abetting. 3 3 6 The Prosecution in Oenning and Nix contemplated liability on the basis both o f 
instigation and common purpose. 3 3 7 In von Mackensen and Maelzer, the 'concerned in ' 
no 
charge was used as a basis for liability for ordering the commission of a crime, as in von 
Falkenhorst.339 Similarly, in Kesselring, it seems to have founded liability for instigation 
and ordering. 3 4 0 
3 2 4 Buck (UK), 1946, pp. 39-41. 
3 2 5 Wielen (UK), 1947, pp.34-35, 39, 45. 
3 2 6 Amberger (UK) , 1946, pp.82-83 
3 2 7 Renoth (UK), 1946,p.76. 
3 2 8 Kramer (UK) , 1945, pp.118, 120, 139. 
3 2 9 Schonfeld(UK), 1946, pp.66-71. 
3 3 0 Sandrock (UK) , 1945, p.40. 
3 3 1 Eck (UK) , 1945, pp.3-5, 12. 
3 3 2 Rohde (UK), 1946, pp.54-59. 
3 3 3 On which, also Mackensen (UK) , 1946, p.81. 
3 3 4 Gerike (UK), 1946, pp.76-77. 
3 3 5 Heyer (UK), 1945, pp.89-90. 
3 3 6 Rauer (UK), 1946, pp. 116-117. 
3 3 7 Oenning/Nix (UK) , 1945, p.74. 
3 3 8 Von Mackensen/Maelzer (UK) , 1945, p.2. 
3 3 9 Von Falkenhorst (UK), 1946, pp. 18-20, 22-23. 
3 4 0 Kesselring (UK) , 1947, pp. 10-12. 
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Other national tribunals also illustrate the difficulties in inferring specific legal rules from 
the jurisprudence of the era. Under Control Council Law No. 10, the N M T applied a 
complicity charge as wide as that o f the British courts: "the essential elements to prove a 
defendant guilty under the indictment in this case are that [they] had knowledge of an 
offense charged in the indictment and established by the evidence, and that he was 
connected with the commission of that offense". 3 4 1 This formed the basis for decisions like 
Sawada, where the liability of some of the accused seems particularly opaque.3 4 2 On the 
other hand, liability in Kleini4} was clearly based on something like common purpose 
doctrine, and on its systemic variant in Weiss.*44 In Afuldisch, on the other hand, the 
Military Commission inferred the mens rea of the accused on the sole basis of their 
membership in a criminal organisation, 3 4 5 an approach the ICTY/R has clearly 
deprecated.346 Similarly, a passage from the Einsatzgruppen case,347 cited by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber as "precedent for conviction of a person who gave his contribution to a 
large-scale common criminal purpose, accepting the foreseeable consequence that crimes 
would be committed by others" (JCE I I I l iabi l i ty 3 4 8 ) , may just as easily found the inference 
that the accused's membership of a criminal organization (for which he was convicted) 
inexorably led to his responsibility for its acts, a model o f liability which inappropriately 
underplays the significance of contributory faul t . 3 4 9 
The Supreme National Tribunal of Poland had imposed liability on the basis of membership 
in a criminal organisation in a number of cases. In Motomura, the Dutch Court-Martial 
341 Altstoetler (NMT), pp.1093, 1081, 1143; Pohl, Supplemental Judgment (NMT), pp.1173-1174. 
3 4 2 Sawada (US), 1946, p.7. Also hayama (US), 1946, pp.63-64; Hisakasu (US), 1946, pp.66-70. C.f. Hans 
(Norway), 1947, pp.90-92. 
3 4 3 Klein (US), 1945, pp.47-52. Also Masuda (US), 1945, pp.73, 76. 
3 4 4 Weiss (US), 1945, pp. 12-14. 
3 4 5 Afuldisch (US), 1946, unreported, cited at I I L R T W C 15. Also Altstoetler (NMT), p. 1030. 
3 4 6 E.g., Rwamakuba, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal regarding Application of [JCE] to the Crime of 
Genocide (hereinafter "Rwamakuba Interlocutory Appeal"), para. 19, fh.45. 
347 Ohlendorf (NMT), p.526: "Despite the Finding that Vorkommando Moscow formed part of Einsatzgruppe 
B and despite the finding that Six was aware of the criminal purposes of Einsatzgruppe B , the Tribunal cannot 
conclude with scientific certitude that Six took an active part in the murder program of that organization. It is 
evident, however, that Six formed part of an organization engaged in atrocities, offenses, and inhumane acts 
against civilian populations. The Tribunal finds the defendant guilty..." 
3 4 8 P.SO.infra. 
3 4 9 V A N D E R WiLT.(2007).op.cit., pp.94-95. 
3 5 0 Hoess (Poland), 1947, pp.20-24; also perhaps Goeth (Poland), 1946, p.l et seq. C.f. Buhler (Poland), 1948, 
pp.35-38. 
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went even further, entering a conviction while stressing that it was "not concerned with the 
accused as individuals but as a group". 3 5 1 
French tribunals tended to charge the accused simply with "complicity", a concept within 
which the bones of common purpose doctrine, co-perpetration, ordering, and aiding and 
abetting might be discerned. 3 5 2 The notion of "instigation" applied in Holstein, despite the 
term, might in fact more properly be considered as ordering, or even a variant of command 
responsibility. 3 5 3 Similarly, in Motosuke, the term "incitement" was used to connote a form 
of liability which could potentially be construed as ordering, participation in a common 
purpose, or aiding and abetting. 3 5 4 
Only a relative few cases (relating to direct perpetration, 3 5 5 instigating, 3 5 6 ordering 3 5 7 and 
aiding and abetting 3 5 8) appear to be straightforward analogues to the modern approach, and 
they reflect the relative simplicity of the underlying facts. 
Taking all these authorities together, and the many others not specifically cited, it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that any attempt to discern discrete customary rules on this basis would 
be inevitably selective and partial. The same legal charge too often resulted in the 
application of a variety of legal elements at ambiguous standards; the authorities reflect no 
degree of legal specificity. Given that the distinction between modes of liability largely 
depends on subtle gradations between mental or actual standards, this is a significant 
problem. In the light o f the relatively brief period of litigation, there was no possibility for 
competing legal approaches to be tested against one another and resolved. Thus, the 
approach to common purpose which requires personal participation to be proven and the 
approach to common purpose which permits personal participation to be inferred merely 
3 5 1 Motomura (Netherlands), 1947, pp. 141-142. 
3 5 2 Wagner (France), 1946, pp.30-33; Bauer (France), 1945, pp. 15-16; Becker (France), 1947, pp.70-71; 
Szabados (France), 1946, p.60. 
3 5 3 Holstein (France), 1947, pp.26, 32. 
3 5 4 Motosuke (Netherlands), 1948, pp. 126-127. 
3 5 5 Back ( U S ) , 1945, p.60; Chusaburo ( U K ) , 1946, p.76; Chuichi (Australia), 1946, p.62; Heering ( U K ) , 1946, 
p.79; Wagner (France), 1946, p. 118; Gerbsch (Netherlands), 1948, p. 131. 
3 5 6 Meyer (Canada), 1945, pp.100, 107, 109. 
3 5 7 Dostler ( U S ) , 1945, pp.22-23, 29; Thiele/Steinert ( U S ) , 1945, p.56; Kato (Australia), 1946, p.37; Flensch 
(Norway), 1946, pp.111-112; Awochi (Netherlands), 1946, p. 125; Moehle ( U K ) , 1946, pp.75-78, 80-81; 
Meyer ibid. 
3 5 8 7&K?/?(UK), 1946, p.93. 
55 
from membership of a criminal organization remained, in the context of the supporting 
authorities, equally viable. 
A l l of the authorities agree, however, that individuals may be held liable for complicitous 
conduct that is sufficiently connected to the criminal consequence, even though they differ 
slightly as to how that connection should be established. They also identify limited forms of 
behaviour which are likely to result in criminal responsibility, although again they differ as 
to the reasons why. 
There is a general norm of customary law providing for liability by complicity 
Beyond the authorities considered above, there is further evidence o f both state practice and 
opinio juris relating to the existence of a customary norm of complicity. 
The IMT's Charter itself declared: "Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices 
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any 
of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such a plan." 3 5 9 Although the I M T chose to apply the inchoate notion of "conspiracy" only 
in respect of crimes against peace, broader ideas of complicity are evident in its 
judgment. 3 6 0 The broad principles of the Charter were affirmed by the General Assembly. 3 6 1 
362 
The Nuremberg Principles, probably declaratory of customary international law, 
recognised the potential for the application of this type of concept more widely: 
"[complici ty in the commission of an [international crime] is a crime under international 
law." 3 6 3 
More explicitly, the relevant provision of Control Council Law No. 10 had stated: 
3 6 0 Goering (IMT), pp.43^t4. Also V A N D E R WlLT.(2007).op.cit., p.93. 
3 6 1 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal, UN 
G A Res. 95 (I), 1946. 
3 6 2 C.f ADAMS.(1993).op.cit. , pp.283-284. 
3 6 3 'Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment 
of the Tribunal Adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, with commentaries,' 
1950, pp.377-378. 
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Any person... is deemed to have committed a crime... if he was (a) a principal or (b) was [sic] an 
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a 
consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its 
364 
commission... 
Control Council Law No. 10, along with the IMT Charter and IMT Judgment, was held to 
constitute "authoritative recognition of principles of individual penal responsibility in 
international affairs which.. . had been developing for many years." 3 6 5 The 1946 Norwegian 
Law on the Punishment of Foreign War Criminals also made provision for the punishment 
of individuals complicit in a core offence, 3 6 6 as did Dutch law. 3 6 7 
The Genocide Convention punishes direct perpetration of the core offence, as well as those 
who conspire to commit it, directly and publicly incite it, or are otherwise complicit . 3 6 8 The 
Apartheid Convention makes similar provision. 3 6 9 Although not necessarily a part o f the 
system of ICL discussed here, the international conventions providing for the domestic 
criminalization of certain acts are also illustrative. They evidence both a long-established 
understanding by the majority of states that modes of liability other than direct perpetration 
exist in law, and that the definition of these modes is evolving. They reflect a widely-
ratified evolution from liability for any person who "participates as an accomplice" 3 7 0 to 
anyone who "abets... or is otherwise an accomplice" 3 7 1 to, recently, any who: 
a. participates as an accomplice in a [specified offence]; or 
b. organizes or directs others to commit a [specified offence]; or 
3 6 4 Control Council Law No. 10, Article 11(2). 
3 6 5 Altstoetter (NMT), pp.968, 977-978. 
3 6 6 Law on the Punishment of Foreign War Criminals, (No. 14) 1946, Art.4, cited in Annex I: Norwegian law 
concerning trials of war criminals, 3 L R T W C 81, 85. 
3 6 7 Extraordinary Penal Law Decree, 22 December 1943, as amended, Arts. 12, 15, cited in Annex: 
Netherlands law concerning trials of war criminals, 11 L R T W C 86, 97-98. 
3 6 8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art.3. [In force 1951; 140 
parties.] 
6 9 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Art.3. [In force 
1976; 107 parties.] 
3 7 0 Convention Against Torture, Art.4( I) [in force 1987; 145 parties]; International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages, Art. 1(2) [in force 1983; 164 parties]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Art.2(l)(e) [in force 1977; 
166 parties]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Art. 1(2) [in 
force 1973; 185 parties]. 
3 7 1 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Art.3(2) [in 
force 1992; 146 parties]; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf, Art.2(2) [in force 1992; 135 parties]. 
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c. in any other way contributes to the commission of [a specified offence] by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with 
the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group... 3 7 2 
The drafting history o f this provision is related to that of relevant portions of Article 25 of 
the ICC Statute,313 itself drawing upon the ILC's 1996 Draft Code314 The ICTY/R Statutes, 
duplicated by the SCSL, also provide in relevant part: 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation of execution of a crime... shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
Taken together, it is clear from these sources that the vast majority of states (certainly, well 
over 50%) have manifested their recognition that individuals complicit in a crime also 
partake of criminal responsibility. It might be argued moreover that they suggest a 
customary basis for a limited enumerated complicity doctrine: Cryer, for example, referring 
to the basic agreement of state comments in reviewing the relevant drafts and the 
widespread acceptance they have subsequently received, considers the basic structure of the 
participation provisions in the ICTY/R Statutes to be established in customary law. 3 7 5 This 
view is perhaps sustainable, although it resurrects the earlier debate as to the proper 
circumstances in which one might discern custom. It might be better to suggest that the 
provisions reflect general principles of law, which may or may not have subsequently 
crystallised into custom. As such, in the conservative manner adopted here, it is preferable 
to be cautious. 
For all the above reasons, therefore, it can only be certain that an unenumerated doctrine of 
complicity was established in customary law before the operation of the ICTY/R. No 
systematic attempt had been made to identify and confirm the meaning of the various 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Art.2(4) [in force 2007; 29 
parties, 115 signatories]; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Art.2(5) 
[in force 2002; 160 parties]; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Art.2(3) [in 
force 2001; 153 parties.] 
3 7 3 C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., p.309; SCHABAS.(2004).op.cit . , p. 103. 
3 7 4 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the [ I L C ] to the General 
Assembly, 1996, Art.2(3). 
3 7 5 'The boundaries of liability in [ I C L ] , or "Selectivity by Stealth",' C R Y E R , R., 2001, p.21. 
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concepts and applications to which reference had been made; there was no basis for the 
international community to reach an informed consensus. Since 1998, however, the ICTY/R 
and ICC have engaged in precisely this task. From their work, the following doctrines have 
emerged. Although the institutions diverge in some respects, these doctrines represent a 
sound basis for the crystallisation of customary law and a more developed body of 'rules' of 
attribution. Indeed, the nature of the relationship between their jurisprudence wi l l largely be 
shaped by the ICC judges' careful consideration—beyond the scope of this study—as to 
when this crystallisation occurred. 
A.) Coincidence between individual conduct and the criminal consequence 
In principle, any mode of liability may apply to any substantive crime. 3 7 6 It is necessary, 
however, that the particular conduct manifests a sufficient connection between the conduct 
of the accused and the core offence charged, both materially and mentally. 3 7 7 This is a 
natural consequence of the principles of autonomy 3 7 8 and culpability, 3 7 9 reflected in Article 
25(2) o f the ICC Statute and which may certainly be considered law common to the 
nations. 3 8 0 
The requirements of a particular mode of liability do not formally alter or replace the 
material and mental elements of the substantive crimes themselves, including any specific 
381 
intent, although they may vary the standard by which those elements are considered to be 
met. Thus, although the definition of each offence is framed by reference to the material 
E.g., Rwamakuba Interlocutory Appeal, para.31; Tadic.AJ, para. 188; Kajelijeli. TJ, para.756. This statement 
is necessarily contingent on certain assumptions (for example, the role of intent/knowledge, the enumeration 
of all modes of liability, etc): it is possible to conceive of circumstances where this may not be the case, 
although such a contingency is judged unlikely: e.g., 'The concept of a [JCE] and domestic modes of liability 
for parties to a crime: a comparison of Gentian and English law,' H A M D O R F , K . , 2007, p.212; V A N 
SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., pp.190-191, 195. 
3 7 7 Delalic.TJ, para.424. 
3 7 8 V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003) .op .c i t . , p.58. 
3 7 9 Tadic.AJ, para. 186; In re Yamashita ( U S ) , 1946, pp.28-29. Also AMBOS.(2006).op.cit. , p.671; 
TRESCHEL.(2005) .op .c i t . , pp.158, 171; JESCHECK.(2004) .op .c i t . , p.44. 
3 8 0 Delalic.TJ, para.424; also V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003) .op .c i t . , pp.42-43. 
3 8 1 Stakic.TJ, paras.437, 442. Further fn.376 supra. 
3 8 2 Fn.397 infra. 
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and mental elements adapted to the relevant circumstances, it is also possible to speak of 
more general material and mental standards (usually in the context of intent/knowledge and 
causation) which define modes of liability. It is submitted that there are minimum standards 
which any mode of liability must meet in order to preserve the culpability principle. 3 8 4 
These are, of course, minimum standards only—it remains true to say that certain modes of 
liability may require a higher standard in order to reflect the requisite degree of culpability. 
The existence of the general mens rea provision in the ICC Statute illustrates this 
concept. 3 8 5 Although in express terms it lays down a default, rather than a minimum, 
requirement,3 8 6 the Statute makes substantial departure from it only in respect of superior 
responsibility (Article 28) . 3 8 7 Even then, at least with regard to the practice of the ICTY/R, 
it might be argued that the mental requirement for superior responsibility is compatible with 
the general standard, or very nearly so. 3 8 8 Even so, for the taxonomy advanced in this paper, 
superior responsibility remains something o f a 'special case' and thus outside the general 
scope of the minimum standards which are otherwise argued to prevail. 
As Dupuy notes, "intentionality" (in the broad sense: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea) 
is the decisive criterion upon which individual responsibility rests.3 8 9 Accordingly, in 
contemporary discussion o f the general part o f ICL, emphasis tends to be placed on the 
E.g., ScHABAS.(2003).op.cit., pp. 1020-1025; 'Addendum, Part II: Elements of Crimes,' Report of the 
Preparatory Commission for the [ICC] (hereinafter "Elements of Crimes"). 
3 8 4 Also SCHABAS.(2001).op.cit., p.446. 
3 8 5 PlRAGOFF/ROBlNSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.5; WERLE/JESSBERGER.(2005) .op .c i t . , p.35; 'Mental 
elements—mistake of fact and mistake of law,' E S E R , A., in C A S S E S E E T AL.(2002).op.cit., p.902. Cf 
SCHABAS.(2003).op.cit., p. 1025. 
3 8 6 ICC Statute, Art.30(l): "Unless otherwise provided..." 
3 8 7 PlRAGOFF/ROBlNSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.14; WERLE/JESSBERGER.(2005).op.cit. , p.47; 
ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.898-899. For other minor departures, ICC Statute & Elements of Crimes: 
Arts.8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(vii) et al, 8(2)(b)(xxvi). In the former example, the case for its departure from Art.30, 
hinging on one definition of "wantonly", is not altogether convincing: ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.899 ; c f . 
CRYER.(2001).op.cit., p.24. With respect to the second example, the use of a "knew or should have known" 
standard is the outcome of Art.32. Only with respect to the latter does the lower mental standard go to the 
heart of the offence: its meaning, however, has not yet been elaborated. Given the practical context of this 
offence, a 'wilful blindness' approach might be the most practicable, and is itself consistent with Art.30: 
fn.858 infra. C.f Dyilo Charges Decision, paras.356-359. 
3 8 8 E.g., Schabas' assertion of the gap between the 'knowledge' standard required for complicity at the 
I C T Y / R and the 'constructive knowledge' standard required for superior responsibility may be less defensible 
in the light of the Blaskic appeal: 'Mens rea and the [ I C T Y ] , ' SCHABAS, W.A., 2003, pp.1026, 1028. Further 
pp. 114-115.infra. 
'International criminal responsibility of the individual and international responsibility of the state,' D U P U Y , 
P., in C A S S E S E E T AL.(2002).op.cit., pp. 1092, 1095. The requirement for a 'guilty mind' may be a general 
principle of law: ScilABAS.(2003).op.cit., 1015-1017. Also Kordic.TJ, para.219. 
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mental rather than the material element of the nexus between the individual and the criminal 
consequence. This may at least partially account for the fact that the drafters of the ICC 
Statute were content to include a general provision controlling the minimum mens rea 
standard (Article 30) but not the actus reus.390 However, as Ambos notes with regard to 
aiding and abetting—a comment, it is submitted, that may be sustained more generally—a 
clarification of the actus reus standard would be both feasible and beneficial. 3 9 1 
Alhough the case can be made that there should be no general, minimum objective standard 
(or that any existing standard is vanishingly low), it should not be warmly regarded. The 
very principle behind the use of modes of liability (rather than applying inchoate crimes 
such as conspiracy) is to demonstrate the individual's engagement with the core substantive 
offence. It is self-defeating, therefore, to deny the existence of a minimum objective 
standard. 
The Trial Chamber in Delalic considered that: 
The requisite actus reus for such responsibility is constituted by an act of participation which in 
fact contributes to, or has an effect on, the commission of the crime. Hence, this participation must 
have "a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act". The corresponding 
intent, or mens rea, is indicated by the requirement that the act of participation be performed with 
knowledge that it will assist [...] in the commission of the criminal act. Thus, there must be 
"awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, 
instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a 
A provision along these lines was included in an earlier draft: Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an [ICC], Addendum, 1998, Art.28(3), pp.54-55. Its subsequent loss may be largely 
attributed to its association with crimes of omission, upon which no consensus could be satisfactorily 
established: 'Individual criminal responsibility,' E S E R , A . , in C A S S E S E E T AL.(2002).op.cit., p.819; 
AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.51. Less convincingly, Ambos also highlights the possible relevance of the 
fact that, in contrast to domestic criminal contexts, the individual's own contribution to the harmful result is 
not always apparent: mn.3. Werle suggests, rather tenuously, that an objective requirement (causation) remains 
implicit in Article 30: WERLE.(2005) .op.ci t . , p.98. 
3 9 1 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.21. 
3 9 2 Delalic.TJ, para.326. Also Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, paras.29-32; Aleksovski.TJ, para.61; Akayesu.TJ, paras.477-
479; Tadic.TJ, para.674; c.f Seromba.TJ, para.306. For earlier propositions of the mental element, see 
ESER.(2002b).op.cit.,pp.893-895. 
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The actus reus standard is better considered merely as the rendering o f a "substantial" 
contribution: depending on the mode o f liability in question, and the prevailing 
circumstances, there may be occasions when an individual's conduct may have a substantial 
effect on the commission of the core crime but not a direct one. 3 9 3 "Substantial" should be 
understood in the qualitative sense of "material" rather than the quantitative sense of 
"significant". 3 9 4 Articulating this general standard may appear to be rather bold. As the 
discussion of the individual modes of liability illustrates, however, it is not without 
foundation. The recent decision in Haradinaj reflects similar reasoning. 3 9 5 
Accordingly, Delalic suggests it must invariably be shown that: 
• the accused intended their conduct (i.e., it was not done involuntarily); 
• their conduct in fact had a substantial effect upon the criminal consequence; and 
• the accused 'knew' their conduct served to promote the criminal consequence. 
Beyond the minimal mens rea requirement laid down in Tadic and Delalic, it is suggested 
that a higher standard has in fact been applied. Distinguishing the mental element of a mode 
of liability from that of the substantive offence can be difficult: whereas the general material 
standard for responsibility (a causal link, however minimal) is often easily distinguished 
from the material elements of the specific offence (proscribed acts), the language of mens 
rea is the same (intent, knowledge 3 9 6). As van Sliedregt emphasises: 
Participatory liability almost by definition combines mental elements that exist on different levels. 
In trying to solve this incompatibility, the mental elements should be seen as distinct. Participatory 
Oric.TJ, paras.276, 285; Furundzija.TJ, para.232. 
3 9 4 C.f. SCHABAS.(200l).op.cit., pp.447-448, 450. Further pp.15-11 .infra. 
3 9 5 Haradinaj. TJ, para. 141. 
3 9 6 The jurisprudence of the tribunals is littered with confused and confusing references to the terms 
"knowledge" and "intent", sometimes used synonymously, sometimes in a nuanced fashion. As Fletcher 
observes, it is often "anomalous" to consider an accomplice to "intend" an offence, even if they are fully 
knowing: Rethinking Criminal Law, F L E T C H E R , G.P., 2000, p.635; also 'Parochial versus universal criminal 
law,' F L E T C H E R , G.P., 2005, p.33. For the present purposes, when the term "intent" is used, it generally 
conveys the mens rea of a perpetrator only; knowledge of intent, which may still convey a sufficiently 'guilty' 
mind is more apposite for other parties in a crime: see, e.g., VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., pp. 195-196. 
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liability has its own mental element through which the mental element of the underlying crime is 
established.397 
The mental standard articulated by the Blaskic Appeals Chamber in the context of 
"ordering" (acting in the "awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime wi l l be 
committed" 3 9 8) would seem to be compatible with all the modes of l iabi l i ty . 3 9 9 Indeed, it has 
also been expressly applied in the context of "committing", "instigating" and "planning". 4 0 0 
It requires "awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element"—the latter 
element makes it a slightly higher test than mere knowledge and includes an aspect of 
intent. At the same time, it recognises that not all accomplices act with certainty but 
sometimes with indifference. As such, it falls (in common law terms) somewhere between 
"indirect intent" and recklessness;401 in civi l law terms, 4 0 2 it is approximate to dolus 
eventualis 4 0 i 
The only mode of liability to which the application of this standard is in doubt is aiding and 
abetting. The Vasiljevic mental standard recalled in Blaskic404 ("knowledge that [the] acts 
assist the commission of the offen[c]e") could be interpreted as more stringent than dolus 
eventualis, more akin to second-degree dolus direc/us. However, the Blaskic Chamber also 
went out of its way to approve an alternative formulation from Furundzija ("awarefness] 
that one of a number of crimes wi l l probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in 
fact committed"), 4 0 5 which left the door open for general application of its dolus eventualis 
approach. This inference has been imperilled by the recent decision in Blagojevic, which 
answered a Prosecution appeal on the mens rea of aiding and abetting premised on a very 
VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., p.204; see further Brdanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal (hereinafter, 
"Brdanin Interlocutor}' Appear), per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.2, 4-5; also 'Article 30: mental element,' 
PlRAGOFF, D.K., & ROBINSON, D., in TRIFFTERER.(2008 forthcoming).op.cit., mn.8. 
3 9 8 Blaskic.AJ, para.42, emphasis added. 
3 9 9 'Joint Criminal Enterprise: criminal liability by prosecutorial ingenuity and judicial creativity,' POWLES, S., 
2004,p.6l l . 
4 0 0 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, paras.29-32; Limaj.TJ, para.509. 
4 0 1 Ojdanic Indirect Co-perpetration Decision, para.38; SlMESTER/SULLIVAN.(2003).op.cit., pp. 132-135. 
4 0 2 More precisely, in the civil law tradition reflected in German and Dutch law, for example. The French 
notion of dol eventuel equates more closely to inadvertent recklessness: VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.46-
47. 
4 0 3 For definitions, see HAMDORF.(2007).op.cit., p.214; FLETCHER/OHLlN.(2005).op.cit., p.554; VAN 
SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.45-48; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.906; Ojdanic JCE Decision, per Judge Hunt, 
para. 10, fh.44. Dolus eventualis, at least as applied in I C L , is not a negligence standard: Stakic.AJ, paras.99-
103;Sta*/'c.77, para.587. 
4 0 4 Blaskic.AJ, para.46. 
4 0 5 Ibid., para.50. 
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similar argument to the one outlined here. In the impugned decision, the Trial Chamber 
had applied the mens rea standard from Vasiljevic™1 which requires knowledge that the 
aider and abettor's acts assist in "the commission of the specific crime" by the principal, the 
higher of the two tests approved in Blaskic. The Appeals Chamber swiftly rejected the 
Prosecution's argument, recalling 
...its position from [Blaskic] that there are no reasons to depart from the definition of mens rea of 
aiding and abetting found in [Vasiljevic]. [Blaskic] did not extend the definition of mens rea [sic.] 
of aiding and abetting.4 0 8 
This finding depends on strict linguistic parsing indeed. Although it is correct insofar as 
Blaskic did in terms uphold Vasiljevic, it ignores the reference to the standard suggested by 
Furundzija.409 As a matter o f judicial discipline, this can perhaps be jus t i f ied . 4 1 0 However, 
in so doing, they have wafted an unfortunately chill wind over the Furundzija standard, and 
thus the generality of the Blaskic approach to mens rea. That said, Furundzija itself has still 
not been specifically disapproved, nor substantively measured against Vasiljevic. Thus, with 
relatively little judicial sleight-of-hand, both Blaskic and Furundzija could live to fight 
another day. Such a development would, it is submitted, be a sensible and logical step to 
correct a likely inadvertent consequence, standardising the law and further enhancing its 
clarity. 
It is suggested that analogous minimum standards for modes of liability apply under the ICC 
Statute. In the absence of express provision for a minimum material standard, it is suggested 
that the ICC should apply the ICTY/R jurisprudence on the point, via Article 21. With 
regard to mens rea, Article 25, which sets out the relevant modes of liability, must be read 
with Article 30. Within the latter's general requirement for "intent and knowledge" 4" (i.e., 
both a volitional and a cognitive element), the article may be reduced to stipulating that: 
4 0 6 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, paras.219-220. 
4 0 7 Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 102. 
4 0 8 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para.222. 
4 0 9 Blaskic.AJ, para.50. 
4 1 0 Blaskic.AJ, para.52. 
4 1 1 ICC Statute, Art.30(1); WERLE/JESSBERGER.(2005).op.cit. , pp.38-39. Although expressed conjunctively, 
the relationship between these elements is not quite as straightforward as it seems: ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.916. 
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• the actor's conduct is intentional; 4 1 2 
• the actor knows of any relevant circumstances;413 
• the criminal consequence is 'intended', 4 1 4 or is foreseen as occurring "in the 
ordinary course of events". 4 1 5 
Article 30 clearly permits liability on the basis of proof of dolus directus, in either first or 
second degrees.416 In the latter case, foreseeability of the criminal consequence amounts to a 
virtual certainty. 4 1 7 It is unclear, however, whether the provision also permits the lower 
standard of foreseeability envisaged by dolus eventualis, as commonly interpreted in I C L . 4 1 8 
I f it does not, it wi l l apply an even higher mental standard than the ICTY/R (although 
technically as a 'default' rather than a 'minimum'). 
Werle and Jessberger consider that the minimum requirement under the plain words o f 
Article 30 is "awareness of the probable occurrence of the consequence... it is not enough 
for the perpetrator merely [to] anticipate the possibi l i ty" 4 1 9 As such, they suggest that the 
provision is not directly amenable to the use of a dolus eventualis standard. 4 2 0 However, 
relying on a broad interpretation o f the "unless otherwise provided" qualification, they 
advocate reference to the jurisprudence of the ICTY/R through Article 2 1 . 4 2 1 They consider 
that "this case law also determines the subjective requirements of crimes under [the ICC 
Statute]" 4 2 2 There are some difficulties with this approach. First, it seems to be predicated 
on the notion that the jurisprudence expands potential criminal responsibility in respect only 
of a few offences, in particular "ki l l ings" . 4 2 3 However, given that dolus eventualis would 
then suffice as the minimum mens rea state for almost all modes o f liability (excepting only 
some forms of perpetration/JCE), the effect is to broaden Article 30 more dramatically even 
4 1 2 ICC Statute, Art.30(2)(a). 
4 1 3 Ibid., Art.30(3); further PlRAGOFF/ROBlNSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.6. 
4 1 4 PlRAGOFF/ROBlNSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn. 11. 
4 , 5 Ibid., Arts.30(2)(b), (3). 
4 1 6 ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.914-915. 
4 1 7 VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).Op.cit., p.46. 
4 1 8 PlRAGOFF/ROBINSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., fn.67. 
4 1 9 WERLE/JESSBERGER.(2005).op.cit. , p.41. On this issue, also generally WERLE.(2005).op.cit., pp.104-110, 
113-116. 
4 2 0 Ibid., pp.42, 53. Also C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p.320; VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.51-52; 
ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.915-916, 932-933. 
4 2 1 WERLE/jESSBERGER.(2005).op.cit. , pp.45-46. 
4 2 2 Ibid, p.54. 
4 2 3 Ibid., p.48. 
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than Werle and Jessberger might have intended. Secondly, their approach presupposes 
that the customary status of the ICTY/R rule has already crystallised. Although certainly 
arguable, it is an unnecessary gamble. Instead, in light of the broad resonance between the 
modes of liability applied by the ICTY/R and ICC—and the extent to which an apparently 
'strict' construction of Article 30 leads to it being turned inside out—it might be preferable 
to infer that the ICC drafters intended to permit liability under dolus eventualis in the first 
place. 
Piragoff and Robinson seem to interpret Article 30 in precisely this fashion, 4 2 5 although the 
definition of dolus eventualis they apply seems more reminiscent of second-degree dolus 
directus. Mantovani considers too that prosecution for 'advertent recklessness' (dolus 
eventualis) is permitted, excluding only inadvertent recklessness and pure negligence. 4 2 6 On 
the other hand, van der Wilt strongly implies that its use is against the spirit of the Statute, 
either under Article 30 or via Article 2 1 . 4 2 7 
In considering the scope for determining the meaning of the provision, it should be recalled 
that the ICC Statute is a treaty and must be interpreted as such: 4 2 8 even when strictly 
construed, the relevant rules of interpretation are subtly different than those which prevail 
for domestic legislation. As such, where interpretive ambiguity exists, reference to relevant 
general international law is jus t i f ied , 4 2 9 even without formal recourse through the Article 21 
mechanism. 
It is to be hoped that this issue has been resolved by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. Although 
choosing to leave the basis for its reasoning ambiguous, it ruled that the volitional element 
required by Article 30 includes all three forms of dolus recognised in the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY/R . 4 3 0 In discussing dolus eventualis, wot only does it borrow the Blaskic language 
of "substantial l ikelihood" 4 3 1 but it also suggests the (novel) possibility that an actor's clear 
4 Ibid., p.55. 
5 PlRAGOFF/ROBINSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.22. 
6 MANTOVANI. (2003) .op .c i t . , p.32. 
7 V A N D E R WlLT.(2007).op.cit„ p. 100. 
8 SCHABAS.(2004).op.cit . , pp.93-95. 
9 Fn.269.supra. 
u Dyilo Charges Decision, paras.351-355. 
1 Ibid., para.353. 
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or express acceptance of the risk may permit the imposition of liability where the criminal 
consequence is even less foreseeable.4 3 2 This latter step is presumably based on the 
reasoning that an enhanced manifestation of the volitional element can compensate for a 
lower cognitive element. This seems dubious, as the actor's subjective acceptance of the 
risk does not seem actually to be increased; rather, it is merely easier to prove. 
It may be concluded, in short, that the notion of a predicate connection between an 
individual's conduct and the criminal consequence is established in both the law of the 
ICTY/R and the ICC. Although there is a measure of ambiguity in both fora, it is suggested 
that the authorities can reasonably be interpreted to prohibit liability without proof that an 
individual's act had a qualitatively substantial effect on the criminal consequence and that 
the act was committed with, at least, dolus eventualis. 
B.) Prohibition of perpetration... 
...directly and personally 
It is, of course, almost trite to cite this mode of liability. According to the ICTY/R, a person 
is said to have "committed" 4 3 3 an offence "when he or she physically perpetrates the 
relevant act or engenders a culpable omission in violation of a rule of criminal law". 4 3 4 The 
'physical' nature of the act is not itself requisite; it is a term of art to connote "direct" and 
"personal" involvement. 4 3 5 Such participation must form an "integral" part of the offence as 
legally defined, 4 3 6 satisfying both the requisite material and mental elements. A number of 
individuals may directly perpetrate the same crime, provided that all o f them f u l f i l the 
requisite elements.4 3 7 
4 3 2 Ibid., para.354. 
4 3 3 The terms "committed" and "perpetrated" may be used interchangeably: C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p.302. 
4 3 4 Kayishema/Ruzindana.AJ, para. 187; Tadic.AJ, para. 188; Haradinaj. TJ, para. 141; Limaj. TJ, para.509; 
Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.694; Galic.TJ, para. 168; Kajelijeli.TJ, para..764; Simic.TJ, para. 137; Stakic.TJ, 
para.432; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.62, Vasiljevic.TJ, para.62; Kvocka.TJ, para.243; Krstic.TJ, para.601; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.390. 
4 3 5 Kayishema/Ruzindana.AJ, para. 187; Limaj.TJ, para.509; Simic.TJ, para. 137; Semanza.TJ, para.383; 
Kvocka.TJ, para.251; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.376. C.f. Gacumbitsi.TJ, para.285; Muhimana.TJ, para.506. 
4 3 6 Seromba.AJ, para. 161; Gacumbitsi.AJ, para.60. 
4 3 7 Simic.TJ, para. 137; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.62. 
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The accused must at least act with dolus eventualis. Although the Trial Chamber in Simic 
referred only to the requirement that the accused "intended" the occurrence of a criminal 
offence as a consequence of their conduct, 4 3 9 the term should be understood in the broad 
sense otherwise applied by the ICTY/R . 4 4 0 This view was confirmed by the more laborious, 
composite formulation applied in Lima/441 Despite its express commitment to the law of the 
ICTY/R, 4 4 2 the SCSL offered a nuanced reading of this standard in Fofana, referring to a 
requirement for intent or "reasonable knowledge" that the crime would likely occur. 4 4 3 
Given the approach in Brima444 it is to be assumed that the Fofana Trial Chamber intended 
to express the notion of dolus eventualis, however clumsily. Nonetheless, the connotations 
of negligence implicit in the "reasonable knowledge" terminology require that this approach 
is disapproved. 
Assuming an expansive interpretation of Article 30, Article 25(3)(a) o f the ICC Statute 
presents an identical approach to single-actor perpetration, even though its wording (in 
English) is not well-considered. 4 4 5 The ICC Statute does not give general consideration to 
the possibility of omissions as forming the basis for crimes, although this must be inferred. 
The ICTY/R have recognised in principle the possibility that omissions may give rise to 
liability, provided the accused is under a positive duty to act. 4 4 6 
...jointly or by means 
The evolution of co-perpetration and common purpose liabilities has, without doubt, been 
one of the most controversial aspects of modern ICL. Discussion has been vigorous. Quite 
apart from ambiguities as to the source of this law, the debate has been characterised by a 
theoretical argument between those who favour a "subjective" approach to co-perpetration 
(the individual must intend the commission of the offence) and those who favour a "control-
4 3 8 E.g.,Kvocka.TJ, para.251 
4 3 9 Simic. TJ, para. 137; also Seromba.AJ, para. 173. 
4 4 0 Blaskic.AJ, paras.41-42. 
4 4 1 Limaj.TJ, para.509. 
44" Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, para.205; Brima.TJ, para.762. 
4 4 3 Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, para.205. 
4 4 4 Brima. 77,para.763. 
4 4 5 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.7; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.789. 
4 4 6 Brdanin.AJ, para.274; Galic.AJ, para. 175; Ntagerura.AJ, para.334; Blaskic.AJ, para.663; Tadic.AJ, 
para. 188. 
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based" approach (the individual must knowingly control the commission of the offence). 
For the foreseeable future, it is likely that the two approaches w i l l remain side-by-side in 
general ICL—despite the ruling of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. Certainly, the appellate 
decision in Brdanin is significant in signalling that the ICTY has not adopted a deliberate 
policy of retrenchment with regard to JCE, 4 4 8 while co-perpetration remains alive and well 
at the ICC. Whether these approaches wi l l prove equally popular with prosecutors is, of 
course, another question. 
The principal co-perpetration doctrine developed by the I C T Y / R 4 4 9 is "joint criminal 
enterprise" (JCE). 4 5 0 Early authorities considered JCE straightforwardly as "co-
perpetration",4 5 1 with all that the idea entailed, and indeed this view remains relatively 
current. 4 5 2 In formal terms, regardless of individual conduct, all JCE participants are equally 
responsible.4 5 3 However, its nature has also always been "hotly contested".4 5 4 In its three 
forms (basic, systemic, and extended 4 5 5), it challenges the distinction between perpetrative 
and derivative liabilities: the culpability of those liable under the doctrine varies. 4 5 6 
JCE has also been a particular focus of concern about judicial creativity. In Tadic, the 
Appeals Chamber held that "common design" is a form of liability "f i rmly established" in 
4 4 7 Dyilo Charges Decision, paras.326-331. Also Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.45; 
Vasiljevic.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.32. 
4 4 8 C.f., e.g., VAN DER WiLT.(2007).op.cit., p.92. 
4 4 9 Primarily litigated at the I C T Y , it also exists at the ICTR: Ntakirutimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, para.468. The 
S C S L (e.g., Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, para.208) and Special Panel for Serious Crimes (East Timor) have also 
recognised it (e.g., Perreira.TJ, 2005, pp. 19-20; de Deus.TJ, 2005, p. 13; cited in AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., 
fn.37). 
4 5 0 Variously, it has also been known as "a common criminal plan, a common criminal purpose, a common 
design or purpose, a common criminal design, a common purpose, a common design, [...] a common 
concerted design... a criminal enterprise, a common enterprise, and a joint criminal enterprise." Brdanin/Talic, 
Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend (hereinafter 
"Brdanin/Talic Decision"), para.24. Acting "in concert" may also connote J C E : Vasiljevic.TJ, para.63. The 
term " J C E " is preferred: Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.36; per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.3-5; per Judge Hunt, 
para.5; Simic.TJ, para. 149. Further Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.30-33; V A N 
SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p. 100. 
4 5 1 Krnojelac.AJ, para.73; Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.20; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, paras.695-696; Simic.TJ, 
para. 138; Kupreskic.TJ, paras.772, 782. 
5 2 E.g., Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 119, and per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.2. C.f. Oric.TJ, para.281. 
4 5 3 Vasiljevic.AJ, para.l 11; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.702; Stakic.TJ, para.435; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.67; 
Krnojelac.TJ, para.82. 
4 5 4 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., pp. 189-190, 201-202; METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., pp.287-288. 
4 5 5 Pp.78-80.rn/ro. 
4 5 6 VAN SLIEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., p.205; CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., pp. 120-122; OHLlN.(2007).op.cit., p.83; 
CRYERETAL.(2007).op.cit . , p.308; SCHABAS.(2006).op.cit., p.314; METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p.292; VAN 
SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.76, 103, 106. Also Brdanin.AJ, para.432. 
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customary international law. Various commentators have disagreed, particularly with 
regard to the extended variant. 4 5 8 Even as recently as the appeal in Brdanin, the ICTY 
Association of Defence Counsel maintained that JCE does not exist in customary law. 4 5 9 
The fact that Cassese considers JCE to have become "consolidated" in ICL "since" the 
Tadic appellate decision also underlines the role that modern judicial practice has played. 4 6 0 
The actus reus of JCE is: 
i. A plurality of persons. They need not be organised in a military, political or 
administrative structure... 
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the 
commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is no necessity for this plan, 
design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated. The common plan or 
purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality 
of persons act in unison... 
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of one of 
the crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not involve commission of 
a specific crime... but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the 
execution of the common plan or purpose.'16' 
In practice, this amounts to a simpler, two-element test: the existence of the JCE itself and 
the (intentional) participation by the accused.4 6 2 Concerns about the scope of JCE (i.e., the 
possibility that liability w i l l over-reach culpability) have led to some attempts to interpret 
these elements restrictively. 4 6 3 However, such attempts have tended to do such violence to 
the purpose of JCE, or its legal and practical context, that they are better avoided. This 'all 
E.g., Brdanin.AJ, para.405; Gacumbilsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.40-41; Vasiljevic.AJ, para.95; 
Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.29; Tadic.AJ, para.226. 
4 5 8 E.g., DARCY.(2007).op.cit., pp.381, 384-385; PoWLES.(2004).op.cit., pp.615-617. 
4 5 9 Brdanin, Amicus Brief, fn.73, cited in Brdanin.AJ, para.373, fn.804. 
4 6 0 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit, p. 110. 
4 6 1 Tadic.AJ, para.227. Also Brdanin.AJ, paras.364, 430; Stakic.AJ, para.64; Kvocka.AJ, para.8l; 
Ntakirutimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, para.466; Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 100; Kayishema/Ruzindana.AJ, para. 193; 
Furundzija.AJ, para.l 19; Mrksic.TJ, para.545; MarticTJ, paras.435-436; Krajisnik.TJ, para.883; Limaj.TJ, 
para.511; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.698; Brdanin.TJ, paras.260-261; Simic.TJ, para. 156; Kvocka.TJ, para.266; 
Krstic.TJ, para.611; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.397; Kupreskic.TJ, para.772 . 
4 6 2 Delalic.AJ, para.366; Stakic.TJ, para.435; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.65; Krnojelac.TJ, para.79. Greater 
consideration of the 'plurality' requirement may offer, however, an as yet unexplored avenue for ensuring the 
compliance of J C E with the culpability principle: ' [JCE] and Brdanin: misguided over-correction,' 
O ' R O U R K E , A., 2006, p.325. 
4 6 3 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., 188-189; O'RoURKE.(2006).op.cit., p.315. 
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or nothing' quality may have been a significant contributor to the 'stand-off that has 
developed with other co-perpetration doctrines. 
The 'common plan' may be understood as "an understanding or arrangement amounting to 
an agreement"4 6 4 although, as it may develop tacitly and extemporaneously,465 it need have 
no formal trappings: the parties themselves may not subjectively recognise it as a 'p lan ' . 4 6 6 
Any requirement for "express agreement" was recently disapproved. 4 6 7 In the practical 
context of international crimes, the reasoning behind this decision is sound 4 6 8 (providing 
that a unifying purpose is made out to the criminal standard, its express or implicit nature is 
beside the point 4 6 9 ) but it leads to the odd conclusion that this aspect of the actus reus 
requirement becomes very difficult to identify in abstract terms, being more or less 
subsumed in the mens rea requirement of shared intent. The nuance offered by the Krajisnik 
Trial Chamber, linking the identification of the common objective with co-ordinated action 
by the parties, 4 7 0 may be a helpful way forward, offering a more practical test while not 
unduly impeding the efficacy of the doctrine. 
The fact that the common plan is hard to define does not necessarily mean that the link 
between JCE members is attenuated, although it is a danger: 4 7 1 it should thus be identified 
on the facts strictly. 4 7 2 The common plan must be susceptible to proof, albeit by inference 
from the circumstances,4 7 3 and must be based on more than isolated examples of apparently 
facilitative conduct. 4 7 4 In the particular circumstances of a systemic JCE, proof of 
involvement (not just presence) in the system is largely sufficient. 4 7 5 The underlying 
4 6 4 Simic.TJ, para. 158; Stakic.TJ, para.435; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.66; Krnojelac.TJ, para.80. 
4 6 5 Stakic.AJ, para.64; Kvocka.AJ, para. 1171; Marlic.TJ, para.437; Krajisnik.TJ, para.883. 
4 6 6 Brdanin.AJ, para.390. 
4 6 7 Brdanin.AJ, paras.417-419; Mrksic.TJ, para.545; Martic.TJ, para.437. C.f. Brdanin.TJ, para.347. 
4 6 8 'The requirement of an 'express agreeement' for [JCE] liability: a critique of Brdanin,' G U S T A F S O N , K . , 
2007, pp.145-149; O'R.OURKE.(2006).op.cit., pp.323-325; c.f. V A N D E R WlLT.(2007).op.cit., pp.99-100; V A N 
SLIEDREGT.(2007) .op .c i t . , pp.200-201; 'The judgment of the [ I C T Y ] in the Brdanin case,' B L U M E N S T O C K , T., 
2005,pp.72-73. 
4 6 9 Brdanin.AJ, para.418; V A N D E R WlLT.(2007).op.cit., p. 107. 
4 7 0 Krajisnik.TJ, para.884; also Haradinaj.TJ, para. 139. The Trial Chamber's emphasis on the importance of 
'mutuality' can be understood just as well in this context: Brdanin.TJ, para.351. 
4 7 1 V A N SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., pp.204-205. 
4 7 2 Krnojelac.AJ, para. 116; see further paras. 117-120. 
4 7 3 Vasiljevic.AJ, para.109; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.699; Brdanin.TJ, para.262. E.g., Furundzija.AJ, para.120. 
4 7 4 Brdanin.TJ, para.352. 
4 7 5 Kvocka.AJ, paras.l 18, 413; Krnojelac.AJ, paras.96-97; Simic.TJ, para.158. 
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purpose, or motive, for entering into a 'common plan' is irrelevant. The plan's criminal 
nature may be derived not only from the ultimate objective sought but also from the means 
contemplated to that end. 4 7 7 
In particular, it must be established to which crimes the accused 'agreed'. 4 7 8 This is 
important both for the culpability principle, and in considering the extended form of JCE: 
the scope of the additional actus reus element of the latter (further crimes committed as a 
foreseeable consequence of the common criminal plan) necessarily depends on what the 
accused actually contemplated. 4 7 9 
It was asked in Milutinovic whether the physical perpetrator(s)4 8 0 must necessarily be part of 
the JCE. The Appeals Chamber declined to consider the issue as improvidently raised. 4 8 1 It 
was nonetheless a sufficiently important question, particularly once the 'absence' of a 
doctrine of indirect co-perpetration was established,482 that the Appeals Chamber gave the 
matter special subsequent consideration. In determining the point, emphasis was placed not 
on the particular membership of the JCE 4 8 3 but instead upon the degree to which it may be 
proved that the relevant crime was part of the common purpose. 4 8 4 The fact that the physical 
perpetrator was a member of the JCE, or was closely associated with a member, simplifies 
the evidential burden considerably but is not the only means of discharging i t . 4 8 5 In order to 
show the necessary 'mutuality' of purpose, physical perpetrators outside the JCE must be 
shown to be "linked" to a JCE member who used them pursuant to the plan. 4 8 6 Reliance on a 
physical perpetrator outside the JCE, particularly in the chaos of internecine conflict, may 
4 7 0 Kvocka.AJ, paras. 106, 209; Brdanin. TJ, para.342. 
4 7 7 Brima.AJ, para.76. 
4 7 8 Brdanin. TJ, para.264; Brdanin/Talic Decision, paras.44—45. 
4 7 9 Brdanin. A J, para.365; Karemera JCE Decision, para. 17; Stakic.AJ, para.65; Kvocka.AJ, para.86; Mrksic. TJ, 
para.546; Martic.TJ, para.439; Krajisnik.TJ, para.882; Limaj.TJ, para.512; Krstic.TJ, para.614. 
8 0 It has proved awkward to identify an apt term for the "people on the ground" or "trigger men" who 
transform the criminal plan into practical reality. The Appeals Chamber has favoured the term "principal 
perpetrators" (Brdanin.AJ, para.362) but this carries hierarchical overtones which fly in the face of the 
reasoning underlying J C E and co-perpetration doctrines. Thus, with some reluctance, the term "physical 
perpetrator" is preferred, even though it has obvious shortcomings in certain circumstances. 
81 Ojdanic Indirect Co-perpetration Decision, para.23. 
4 8 2 P. 84.infra; Ojdanic Indirect Co-perpetration Decision, per Judge Bonomy, paras.3-4. 
4 8 3 Which may, in any event, be hard to prove: e.g., Krnojelac.AJ, para.l 16; Brdanin.TJ, paras.345-346; 
Krajisnik. TJ, paras. 1081 -1082, 1086. 
4 8 4 C.f. CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., pp. 125-126. 
4 8 5 Brdanin. A J, para.410; Ojdanic Indirect Co-perpetration Decision, per Judge Bonomy, paras. 10-11, 13; 
Mrksic.TJ, para.547; Martic.TJ, para.438. 
4 8 6 Brdanin. A J, paras.413, 418, 430. 
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increase the chances that they wi l l operate outside the common plan, and open the question 
of JCE I I I l iabi l i ty . 4 8 7 
JCEs may overlap with each other, contain subsidiaries, or form part o f a wider scheme. 
Smaller enterprises may be more likely to have a purpose focused on a particular criminal 
488 
act; larger ones may have broad objectives which entail the violation of a range of 
criminal offences. 4 8 9 In principle, JCEs may be usefully ' inter-linked' . 4 9 0 There is no 
geographical or numerical limit on the size o f a JCE, 4 9 1 providing the necessary elements 
are made out . 4 9 2 Nonetheless, prosecutions for the more generally significant enterprises 
(targeting a system crime as a whole—such as the prosecutions in Brdanin or Krajisnik— 
rather than a particular crime incidental to it—such as Tadic) have become rather more 
complicated. In particular, it may be very difficult to prove the existence of a common plan 
where the accused is "physically and structurally" remote from the physical 
perpetrator(s).4 9 3 One JCE may also succeed another, although comprised of the same 
membership, where the objective changes fundamentally in nature. 4 9 4 In such 
circumstances, the foundations of liability must be established ab initio4,95 
The importance of the participation element in JCE should not be underestimated: JCE is 
not liability for mere conspiracy. 4 9 6 For the same reason, a crime must in fact have taken 
place pursuant to the common plan. 4 9 7 A nicely judged standard o f participation can help to 
Brdanin.AJ, para.411; Mrksic.TJ, para.547. 
4 8 8 Krnojelac.AJ, para. 122. 
4 8 9 Kvocka. TJ, para. 307. 
4 9 0 GuSTAFSON.(2007).op.cit., pp.146-149, 155-157. 
4 9 1 Brdanin.AJ, para.425; Karemera JCE Decision, para.17; Rwamakuba Interlocutory Appeal, para.25; 
Krajisnik.TJ, para.876. Further, e.g., Ohlendorf(NMT), pp.427-433. 
4 9 2 It is important to stress, however, that entire conflicts should not be regarded as JCEs: it has been recalled 
that it is vital to protect the notion of lawful combatancy, where applicable, in order to foster general 
engagement with the notion of IHL. SASSOLl/OLSON.(2000).op.cit., pp.8-9. 
4 9 3 See, e.g., Karemera JCE Decision, para. 17; Brdanin TJ, paras.354-355. This is, however, a practical 
challenge, not a legal one: Brdanin.AJ, para.424. 
4 9 4 Krajisnik. TJ, para. 1118; Blagojevic/Jokic. TJ, para.700. 
4 9 5 This requirement is, of course, subject to the possibility that liability under J C E III may be established. It is 
likely, however, that any change to the objective "fundamental in nature" will not also be "natural and 
foreseeable". 
4 9 6 Stakic.AJ, para.64; Ojdanic JCE Decision, para.26; Brdanin. TJ, para.263; Simic.TJ, para. 158. 
Fn.294.sup/-a. 
4 9 7 Brdanin.AJ, para.430. 
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address concerns about the compliance of JCE with the principle of culpability. The 
jurisprudence on this point has, however, been confused. 
Comparing JCE liability to aiding and abetting, it was held that " i t is sufficient for [a JCE] 
participant to perform acts that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common 
plan or purpose." 4 9 9 On the other hand, in Furundzija, it was observed that "to be guilty of 
torture as a perpetrator (or co-perpetrator), the accused must participate in an integral part 
of the torture", as well as possessing the necessary mens rea.500 The Trial Chamber in 
Kvocka, noting that the minimum threshold for the JCE actus reus had not been precisely 
determined, 5 0 1 recalled that "the contribution of persons convicted of participation in a 
[JCE] has to date been direct and significant". 5 0 2 It continued: 
The participation in the enterprise must be significant. By significant, the Trial Chamber means an 
act or omission that makes an enterprise efficient or effective, e.g, a participation that enables the 
system to run more smoothly or without disruption. Physical or direct perpetration of a serious 
crime that advances the goal of the criminal enterprise would constitute a significant contribution. 
In general, participation would need to be assessed on a case by case basis, especially for low or 
mid level actors who do not physically perpetrate crimes. 5 0 3 
References to the relevance of hierarchical position 5 0 4 should not themselves be afforded 
significance, 5 0 5 other than as an indicium of the accused's actual degree of participation 5 0 6 
or intent. 5 0 7 Some years later, the Appeals Chamber purported to reverse the requirement of 
significant participation, holding that: 
[I]n general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial contribution 
to the joint criminal enterprise. However, there may be specific cases which require, as an 
exception to the general rule, a substantial contribution of the accused to determine whether he 
4 9 8 O'RoURKE.(2006).op.cit., p.325. 
4 9 9 Tadic.AJ, para.229, emphasis added; Kvocka.TJ, para.274. 
5 0 0 Furundzija.TJ, para.257, emphasis added. The Appeal Chamber did not demur: Furundzija.AJ, para. 118. 
5 0 1 Kvocka.TJ, para.289; also para.308. 
5 0 2 Kvocka.TJ, para.275. 
5 0 3 Kvocka.TJ, para.309; also paras.306, 312. Also Simic.TJ, para. 159. 
5 0 4 Kvocka.TJ, paras.306, 309. 
5 0 5 Kvocka.AJ, para. 101; Krnojelac.TJ, para.78. 
5 0 6 Kvocka.AJ, para. 192. 
5 0 1 Limaj.TJ, para.511. 
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participated in the [JCE]. In practice, the significance of the accused's contribution will be relevant 
to demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose.5 0 8 
At the same time, the Chamber did assert that there is a minimum standard for participation 
in a JCE. 5 0 9 Neither did it touch on the finding of the Trial Chambers in Brdanin and 
Blagojevic that the accused's involvement must at least "form a link in the chain of 
causation", even though it need not be a sine qua non.5W Indeed, in expressly upholding this 
latter point and remaining silent on the question of general causal requirements, the Appeals 
Chamber at the very least left this possibility open. 5 1 1 
It seems likely that this finding illustrates confusion between the qualitative and quantitative 
meanings of the word "substantial". In the OED, the qualitative meaning ("having a real 
existence") is the primary one. 5 1 2 Similarly, a proper understanding of the minimum actus 
reus requirement for an act to have a "substantial" effect on the criminal consequence513 
(applicable to all complicity-based modes o f liability) is that it means a "real" one. A "real" 
act is indeed one, as the Kvocka Trial Chamber found, that enhances the enterprise in some 
way, that is less than minimal . 5 1 4 JCE liability should comply with this standard.5 1 5 Indeed, 
Judge Shahabuddeen had previously commented that participation in a JCE must be 
"real", 5 1 6 a determination to be made by the court on the facts of the particular case. 
The Kvocka Appeals Chamber applied the quantitative meaning of substantial: in holding 
that a substantial contribution was not required, it referred to an act forming a "major" or 
"sizeable" component of the entire offence. This can be inferred from the Appeals 
Chamber's cross-reference to its later finding that a quantitatively substantial contribution 
was required to show that an 'opportunistic visitor' should be included in a systemic JCE. 5 1 8 
Kvocka.AJ, para.97; also Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.44; Krajisnik.TJ, paras.883, 885. 
5 0 9 Kvocka.AJ, para. 193. 
5 1 0 Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.702; Brdanin.TJ, para.263. Also Mrksic.TJ, para.545. 
5 1 1 Kvocka.AJ, paras.98, 193, 421; also Krajisnik.TJ, para.883. 
5 1 2 OED, Compact Ed. 
5 1 3 P.64.supra. 
5 1 4 METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p.284. 
5 1 5 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., pp. 127-128; also OHLlN.(2007).op.cit., p.74. 
5 1 6 Vasiljevic.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.33; also para.40. 
5 1 7 Kvocka.AJ, para.97, fn.593. 
5 1 8 Kvocka.AJ, para.599, emphasis added. Also Kvocka.TJ, paras.310-311. 
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It is quite obvious that Zigic's contribution, resulting in "grave crimes", was qualitatively 
substantial and so would have been sufficient for JCE liability i f he was not an outsider. 
Accordingly, although it has been implied that the distinction between participation by JCE 
and aiding and abetting rests on the fact that only the latter requires a "substantial" 
contribution, 5 1 9 it is suggested that this is incorrect. The proper distinction between the two 
clearly pertains to the mens rea standard (intent rather than knowledge). 5 2 0 JCE is no 
different from the other complicity-based modes of liability in requiring, at minimum, that 
the accused's conduct has a qualitatively substantial effect. This interpretation appears to 
have been recently confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in Brdanin,521 even though it 
introduced new terminological confusion by use of the term "significant" 5 2 2 (a term which is 
already sowing the seeds of a future confusion with notions of control of the crime 5 2 3 ) . 
Thus, present statements of the law are hardly self-explanatory.5 2 4 
The manner of participation in a JCE can vary to include involvement in the direct personal 
perpetration of criminal offences, the rendering of assistance and encouragement (joined 
with the requisite intent) and contribution to the effective operation of a particular system 
within which the crimes are known to be committed. 5 2 5 Personal presence at the scene of the 
crime is not essential,5 2 6 nor is physical participation in any element of the crime. 5 2 7 
Contribution to a joint criminal enterprise can include an omission. 5 2 8 As with aiding and 
abetting, 5 2 9 it has been suggested that the silent but approving presence at the crime-scene of 
a person with significant authority or influence may itself be sufficient participation, 5 3 0 
providing that it is shown to have a qualitatively substantial effect on the facts. The 
5 l 9 GuSTAFSON.(2007) .op.c i t . , p. 142; VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit. , pp. 185, 195,200-201; 
SCHABAS.(2006).op.cit., p.313. 
5 2 0 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., p . l 16; EsER.(2002) .op.ci t„ pp.791-792. 
5 2 1 Brdanin.AJ, para.427. 
5 2 2 Ibid., paras.430-431; also per Judge van den Wyngaert, para.4; Martic. TJ, para.440. 
5 2 3 E . g . , OHLlN.(2007).op.cit., p.89. 
5 2 4 E . g . , Mrksic.TJ, para.545. 
5 2 5 Brdanin.AJ, para.424; Ntakimtimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, para.466; Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 100; Krnojelac.AJ, 
paras.80-81; Krajisnik.TJ, para.883; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.702; Brdanin.TJ, para.263; Stakic.TJ, para.435; 
Vasiljevic.TJ, para.67; Krnojelac.TJ, para.81. 
5 2 6 Kvocka.AJ, paras.113, 251; Mrksic.TJ, para.545; Limaj.TJ, para.511; Simic.TJ, para.158. 
5 2 7 Kvocka.AJ, paras .99, 112. 
5 2 8 Kvocka.TJ, para.284. 
5 2 9 P.98 infra. 
i w Kvocka.TJ, para.309. 
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relationship with aiding and abetting is such that it generally remains an alternative mode of 
liability i f perpetration within a JCE is not made out. 5 3 1 
Mens rea varies according to the form of JCE applicable. 
JCE I: 'basic JCE' 
The simplest category of JCE features intent that the crime in the common plan is 
committed. 5 3 2 Where necessary, this must include the requisite specific intent. 5 3 3 Cassese 
has recently suggested, extra-judicially, that dolus eventualis may suffice for JCE I . 5 3 4 
However, this reasoning seems to collapse the distinction between JCE I and JCE I I I , as his 
example indicates, and so should be treated with great caution. 
As for all modes of liability discussed, the accused must also intend their own acts, in this 
case the participation in the common purpose. Personal enthusiasm or satisfaction is 
irrelevant. 5 3 6 
JCE II: 'systemic JCE' 
The second form, although derived principally from concentration camp cases, is in fact 
applicable to any "organised system set in place to achieve a common criminal purpose". 5 3 7 
The required mens rea is personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment and intent to 
promote i t . 5 3 8 Fundamentally, it is only a minor variant of the first category. 5 3 9 In borrowed 
5 3 1 E.g., Vasiljevic.TJ, para.69; Krnojelac.TJ, para.87. 
5 3 2 Stakic.AJ, para.65; Kvocka.AJ, para.82; Ntakirutimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, paras.463, 467; Vasiljevic.AJ, 
paras.97, 101; Krnojelac.AJ, paras.83-84; Delalic.AJ, para.366; Tadic.AJ, para.228; Haradinaj.TJ, para.135; 
Mrksic.TJ, para.546; Martic.TJ, para.439; Krajisnik.TJ, para.879; Limaj.TJ, para.511; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, 
para.703; Brdanin.TJ, para.264; Simic.TJ, paras. 156-157, 160; Stakic.TJ, para.436; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.64; 
Krnojelac.TJ, para.78; Brdanin/Talic Decision, paras.25-26, 42—43; Kupreskic.TJ, para.772. 
5 3 3 Kvocka.AJ, paras. 110, 240; Krnojelac.AJ, para. I l l ; Simic. TJ, paras. 156, 160; Stakic. TJ, para.436; 
Vasiljevic.TJ, para.68; Krnojelac.TJ, para.83; Kvocka.TJ, para.288. 
5 3 4 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., pp. 111-112. 
5 3 5 Brdanin.AJ, para.365; Martic.TJ, para.439. 
5 3 6 Kvocka.AJ, paras. 106, 242; Krnojelac.AJ, para. 100. 
5 3 7 Stakic.AJ, para.65; Kvocka.AJ, paras.82, 182; Ntakirutimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, para.464; Krnojelac.AJ, 
para.89; Krajisnik.TJ, para.880. 
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terminology, it "does not dispense with the need to prove intent [but merely] provides a 
mode of proving intent in particular circumstances".540 As the immediate post-war practice 
illustrates, however, this can be a nice distinction. 5 4 1 As with JCE I , it is essential to prove 
that all relevant members of the enterprise had a "common state of mind" , 5 4 2 and that this 
common purpose relates to the commission of certain crimes. 5 4 3 Although it was suggested 
in Kvocka that the "culpable participant would not need to know of each crime 
committed", 5 4 4 this is presumably a reference to occasions where multiple counts of the 
same crime are committed, a fact irrelevant to the identification of a common purpose. 
JCE 111: 'extended JCE' 
This 'extended' form relies on the established existence of a JCE, either basic or 
systemic. 5 4 6 Where further, unplanned crimes are committed by a member of the original 
enterprise but which were nevertheless a foreseeable consequence of the criminal design (an 
additional objective element 5 4 7), the accused may be liable i f they are proved to have 
accepted that ' r i sk ' . 5 4 8 
As noted in Brdanin, the latter criterion was expressed by the Appeals Chamber in a number 
of ways, implying various possible mens rea standards: 
The word "risk" is an equivocal one, taking its meaning from its context. In the first of these three 
formulations stated ("the risk of death occurring"), it would seem that it is used in the sense of a 
5 3 8 Brdanin.AJ, para.365; Stakic.AJ, para.65; Kvocka.AJ, paras.82, 198, 237; Ntakirutimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, 
para.467; Vasiljevic.AJ, paras. 101, 105; Krnojelac.AJ, para.89; Tadic.AJ, para.228; Mrksic.TJ, para.546; 
Limaj. TJ, para.511; Simic. TJ, para. 157. 
5 3 9 Karemera JCE Decision, para. 13; Vasiljevic.AJ, para.98; Ojdanic JCE Decision, Per Judge Hunt, para.30; 
Tadic.AJ, para.203; Haradinaj.TJ, para. 136; Krajisnik.TJ, para.880; Krnojelac.TJ, para.78; Vasiljevic.TJ, 
para.64; Brdanin/Talic Decision, paras.25, 27. C.f. V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p. 100. 
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Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.2. 
V A N SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., p. 188; V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p. 107. 
Krnojelac.AJ, paras.83-84; Ojdanic JCE Decision, Per Judge Hunt, para.7; Simic. TJ, para. 160; 
Brdanin/Talic Decision, para.26. Also Vasiljevic.TJ, para.64; Krnojelac.TJ, para.78. 
5 4 3 V A N DER WiLT.(2007).op.cit., pp. 100-101. 
5 4 4 Kvocka.TJ, para.312. C.f. OHLtN.(2007).op.cit., p.75. 
5 4 5 Stakic.AJ, para.65; Kvocka.AJ, para.83; Ntakirutimana/Ntakirutimana.AJ, para.465; Vasiljevic.AJ, 
para. 101; Mrksic.TJ, para.546; Krajisnik.TJ, para.881; Limaj.TJ, para.511; Brdanin.TJ, para.347. 
5 4 6 Kvocka.AJ, para.86. 
5 4 7 Haradinaj.TJ, para. 137. 
5 4 8 Stakic.AJ, para.65; Kvocka.AJ, para.83; Vasiljevic.AJ, paras.99, 101; Tadic.AJ, paras.204, 220, 228; 
Martic.TJ, para.439; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.398. 
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possibility. In the second formulation, "most likely" means at least probable (if not more), but its 
stated equivalence to the civil law notion of dolus eventualis would seem to reduce it once more to 
a possibility. The word "might" in the third formulation indicates again a possibility. In many 
common law national jurisdictions, where the crime charged goes beyond what was agreed in the 
joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution must establish that the participant who did not himself 
commit that crime nevertheless participated in that enterprise with the contemplation of the crime 
charged as a possible incident in the execution of that enterprise. This is very similar to the civil 
law notion of dolus eventualis... So far as the objective element to be proved is concerned, the 
words "predictable" [...] and "foreseeable" [...] are truly interchangeable in this context.5 4 9 
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber held that the "prosecution needs to establish only that the 
accused was aware that the further crime was a possible consequence in the execution of the 
enterprise and [ . . . ] , with that awareness, he participated in that enterprise",5 5 0 despite the 
rather loose reference to dolus eventualis. This dictum has nonetheless been broadly 
applied. 5 5 1 The Appeals Chamber in Kvocka appears to have adopted a similar standard 5 5 2 
and in Stakic referred to the Brdanin and Kvocka standards more or less interchangeably.553 
In Brdanin, it referred merely—and enigmatically—to "dolus eventualis".554 
However, although adopting the "possibility" formulation from Brdanin, the Stakic Trial 
Chamber had chosen to quote the Tadic dictum which presents the highest mens rea 
standard: a 'proper' articulation of dolus eventualis ("everyone in the group must have been 
able to predict [the] result... more than mere negligence is required. What is required is a 
state of mind which a person... was aware that the actions of the group were most likely to 
lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that r i sk .") . 5 5 5 Similarly, the Appeals 
Chamber in Krstic summarised the standard for extended JCE liability in terms of 
"probability". 5 5 6 
Brdanin/Talic Decision, para.29. Identically, also Ojdanic JCE Decision, per Judge Hunt, paras.10-12. 
5 5 0 Krstic. TJ, para.613; Brdanin/Talic Decision, paras.30-31. 
5 5 1 Vasiljevic.AJ, para.101; Haradinaj.TJ, para.137; Krajisnik.TJ, para.882; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.703; 
Brdanin. TJ, para.265. 
5 5 2 Kvocka.AJ, para.83, emphasis added; also Limaj. TJ, para.511. 
5 5 3 Stakic.AJ, paras.65, 87. Also Mrksic.TJ, paras.546-547. 
5 5 4 Brdanin.AJ, paras.365, 411, 431; Martic. TJ, para.439. 
5 5 5 Stakic.TJ, para.436, citing Tadic.AJ, para.220. 
5 5 6 Krstic.AJ, para. 150. 
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It is clear, therefore, that the various decisions have sought to apply a dolus eventualis 
standard,5 5 7 but that the Chambers have not shared a common understanding of its meaning. 
In short, what standard of possibility/probability does the term entail? Although an 
apparently weaker line of authority, it would seem that the Krstic—Stakic first instance 
approach is preferable, not least as it conforms much more readily to the general mental 
standard articulated by the Appeals Chamber in Blaskic. 
Cassese has suggested that foreseeability should be understood in the objective sense: "not 
that the secondary offender actually foresaw the criminal conduct likely to be taken by the 
primary offender [but] rather whether a man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen 
that conduct under the [prevailing] circumstances".5 5 8 He justifies this view primarily on a 
policy basis. However, it seems hard to reconcile with the nature of dolus eventualis: the 
volitional element is predicated on the accused's subjective foresight of the risk that the 
crime would occur. Further, given the serious nature of the crimes at consideration, 5 5 9 and 
the existing concerns as to the compatibility of extended JCE with the culpability 
principle, 5 6 0 Cassese's suggestions seems fraught with difficulties. His rationale for 
extended JCE liability—that the individual 'opened the door' by contributing to the 'core' 
criminal enterprise5 6 1—is convincing as the doctrine stands but becomes increasingly 
fraught were it to be extended to a more clearly objective basis. 5 6 2 
It might be assumed that JCE I I I may not be applied to crimes of specific intent. 5 6 3 
However, the Appeals Chamber has held that "the third category of [JCE] is no different 
from other forms of criminal liability which do not require proof of intent to commit a crime 
on the part of an accused",5 6 4 thus that knowledge of intent wi l l suffice, and therefore that 
dolus eventualis is not repugnant. Although Judge Shahabuddeen's separate analysis is 
VAN DER WlLT.(2007).op.cit., p. 100; CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., p. 130; VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., p. 186; 
O'RoURK£.(2006).op.cit . , p.313; VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.99. 
5 5 8 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., p.123. Also OHL[N.(2007).op.cit., pp.75, 81. 
5 5 9 SCHABAS.(2003).op.cit., p.1033. 
5 6 0 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.106-107. 
5 6 1 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., pp.118-120; also DAMASKA.(200l).op.cit., p.465; SASSOLl/OLSON.(2000).op.cit., 
p.8. 
5 6 2 The line between objective and subjective assessments in dolus eventualis is already a narrow one: 
HAMDORF.(2007).op.cit., p.215. 
5 6 3 E.g., Stakic.TJ, para.530. 
i M Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal, paras7-8. 
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preferable to that o f the Chamber, there is some force to this approach. On the other 
hand, as Cassese suggests, although the requisite mens rea standard is distinct for different 
modes of liability, "the 'distance' between the subjective elements" of the JCE I I I 
participant and the more direct perpetrator cannot become too great. 5 6 7 
It may fairly be said that JCE I I I is the biggest cause of controversy in ICL: whereas the 
basic and systemic forms are generally considered "a reasonable, useful and important 
crystallization of international and national precedents and of legal thinking", 5 6 8 the third 
has drawn the fire of a number of commentators.5 6 9 Some have characterised it, along with 
superior responsibility, as a form of "imputed responsibility", 5 7 0 whereby persons are liable 
for the acts of others. Insofar as this epithet is intended to be synonymous with vicarious 
liability, this is not correct. 5 7 1 Both JCE and superior responsibility punish on the basis of 
the individual's own culpability, not that of others. 
The interpretation of JCE advanced here also answers some of the concerns which have 
been raised, 5 7 2 notably with regard to the extent of the individual's intent 5 7 3 and 
participation. At the very least, the parity which has been suggested between the material 
and mental elements for JCEs (at minimum, a substantial contribution to the criminal 
consequence and acceptance of the substantial likelihood of its occurrence) and those for 
other modes of liability eliminates the concern that the accused is disadvantaged by the 
Prosecution's choice of charges. The higher degree of culpability which attaches to JCE 
convictions can be met, in the case of JCE I I I , with Cassese's argument about the 
assumption of risk. 
Stakic co-perpetration 
5 6 5 Brdanin Interlocutory Appeal, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.2-8. 
5 6 6 V A N SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., pp.203-204. 
5 6 7 CASSESE.(2007) .op.cit . , pp. 121—122. Further, METTRAUX.(2005) .op .c i t . , pp.259-265. 
5 6 8 S A S S O L I / O L S O N . ( 2 0 0 0 ) . o p . c i t . , p.6. 
5 6 9 E . g . , OHLIN.(2007).op.cit., p.76. 
5 7 0 DARCY.(2007).op.cit., pp.377, 381; SCHABAS.(2003).op.cit . , pp.1026, 1030. 
5 7 1 Delalic.AJ, para.239. 
5 7 2 'Just convict everyone! Joint perpetration: from Tadic to Stakic and back again,' B A D A R , M . E . , 2006, 
p.301;also FLETCHERyOllLIN.(2005).op.cit., pp.548-550. 
7 3 Dolus evenlalis is an intent standard: HAMDORF.(2007).op.cit . , p.214. 
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The question arose whether JCE is the only co-perpetration doctrine established within the 
law applied by the ICTY/R. In Stakic, the Trial Chamber declared that "[JCE] is only one of 
several possible interpretations... other definitions of co-perpetration must equally be taken 
into account." Indeed, it suggested that definitions more "directly" relating to commission 
(or perpetration) should receive judicial pr ior i ty. 5 7 4 It offered a control-based co-
perpetration doctrine, possessing many similar characteristics to JCE but with a very 
different emphasis on the source of l iabi l i ty . 5 7 5 Whereas JCE predicates liability on a shared 
intent, the Stakic model emphasised "joint control over the act" (accompanied by, at least, 
"silent consent"). 5 7 6 It is not necessary that the Stakic co-perpetrator participates in all 
aspects of the criminal conduct; indeed, it is more common that they possess their own area 
of expertise and responsibility. It is also not necessary that the co-perpetrator performs their 
task(s) themselves. It is entirely sufficient i f they require subordinates to act on their behalf 
(a form of liability informally called indirect co-perpetration). The defining characteristic of 
the mode o f liability is that: 
"The co-perpetrator can achieve nothing on his own... The plan only 'works' if [one co-
perpetrator] works with the other... [T]hey can only realise their plan insofar as they act together, 
but each individually can ruin the whole plan if he does not carry out his part. To this extent he is 
in control of the act... This type of 'key position' of each co-perpetrator describes precisely the 
structure of joint control over the act." 5 7 7 
Evidently, this model of co-perpetration also depends on some kind of "common goal" and 
"agreement or silent consent" but these factors receive somewhat less emphasis.5 7 8 The 
Prosecution's definition in Milutinovic concurs. 5 7 9 The mens rea requirement is the general 
5 7 4 5taA:/c.77,para.438. 
5 7 5 /Wc/.,para.441. 
5 7 6 Stakic. TJ, para.490. 
5 7 7 Tdterschaft und Tatherrschaft, ROXIN C , 1994, p.278, cited in Stakic. TJ, para.440, fn.400. Alternatively, 
HAMDORF.(2007).op.cit., p.212; Vasiljevic.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.29. 
5 7 8 Stakic.TJ, paras.470-477. See further, e.g., Tadic.AJ, para.224, fn.283, citing the German Federal Court: 
'"There is co-perpetration [...] when and to the extent that the joint action of the several participants is 
founded on a reciprocal agreement..."' Interestingly, it seems that the standards for the common goal under 
J C E and Stakic co-perpetration may be very similar: on appeal, dismissing the Trial Chamber's conclusions, 
the Appeals Chamber was able to apply J C E liability on the basis of the same findings. Stakic.AJ, paras.73, 
80-81. 
5 7 9 Milutinovic, Prosecution's Response to General Ojdanic's Preliminary Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: 
Indirect Co-perpetration, para.3. 
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dolus eventuahs standard, supplemented by an awareness of the indispensable nature of 
the accused's role. 5 8 1 
The import of this development was initially uncertain. Some judges leapt to the 
opportunity, rather dramatically, to dismiss JCE as a "confusion and a waste of t ime". 5 8 2 
Perhaps as a consequence, the Appeals Chamber's reaction when it came was less than 
temperate. It summarily dismissed the doctrine, holding that "this mode of liability... does 
not have support in customary international law or in the settled jurisprudence of this 
Tribunal". 5 8 3 The Milutinovic Trial Chamber, which was required to render a decision on 
the point on the same day, not only dismissed the existence of the doctrine in customary 
law, but tacitly questioned its basis in domestic law. 5 8 4 Although this barb may have been 
misplaced, it remains true to say that even the doctrine's advocates are challenged to point 
to a national context in which it may be considered to have been truly secure for any 
substantial length of t ime. 5 8 5 In Simic, Judge Schomburg proffered the practice of 24 states 
in support of the notion of co-perpetration. However, on the basis merely of the information 
presented in the text, it is not immediately apparent that these all apply the "joint functional 
control" model o f co-perpetration that he articulated. 5 8 6 Nonetheless, as the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber pointed out, the closely related concept o f perpetration by means has a solid 
foundation. 5 8 7 
Although the introduction of Stakic liability was not well-judged—and its bluntness seems 
to have contributed substantially to its exclusion from the law of the ICTY/R—its blank 
rejection from customary law was not well-judged either. The interface between JCE and 
co-perpetration reflects the interface between the common law and civil law traditions from 
Stakic.TJ, paras.442, 496, emphasis added. Also Ojdanic Indirect Co-perpetration Decision, para.38. 
5 8 1 Stakic.TJ, paras.442, 497-498. 
5 8 2 Simic. TJ, per Judge Per-Lindholm, paras.2-5. 
5 M Stakic.AJ, para.62. 
5 8 4 Ojdanic Indirect Co-perpetration Decision, paras.37, 39. 
5 8 5 OLASOLO.(2007).op.cit., pp. 150-151. 
5 8 6 Simic. A J, per Judge Schomburg, paras. 13-14; further Participation in Crime: Criminal Liability of Leaders 
of Criminal Groups and Networks, Expert Opinion commissioned by the [1CTY] Office of the Prosecutor, 
S lEBER, U. , K O C H , H . , & SIMON, J.M. (eds.), 2006. 
5 8 7 Dyilo Charges Decision, paras.330, 339. FLETCHER.(2000).op.cit., p.639; WERLE.(2005).op.cit., p. 123, 
mn.354; Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, para.16, fn.30. 
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which the doctrines are principally derived. Viewed objectively, the basis o f JCE dehors 
the ICTY/R is not such that it is appropriate to be cavalier about other doctrines. 5 8 9 
Accordingly, the Stakic appeal is better characterised as a preference 5 9 0 for JCE in the 
interests of "judicial discipline" 5 9 1 rather than an ontological rejection of co-perpetration in 
international law. 
The survival of co-perpetration, albeit outside the ICTY/R, is likely to be beneficial. JCE 
and co-perpetration have different strengths, and are suitable to the prosecution of different 
crimes. Crimes in which it is not possible to ascertain which member of a group completed 
the actus reus ("mob crimes") are, for example, ideally prosecuted via JCE. 5 9 2 Stakic co-
perpetration, in such circumstances, would not be, as no group member possesses control 
over the crime. In turn, it is likely that co-perpetration doctrines are of particular efficacy in 
prosecuting 'organisational' or 'policy' crimes (such as Stakic, Brdanin, Krajisnik, where 
JCE law has become singularly complicated) where the accused is structurally and 
physically remote from the physical perpetrators.5 9 3 A prosecutorial system deriving the 
strengths of both might be very effective indeed. 5 9 4 
Precisely for this reason, however, it is also appropriate to sound a note o f caution. Citing to 
Judge Anzi lo t t i , 5 9 5 Judge Shahabuddeen suggested that at least some forms of JCE and co-
perpetration might be mutually exclusive, envisaging a situation where on the same facts, 
co-perpetration could acquit, JCE would convict, and vice versa 5 9 6 This may be a particular 
problem with regard to JCE I I I . The problem is not insurmountable—indeed, the ICC has 
5 8 8 On the roots of co-perpetration, e.g. OLASOLO.(2007).op.cit., pp.149, 152-156; HAMDORf.(2007).op.cit., 
p.211; 'The development of the concept of [JCE] at the [ I C T Y ] , ' H A A N , V. , 2005, p. 197. Also Simic.AJ, per 
Judge Schomburg, paras. 19-21. 
5 8 9 Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.41-42. 
5 9 0 Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.48. 
5 9 1 Simic.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddeen, para.32; Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabudden, para.47. 
5 9 2 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., p. 198; VAN DER WlLT.(2007).op.cit., pp. 107-108; CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., 
p. 115; VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.106, 109. 
5 9 3 OLASOLO.(2007).op.cit., pp. 156-161; V A N SLlEDREGT.(2007).op.cit., p.207; V A N D E R WiLT.(2007).op.cit., 
pp. 105-106; also OHL!N.(2007).op.cit., pp.76-77. 
4 Simic.AJ, per Judge Schomburg, para. 17. 
5 9 5 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary Objection (PCIJ), per Judge Anzilotti, 1939, p.90: 
"It is clear that, in the same legal system, there cannot at the same lime exist two rules relating to the same 
facts and attaching to these facts contradictory consequences... In cases of this kind, either the contradiction is 
only apparent and the two rules are really coordinated so that each has its own sphere of application and does 
not encroach on the sphere of application of the other, or else one prevails... I know of no clearer, more 
certain, or more universally accepted principle than this." 
5 9 6 Gacumbitsi.AJ, per Judge Shahabuddecn, para.50. 
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jurisdiction to apply both doctrines—but may require some careful consideration in the 
future. 
Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute is much more sympathetic to the Stakic approach. It 
expressly provides for liability for those who commit a crime "jointly with another or 
through another", 5 9 7 and retains common purpose liability in some vestigial f o r m . 5 9 8 The 
extent to which the provision is interpreted comprehensively, or as a policy move away 
from common purpose, wi l l be one of the most significant developments in this area of the 
law. Express reference to liability for perpetration "through another" gives perpetration by 
means a much higher profile in ICL than it previously possessed.599 With clear links to the 
joint control co-perpetration doctrine, it is also of great potential use in its own right, 
particularly through the Organisationsherrschaft doctrine. Its elucidation is welcome. 6 0 0 
Certainly, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has made the consistency between Article 
25(3)(a) and Stakic co-perpetration very clear. 6 0 1 It implicitly ascribed the doctrine a 
"synthetic" role (in Hegelian terms), whereas it suggested that alternative doctrines 
(including JCE) privilege either the material or subjective element over the other. This 
conclusion seems partial. 6 0 2 Through a rather opaque piece of reasoning, it inferred that the 
drafters o f the ICC Statute had chosen to reject a subjective approach to co-perpetration.6 0 3 
As a result, it considered that "article 25(3)(d) provides for a residual form of accessory 
liability which makes it possible to criminalise those contributions to a crime which cannot 
be characterised as [falling within articles 25(3)(b) and (c)], by reason of the state of mind 
in which the contributions were made." 6 0 4 Given, however, the fact that the 'procuring' and 
5 9 7 ICC Statute, Art.25(3)(a). 
5 9 8 Ibid, Art.25(3)(d). 
5 9 9 ESER.(2002).op.cit.,p.793. 
6 0 0 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mns.10-13; ' [JCE] and command responsibility,' AMBOS, K . , 2007, pp. 181-
183; ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.794-795. 
6 0 1 Dyilo Charges Decision, para.338; Dyilo Arrest Warrant Decision, para.96. 
6 0 2 In fact, both J C E and control-based co-perpetration marginally favour one element: in co-perpetration, the 
material element is key and the minimum standard mental element is applied; in J C E , the mental element is 
key, and the minimum standard material element is applied. 
6 0 3 Dyilo Charges Decision, paras.334-335. 
6 0 4 /Wt/.,para.337. 
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'aiding and abetting' modes o f liability cover a staggering array of conduct, such a situation 
is almost impossible to conceive. 6 0 5 
In the Chamber's analysis, Article 25(3)(a) wi l l classify an accused as a (co-)perpetrator 
only because: 
i. they physically carry out the objective elements of the offence (commission of 
the crime in person, or direct perpetration); 
ii. they control the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence 
(commission of the crime through another person, or indirect perpetration); 
iii. they have, along with others, control over the offence by reason of the essential 
tasks assigned to them (commission of the crime jointly with others, or co-
perpetration).606 
The Chamber also elaborated upon the Stakic definition of joint control co-perpetration, 
requiring more explicitly: 
• proof of an agreement or common plan, express or implied, which entails the 
commission of a criminal offence, even i f that is not its ultimate object. 6 0 7 
• division of tasks essential to the realisation of the criminal purpose between the 
parties: only parties charged with such a task may fall within this mode of 
l i a b i l i t y 6 0 8 
• mutual awareness of (and reconciliation to) the fact that the common plan wi l l result 
in the commission of a criminal offence, 6 0 9 knowledge of the critical nature of the 
individual's own contribution, 6 1 0 and the necessary mens rea for the core crime. 6 1 1 
MANTOVANl.(2003).op.cit., p.35; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.803; c.f. AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.25; 
DARCY.(2007).op.cit., p.383. 
6 0 6 Dvilo Charges Decision, para.332. 
6 0 7 paras.343-345. 
6 0 8 Ibid, paras.346-348. 
6 0 9 /£;'</., paras.361-365. 
6 1 0 Ibid., paras.366-367. 
6 1 1 Ibid., para.349. Also AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.8. 
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As Hamdorf notes, such a formulation preserves the possibility that co-perpetration may 
also have an 'extended' form in which offences reasonably foreseeable from the common 
plan that in fact come to pass may fall within the scope of the individual's l iabi l i ty . 6 1 2 
Interestingly, however, both Ambos and Eser appear to leave open the possibility that JCE 
may have a bearing on ICC co-perpetration doctrine, 6 1 3 Eser particularly stressing the role 
of the ICTY/R in delineating the distinction between between perpetrative and other forms 
of l iabi l i ty . 6 1 4 He concludes that the perpetrator must, at the least, "co-determine" the crime 
through a more than marginal involvement, and participation in the common plan. Whether 
he would adopt the same position post-Stakic must remain ambiguous. Both commentators 
illustrate, however, that there is very little in the words of Article 25(3)(a) to determine the 
shape of co-perpetration before the ICC, one way or the other. 
Even though the hierarchy of the Article 25(3) suggests that (d) is concerned with derivative 
liability only, it remains appropriate to consider it at the present time. The extent to which 
JCE liability can comfortably fit in the context of (3)(d) may be a sound indicator as to 
whether it should be read into (3)(a). 
Plainly intended to be a reflection of the JCE doctrine 6 1 5—at least in some form—Article 
25(3)(d) is fairly considered more an outcome of compromise than craftsmanship. 6 1 6 
Compared to JCE as presented here, the key material requirement (a contribution to the 
criminal consequence "in any other way") is extraordinarily l o w . 6 1 7 The argument might be 
successfully made via Article 21 that this should be read up to the qualitatively substantial 
effect standard. 
The relevant mens rea is more uncertain. A plain text reading of the relevant provisions 
suggests that the actor must act intentionally, either knowing the crime which is to be 
committed, or intending to further the group's policies even though they involve the 
6 1 2 HAMDORK.(2007).op.cit., p.216. 
6 1 3 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit. , mn.9. Further, AMBOS.(2007).op.cit., p. 172. 
6 1 4 ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.791-793. 
6 1 5 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., p. 132; FLETCHER/OHLlN.(2005).op.cit . , p.546; VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit. , p.95; 
CRYER.(2001).op.cit. , p.23. Brima.AJ, para.79. C.f. AMBOS.(2007).op.cit., p. 173. 
6 1 6 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit. , mns.27-28; C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p.309; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.803., 
6 1 7 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit. , mn.25; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.803. 
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commission of a crime. Ambos argues that, unlike the law of the ICTY/R, the former 
mental requirement requires knowledge of the specific crime that is in fact committed. 6 1 9 
These mental standards are nevertheless broadly compatible with JCE I and I I , but it 
remains ambiguous whether they tolerate JCE I I I . Commentators are divided on the issue. 
In principle, an individual convicted under JCE I I I at the ICTY/R should be liable under 
Article 25(3)(d)(i): by means of their participation in the core (JCE I) criminal enterprise, 
they are acting with the intention to further the group's policies and are aware that this 
entails a crime. The ICC Statute requires only that the group's purpose involves the 
commission of "a" crime within its jurisdiction—it does not indicate that the individual 
must necessarily know of each and every crime which that purpose may entail. 6 2 1 On the 
other hand, such an interpretation would dramatically expand the scope of liability—even 
beyond JCE III—making the individual liable for any crime to which their actions for the 
group contributed, whether or not they possessed even dolus eventualis. The only safe 
conclusion is that the compatibility of JCE I I I with the provision is, at least, doubtful. This 
leaves an unenviable selection of choices: abandoning JCE I I I (a doctrine of great 
prosecutorial efficacy 6 2 2 ) , importing JCE I I I through Article 21, ignoring Article 25(3)(d) 
altogether and applying JCE by means of Article 25(3)(a), or amending Article 25(3)(d). 
None of these solutions is perfect. 
What this analysis does make clear, however, is that there is no great divide—at present— 
between the ICTY/R and the ICC's approach to co-perpetration. The law of both is deficient 
in some degree, but in a largely complementary fashion. It is also clear that concerns about 
the reach of doctrines like JCE can be addressed, and that both subjective and joint-control 
models of co-perpetration have utility. The greatest mistake that could be made would be 
for the ICC to interpret the law in this area in splendid isolation. 6 2 3 At the same time, 
although the ICTY/R have done a highly commendable job in enumerating the JCE doctrine 
6 1 ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.803; AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.29. 
6 1 9 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.30. 
6 2 0 C R Y E R ETAL.(2007).op.cit.,p.309; VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp. 108-109; c.f. CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., 
p.132; PowLES.(2004).op.cit„ pp.617-618. 
6 2 1 C.f. OHLIN.(2007).op.cit., p.85. 
6 2 2 CASSESE.(2007).op.cit., p.l 10; GuSTAFSON.(2007).op.cit., p.157; VAN SLlEDR£GT.(2007).op.cit., pp.184, 
187; O'RoURKE.(2006).op.cit., p.307; SCHABAS.(2003).op.cit., p.1032. Recognising this fact in a policy 
context does not necessarily impugn the principle that a criminal system should stress protections to the 
accused rather than the mindless need to 'avoid' impunity: c.f. FLETCHER/OHLIN.(2005).op.cit., p.540. 
6 2 3 C.f. OHLIN.(2007).op.cit., p.77. 
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and ushering it into customary law, the rejection of joint-control co-perpetration should not 
be taken to reflect general international law. 
C.) Prohibition of procurement 
"Procurement"6 2 4 is not a term which features in the jurisprudence or constitutions either of 
the ICTY/R or the ICC. However, behaviour which is criminalised variously by the terms 
"ordering", "instigating", "planning", "soliciting" and "inducing" may be compendiously 
considered as varying manifestations of one principle. The single provision employed in the 
ICC Statute625 to this end already points to the elegance of this approach; the use of a 
neutral term is helpful in emphasising the commonalities between the specific applications 
of the rule . 6 2 6 
Under English law, 
procurement of an offence requires that the secondary party deliberately causes the principal to 
commit the offence... [T]he perpetration of the principal crime must in some sense be a 
consequence of the procurement [...]. However, [the] contribution need not be a decisive, or sine 
qua non ingredient of the decision by [the direct perpetrator] to commit the offence: it is enough 
that the procurement was influential. Even if there were other reasons why, without [the] 
contribution, [the direct perpetrator] might have chosen to commit the offence anyway, that does 
not matter.6 2 7 
A l l of the doctrines considered in this part are united by a similar causal requirement. 6 2 8 
However, given the fact that the general material requirement for complicity-based modes 
of liability (a qualitatively "substantial" effect on the criminal consequence) may itself be 
Definitions of the relevant verb include "to bring about by care or pain; also [...] to bring about, cause, 
effect, produce": O E D , Compact Ed. 
6 2 5 Art.25(3)(b). 
6 2 6 Van Sliedregt and Eser adopt a similar approach, collating these modes of liability under the heading 
"Instigation". Given the existing technical use of the term in I C L , however, and the recognised semantic 
confusion in translation with "inciting" (Akayesu.AJ, para.478; Akayesu.TJ, para.481), the concept of 
"procurement" (in both English and French) is to be preferred. 'Individual criminal responsibility,' E S E R , A., 
in C A S S E S E E T AL.(2002).op.cit., p.795; V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.77; c.f. p.93. 
6 2 7 S lMESTER/SULLIVAN.(2003) .op .c i t . , pp.202-203. 
6 2 8 E.g., Nahimana.AJ, paras.479-^81. 
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expressed in causation terms, it may be shrewdly asked what makes the particular causal 
link central to procurement liability distinctive. This question assumes a particular 
importance in the context of the distinction between "abetting" and "procuring": the 
definition of the former is, after all, very close to the various definitions embodied in the 
latter, 6 3 0 and yet there may be a significant gradient of culpability between the two. 6 3 1 
It is suggested that procurement, both at the ICTY/R and ICC, is distinguished by its 
requirement for 'special' causation: not just that the nature of the criminal consequence was 
affected—the "substantial effect" standard common to all forms of complicity—but that the 
very occurrence of the criminal consequence was made more likely by the actor's conduct. 
In the context of ' instigation', Oric makes a finding to precisely this effect. 6 3 2 Van Sliedregt 
seems to characterise this form of special causation as requiring that the actor's intervention 
represents a "decisive factor" in the causal chain. 6 3 3 
It is clear that this 'special' causation does not amount to 'but for ' causation. 6 3 4 As such, 
some domestic criminal law tradition would doubt that it merits the term 'causation' at 
a l l . 6 3 5 (This argument applies a fortiori to the general causal requirement common to all 
forms of complicity. 6 3 6 ) However, whereas domestic law is able to take a relatively hard 
theoretical line in exploring causation (it is generally concerned not so much with the extent 
of a crime once committed but its occurrence in the first place), ICL's confrontation with 
system criminality frequently forces it to consider the culpability of those who may play no 
decisive part in initiating a criminal scheme but are nonetheless significant in extending its 
scope from the 'merely' terrible to the horrific. As such, ICL requires a sophisticated 
understanding of causation, and perhaps challenges conventional theories. 6 3 7 
b " E.g., VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.89. 
6 3 0 E.g., Ndindabahizi.TJ, para.457. 
6 3 1 Fn.290.j i^ra. 
6 3 2 Oric.TJ, paras.271, 281. The lack of emphasis on the conduct of the accused is, however, a problem with 
this formulation. Other formulations, however, lack specificity: Gacumbitsi.TJ, para.279. 
6 3 3 V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.80; c.f. pp.82-83. 
6 3 4 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.27; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.387. Also Mrksic.TJ, para.549; Oric.TJ, para.274; 
Limaj.TJ, para.514; Brdanin.TJ, paras.269, 359; Galic.TJ, para.168; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.60; 
Kvocka.TJ, para.252. C.f. Blaskic.TJ, para.339. 
6 3 5 E.g., FLETCHER.(2000).op.cit., pp.588-589, 593-595; c.f. SlMESTER/SULLlVAN.(2003).op.cit., pp.87-89 
6 3 6 SlMESTER/SULLlVAN.(2003).op.cit., p.239; further A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity, 
S M I T H , K.J .M. , 1991 C.f. DAMASK.A.(2001).op.cit., p.461. 
6 3 7 E.g., Nahimana.TJ, paras.952-953. 
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It is true that the rather tenuous defmiton of 'special' causation—academics resort to 
describing it as "some sort of causal relationship"6 3 8—illustrates (and perhaps explains) the 
extent to which the notion of procurement straddles—sometimes uncomfortably—the line 
between assistance and perpetration. The model offered here is certainly not perfect either. 
It is, for example, hard to reconcile 'planning' with this reasoning, as the planner arguably 
shapes the criminal consequence (more akin to an aider/abettor) rather than procures it. It is 
perhaps for this reason that Article 25(3)(b) removes 'planning' as a head o f liability 
altogether. The case can be reasonably be made that the conduct entailed in planning, 
depending on the factual circumstances, can be classified as instigating, ordering or aiding 
and abetting, as appropriate. On the other hand, planning is a convenient label for liability 
by 'indirect instigation'. 6 3 9 
A uniform mens rea standard may be discerned for procurement. Although the practice of 
the ICTY/R initially seemed confused, 6 4 0 the mental standard for ordering liability was 
definitively set as "awareness of a substantial likelihood", 6 4 1 a standard since applied 
relatively strictly. 6 4 2 Kordic confirmed that the same applies to planning and instigation. 6 4 3 
Depending on the interpretation of Article 30 , 6 4 4 a similar mental standard may prevail at 
the ICC. As illustrated in Oricjt remains relatively easy to finesse the distinctions between 
'intent' and 'knowledge' in this area.6 4 5 
Liability for "planning" before the ICTY/R may be incurred by "one or several persons 
[who] contemplate designing the commission o f a crime at both the preparatory and 
execution phases".646 As a conviction may not be entered for planning a crime which is 
' SCHABAS.(2006).op.cit., p.302. 
6 3 9 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.83. 
6 4 0 Oric. TJ, para.277. 
6 4 1 Blaskic.AJ, paras.41-42. Also Haradinaj.TJ, para.144; Mrksic.TJ, para.550; Martic.TJ, para.441; Limaj.TJ, 
para.515; Strugar. TJ, para.333; Brdanin. TJ, para.270. 
6 4 2 E.g., Strugar.TJ, paras.345-347. 
6 4 3 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, paras.29-32. Also Haradinaj.TJ, paras. 143-143; Mrksic.TJ, paras.548-549; Limaj.TJ, 
paras.513-514. This approach was in fact already well established in the jurisprudence: Brdanin. TJ, para.269; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.60; Kvocka.TJ, para.252. 
6 4 4 Pp.66-68.sH/7ra. 
6 4 5 Oric. TJ, para.279. 
6 4 6 Akayesu. TJ, para.480. Also Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.26; Mrksic. TJ, para.548; Limaj. TJ, para.513; 
Brdanin.TJ, para.268; Kamuhanda.TJ, para.592; Galic.TJ, para. 168; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.761; Stakic.TJ, 
para.443; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.59; Krstic.TJ, para.601; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.386; Blaskic.TJ, 
para.279. If multiple people are engaged in the planning process, the accused's conduct must, of course, be 
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subsequently committed by the accused, there is a practical implication that the crime wi l l 
be committed "by others". 6 4 8 Despite suggestion to the contrary, 6 4 9 planning is not an 
inchoate crime. 6 5 0 
The range of behaviour which can substantiate liability is quite wide 6 5 1 yet the core crime 
must be "actually committed within the framework of [the planner's] design". 6 5 2 This causal 
requirement illustrates the conceptual ambiguities which challenge the broad concept of 
procurement liability: the causal link is mitigated—but to an uncertain extent—by the open-
ended term "framework". Perhaps for these reasons, a higher test was preferred in Brdanin, 
requiring proof that "the Accused was substantially involved at the preparatory stage of that 
crime in the concrete form it took". 6 5 3 The "requirement of specificity", it was held, 
"distinguishes 'planning' from other modes of l iabi l i ty" . 6 5 4 The Appeals Chamber has 
affirmed, however, that the plan need only be "a factor substantially contributing to [the] 
criminal conduct". 6 5 5 
"Instigating" is widely defined as "prompting another to commit an offence." The act of 
instigation itself need not be direct or public. 6 5 7 It has been considered that: 
The wording is sufficiently broad to allow for the inference that both acts and omissions may 
constitute instigating and that this notion covers both express and implied conduct. The ordinary 
meaning of instigating, namely, [to] "bring about" the commission of an act by someone, 
sufficiently substantial to warrant liability: e.g., Kamuhanda.TJ, para.592; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.761; 
Bagilishema.TJ, para.30. 
6 4 7 Brdanin. TJ, para.268; Stakic.TJ, para.443; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.59; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.386. 
Involvement in both planning and commission may, however, be treated as a factor in aggravation for the 
purposes of sentencing: Brdanin.TJ, para.268; Stakic.TJ, para.443. It has been suggested that this approach 
applies also to ordering: Stakic.TJ, para.445. 
6 4 8 Galic. TJ, para. 168. 
6 4 9 WERLE.(2005).op.cit . , p. 167. C.f. C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., p.316. 
6 5 0 E.g., Nahimana.AJ, para.479; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.26; Akayesu.TJ, para.473. 
6 5 1 Semanza.TJ, para.380. 
6 5 2 Galic.TJ, para. 168. 
6 5 3 Brdanin. TJ, paras.357-358, emphasis added. 
™Ibid. 
6 5 5 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.26. Also Mrksic.TJ, para.548; Limaj.TJ, para.513. 
6 5 6 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.27; Mrksic.TJ, para.549; Oric.TJ, para.270; Limaj.TJ, para.514; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.269; Kamuhanda.TJ, para.593; Galic.TJ, para. 168; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.762; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, 
para.60; Kvocka.TJ, para.243; Krstic.TJ, para.601; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.387; Blaskic.TJ, para.280; 
Akayesu.TJ, para.482. 
6 5 7 E.g., Akayesu.AJ, para.483; Kamuhanda.TJ, para.593; Gacumbitsi.TJ, para.279; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.762; 
Semanza.TJ, para.381. Further, fn.662 infra. 
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corroborates the opinion that a causal relationship between the instigation and the physical 
perpetration of the crime is an element requiring proof. 6 5 8 
Skating perhaps too close to the doctrine of command responsibility, 6 5 9 it has been held that 
"omissions amount to instigation in circumstances where a commander has created an 
environment permissive of criminal behaviour by subordinates."660 Certainly, instigation by 
omission can only occur where an individual is under a positive duty. 6 6 1 
Instigation must be distinguished from incitement to commit genocide: 6 6 2 the latter is an 
inchoate crime, directed to prohibiting a discrete wrong, while the former is a mode of 
liability reflecting the actor's culpable contribution to the commission of the 'crime of 
crimes'. 6 6 3 The elements of the two liabilities are distinct. 6 6 4 The fact that a direct and public 
incitement does actually result in the commission o f genocide may—as a matter of evidence 
rather than law—assist in the inference that it is more than 'mere' hate speech.6 6 5 It is an 
open question whether convictions for incitement to commit genocide and genocide (by 
means of procurement) are permissibly cumulative. The ICC Statute reflects a similar 
distinction, 6 6 6 despite the strain placed on the text by the inclusion of an inchoate crime in 
the midst of modes of l iabi l i ty . 6 6 7 Given the rather concise formulation of the substantive 
provision on genocide itself, 6 6 8 however, the conclusion is hard to escape. 
"Ordering implies a hierarchical relationship between the person giving the order and the 
one executing it. In other words, the person in a position of authority uses it to convince 
6 5 8 Blaskic.TJ, para.280. Also Mrksic.TJ, para.549; Oric.TJ, para.273; Limaj.TJ, para.514; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.269; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.762; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.387. 
6 5 9 The fuzzy line between Arts.7(l) and 7(3) was generally discernible in the majority's findings in Galic: 
e.g., Galic.TJ, per Judge Nieto-Navia, paras. 116-120. It may be preferable, as in fact held by the Appeal 
Chamber with regard to ordering, to restrict this sort of 'instigation by omission' in favour of command 
responsibility: see, e.g., Galic.AJ, paras. 176-177. 
6 6 0 Galic.TJ, para. 168; Blaskic.TJ, para.337. 
6 6 1 Oric. TJ, para.273. 
6 6 2 Linguistic differences between English and French initially introduced a degree of confusion into what is, 
at heart, quite simple. Akayesu.AJ, paras.478-483; Akayesu.TJ, para.481. 
6 6 3 Nahimana.AJ, para.678; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.855; Niyilegeka.TJ, para.431; Musema.TJ, para. 120; 
Rutaganda.TJ, para.38; Akayesu.TJ, paras.561-562. Also Oric.TJ, para.269, fn.732; METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., 
p.256; V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.77, 110-111; ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.803-806. 
6 6 4 Nahimana.AJ, para.679; Oric.TJ, para.273; Kamuhanda.TJ, para.593; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.762. 
6 6 5 E.g., Nahimana.TJ, paras. 1013-1015; Akayesu.TJ, para.675. 
6 6 6 Nahimana.AJ, para.678, fh.1615; also ScHABAS.(2004).op.cit., pp.102-103. 
6 6 7 C.f. Ambos.(forthcoming).op.cit., mns.31, 34. 
6 6 8 ICC Statute, Art.6. 
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another to commit an offence." Crucially, the position of authority, and thus the 
relationship, can be de facto rather than de jure.670 However, despite the similarity of the 
concepts, the hierarchical relationship required is not the same as the superior-subordinate 
relationship required for superior responsibility, 6 7 1 and does not require proof that the 
accused generally possessed effective control over the relevant parties. 6 7 2 Use of the term in 
the context of ordering, although understandable, is thus not altogether helpful . 6 7 3 
The Appeals Chamber has held that "the very notion of 'instructing' requires a positive 
action by the person in a position of authority." 6 7 4 There is no requirement for the form of 
the order, or the degree to which it must be made explicit . 6 7 5 It need not be given directly to 
the direct perpetrator of the core offence; 6 7 6 it is sufficient i f it enters a chain o f command. 
A preferred definition, therefore, is that 'ordering' entails a person in a position of authority, 
de facto or de jure, using that position to instruct another to commit an o f fence 6 7 7 
Given the implication o f some earlier authorities, 6 7 8 it should be emphasised that ordering is 
not an inchoate crime under international law, 6 7 9 and is no different in this respect than any 
of the other modes of liability. This position has been long implicit in the practice o f the 
ICTY/R, although it has only recently been plainly stated. 6 8 0 
6 6 9 Akayesu. TJ, para.483. Also Naletilic/Martinovic. TJ, para.61. 
6 7 0 Gacumbitsi.AJ, para.181; Kamuhanda.AJ, para.75; Semanza.AJ, paras.361, 363; Kordic/Cerkez .AJ, 
para.28; Mrksic.TJ, para.550; Martic.TJ, para.441; Limaj.TJ, para.515; Strugar.TJ, para.331; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.270; Kamuhanda.TJ, para.594; Kajelijeli.TJ, para.763; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.61; 
Kordic/Cerkez. TJ, para.388; Akayesu. TJ, para.483. 
6 7 1 P. 108.infra et seq. C.f. 'Convictions for command responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the [ I C T Y 
Statute],' H E N Q U E T , T., 2002, p.812. 
6 7 2 Seromba.AJ, para.202; Kamuhanda.AJ, para.75. 
6 7 1 E.g., Kamuhanda.AJ, para.75; Semanza.AJ, paras.359-364. C f , e.g., Blaskic.TJ, para.268; Akayesu.TJ, 
para.483; VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.78, 84. 
6 7 4 Galic.AJ, para. 176. A positive order can, however, be proven by taking into account omissions: Galic.AJ, 
para. 177. 
6 7 5 Kamuhanda.AJ, para.76; Mrksic.TJ, para.550; Limaj.TJ, para.515; Strugar.TJ, para.331; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.270; Galic.TJ, para. 168; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.61; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.388; Blaskic.TJ, 
para.281. 
6 7 6 Limaj. TJ, para.515; Strugar. TJ, para.331; Brdanin. TJ, para.270; Naletilic/Martinovic. TJ, para.61; 
Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.388; Blaskic.TJ, para.282. 
6 7 7 Galic.AJ, para. 176; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.28; Mrksic.TJ, para.550; Martic.TJ, para.441; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.270; Galic.TJ, para.168; Stakic.TJ, para.445; Krstic.TJ, para.601. 
678 E.g., Von Falkenhorst (UK) , p.24. 
, C.f. CRYER.(2001).op.cit., p.23. 
rJ, para.267. 
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6 7 9 CRYERETAL.(2007).op.cit., p.313. 
6 8 0 Haradinaj.TJ, para. 141; Brdanin.TJ, 
The ICC Statute makes liable those who "order, solicit or induce" a crime which in fact 
occurs or is attempted.6 8 1 The terms "soliciting" and "inducing" both "refer to a situation 
where a person is influenced by another to commit a crime." 6 8 2 Both of these concepts 
coincide with the ICTY//R doctrines of "instigation" 6 8 3 and, in a rather applied manner, 
"planning". 
Ambos points out that the connotation of agency implicit in the most straightforward model 
of ordering (C orders P to do X crime; P complies regardless of his own sentiments) 
amounts to perpetration by means, and thus might be better located in Article 25(3)(a). 6 8 4 As 
such, he appears to dismiss ordering as an example of procurement at all. He is, of course 
correct that in circumstances where the superior has the power to "dominate" the 
subordinate to the appropriate extent, perpetration through means would lie. However, given 
that he does not make the same argument for solicitation or inducements—which he 
acknowledges can include the use of physical duress,6 8 5 a factor almost as dominating as a 
formal hierarchy—it may be inferred that he recognises circumstances where even a 
considerable degree of compulsion on a persion may not amount to the domination required 
for perpetration by means. Such a position should also be feasible with regard to ordering. 
As such, although he is correct to identify that the prosecutor now has two options when 
confronted with the fact o f an individual ordering another, he is not right to dismiss this 
lesser form of liability for such conduct. A key factor in evaluating which avenues is more 
suitable might be the presence of other subordinates and the nature of the hierarchical 
relationship: for example, i f the superior is assured that another subordinate wi l l perform the 
order, even i f some refuse, perpetration by means might be made out: the superior's order is, 
in fact, the sine qua non of the criminal consequence. Where this is not the case, ordering as 
procurement is preferable, reflecting that although there may be a hierarchical relationship, 
the superior's order is causally less significant. It must be frankly acknowledged that this is 
a theoretical response to a theoretical challenge: the considerable evidential difficulties that 
such a distinction may provoke have not been taken into consideration. 
6 8 1 ICC Statute, Art.25(3)(b). 
6 8 2 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.15; V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.87; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.796. 
6 8 3 CRYER ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p.314. 
6 8 4 AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.14; also V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.77, 86-87; 
ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.797. 
6 8 5 Ibid., mn.15. 
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D.) Prohibition of knowing assistance 
Aiding and abetting (traditionally a unified concept ) includes "all acts of assistance that 
lend encouragement or support to the perpetration of an offence", 6 8 7 however undertaken,6 8 8 
and which make in fact6*9 a sufficient contribution to the criminal consequence for liability 
to be justified. Given that the ICC Statute appears to use these terms more precisely, 6 9 0 
however, this form of liability is now better described generally as 'knowing assistance'. 
Implicit in this definition is the notion that the acts of assistance must be "specifically 
directed" to the criminal consequence,691 in the sense that the end result is not mere 
coincidence. This does not mean, however, that "independent initiative, power, or discretion 
must be shown": the quality of the assistance must be determined on a case-by-case basis.6 9 2 
It was initially suggested that a mere "contribution" to or "effect" upon the core crime was 
sufficient. 6 9 3 However, the general requirement for a "substantial effect" was re-articulated 
in Furundzija and subsequently universally fol lowed. 6 9 4 
Limaj. TJ, para.516; Kvocka. TJ, para.254; Akayesu. TJ, para.484. Also Mrksic. TJ, para.551. 
6 8 7 Delalic.TJ, para.327. Also Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para. 127; Brdanin.AJ, para.277; Simic.AJ, para.85; 
Blaskic.AJ, paras.45—46; Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 102; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.399; Aleksovski.AJ, para. 163; 
Tadic.AJ, para.229; Mrksic.TJ, para.551; Oric.TJ, paras.280, 282; Limaj.TJ, paras.516-517; Strugar.TJ, 
para.349; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, paras.726, 782; Brdanin.TJ, para.271; Simic.TJ, paras. 161-162; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.63; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.70; Krnojelac.TJ, para.88; Kvocka.TJ, paras.253-254; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.391; Blaskic.TJ, para.283; Furundzija.TJ, para.249. 
6 8 8 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para.127; Simic.AJ, para.85; Mrksic.TJ, para.552; Oric.TJ, paras.282-283; Limaj.TJ, 
para.517; Strugar. TJ, para.349; Blagojevic/Jokic. TJ, para.726; Brdanin. TJ, para.271; Simic. TJ, para. 162; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.63; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.70; Krnojelac.TJ, para.88; Kvocka.TJ, para.256; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.391; Blaskic.TJ, para.285; Delalic.TJ, para.327. 
6 8 9 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para. 134; Mrksic. TJ, para.552. 
6 9 0 ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.798. 
6 9 1 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para. 189; Aleksovski.AJ, para. 163; Tadic.AJ, para.229; Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, para.229; 
Brima.TJ, para.775. 
6 9 2 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para. 194. 
6 9 3 Delalic.TJ, para.327. 
6 9 4 Furundzija.TJ, para.249. Also Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para. 127; Brdanin.AJ, para.277; Simic.AJ, para.85; 
Kvocka.AJ, para.90; Blaskic.AJ, paras.45-46, 48; Vasiljevic.AJ, paras. 102, 142; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.399; 
Aleksovski.AJ, para.163; Tadic.AJ, para.229; Mrksic.TJ, paras.551-552; Oric.TJ, paras.282, 284; Limaj.TJ, 
paras.516-517; Strugar.TJ, paras.349, 354; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, paras.726, 782; Brdanin.TJ, para.271; 
Galic. TJ, para. 168; Simic. TJ, para. 161; Naletilic/Martinovic. TJ, para.63; Vasiljevic. TJ, para.70; Krnojelac. TJ, 
para.70; Kvocka. TJ, para.243; Krstic.TJ, para.601; Kunarac.TJ, para.391. Further p.64.supra; c.f. C R Y E R E T 
AL.(2007) .op.ci t„ p.311. 
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The particular identities of direct perpetrators do not need to be known, provided the 
accused is aware of the crime itself. 6 9 6 Omissions may qualify as assistance i f they meet the 
necessary standard. 6 9 7 Mere presence698 at the scene of the crime wi l l not usually be 
sufficient, 6 9 9 although it has been suggested that the presence "o f a person with superior 
authority, such as a military commander, is a probative indicator for determining whether 
that person encouraged or supported the [direct] perpetrators".7 0 0 Accordingly, it must again 
be subject to a determination on the facts that the individual's presence had a substantial 
effect. 7 0 1 The Appeals Chamber in Brdanin applied this requirement to find that the direct 
perpetrator must be aware of the abettor's tacit encouragement.702 
I f the aider and abettor's contribution is made after the completion of the core crime, 7 0 3 a 
prior agreement must exist between the aider and abettor and direct perpetrator, in order that 
the latter was genuinely assisted in the commission o f their act. 7 0 4 This rule is an exception 
to the otherwise prevailing view that the direct perpetrator need not know of the aider and 
abettor's assistance,705 best explained on the basis of causation. 7 0 6 The dicta indicating that 
6 9 5 Brdanin.AJ, para.355; Krstic.AJ, para. 143; Musema.TJ, para. 174; Akayesu.TJ, para.53 I. 
6 9 6 Indeed, an individual may aid and abet a single offence committed by one individual, or a number of 
offences committed by a J C E : Kvocka.AJ, para.90. Despite references to the contrary, this latter circumstance 
has no special ontology ("aiding and abetting a JCE") but merely involves multiple direct perpetrators: 
Kvocka.AJ, para.91; Krajisnik.TJ, para.886. 
6 9 7 Blaskic.AJ, para.47; Mrksic.TJ, para.553; Limaj.TJ, para.517; Stmgar.TJ, para.349. Initially, it was 
suggested that omissions must have "decisive" effect: Blaskic.TJ, para.284; subsequently, "significant" effect: 
Naletilic/Martinovic. TJ, para.63; Kvocka. TJ, para.256. However, it should properly be understood, again, as 
"substantial effect": Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, paras.228, 230; Simic.TJ, para. 162. It can only have this effect is the 
accused is under a positive duty: Mrksic.TJ, paras.553-554; Oric.TJ, para.283. 
6 9 8 Strictly, an act, not an omission: Brdanin.AJ, para.273; c.f. Kayishema/Ruzindana.AJ, para.201; Oric.TJ, 
para.283. 
6 9 9 Mrksic.TJ, para.553; Oric.TJ, para.283; Limaj.TJ, para.517. 
7 0 0 Blaskic.TJ, para.284, emphasis added. Also Brdanin.TJ, para.271; Simic.TJ, para. 165; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.63; Kvocka.TJ, para.257. The S C S L acknowledged the possibility that a 
superior's repeated failures to punish could be charged as aiding and abetting, rather than superior 
responsibility: Brima.TJ, para.777; also para.800. 
7 0 1 Brdanin.AJ, para.273; Limaj.TJ, para.517; Aleksovski.TJ, para.87. On occasion, the term used has been 
"significant effect": Strugar.TJ, paras.349, 355; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.70; Krnojelac.TJ, para.89; Kvocka.TJ, 
para.257; Kunarac.TJ,pnra.293. It is suggested that this apparently higher standard {c.f. Oric.TJ, para.284) is, 
in formal terms, inappropriate; it does, however, illustrate that the "substantial effect" test should be applied 
rigorously, and is very often likely to be challenging to prove on the evidence. Although it refers to both 
views, this seems to be the approach adopted by a Trial Chamber in 2003: Simic.TJ, para. 165. Further 
Akayesu.TJ, para.693; Tadic.TJ, para.690. 
7 0 2 Brdanin.AJ, para.277. 
7 0 3 Oric. TJ, para.282. 
1 0 A Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, paras. 177-181; Haradinaj. TJ, para. 145; Blagojevic/Jokic. TJ, para.731. 
7 0 5 E.g., Brdanin.AJ, para.349; Tadic.AJ, para.229; Simic.TJ, para. 161. C.f. Brdanin.AJ, para.277, which 
implies an exception to this rule in the context of "tacit encouragement". 
7 0 6 VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p. 112. 
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a causal link is not required should be interpreted as excluding the special causation which 
707 708 
defines procurement. It is likely that the same principle applies before the ICC. 
The mens rea standard includes "knowledge" 7 0 9 that the assistance wil l contribute to the 
criminal consequence. In Kvocka, the Trial Chamber referred to the requirement of "intent" 
to assist the criminal consequence that would result. 7 1 0 In disapproving this approach,7" the 
Blaskic Appeals Chamber arguably over-reacted. As the analysis in Oric illustrates, 
"knowledge" and "intent" are closely related in assessing mem rea ("a cognitive element of 
knowledge and a volitional element of acceptance"),712 and this standard is precisely that 
which Blaskic offers for general application. In accepting the argument that intent to assist 
is not required, 7 1 3 Cryer et al seem to miss this point, as well as the implication o f the 
general principle laid down in Delalic and Tadic.li4 Such a view also establishes a tension 
more apparent than real with the position under the ICC Statute. 
One line of authority suggests that the accused need not know the precise crime committed, 
provided that they are aware that one of a number of crimes w i l l probably be committed and 
this in fact comes to pass.7 1 5 A competing line, rather stronger in its formal precedential 
value, suggests that the aider and abettor must know that their acts assist the commission of 
the "specific crime" of the direct perpetrator.7 1 6 The Trial Chamber in Simic explicitly noted 
Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, paras. 127, 134; Simic.AJ, para.85; Blaskic.AJ, para.48; Mrksic.TJ, para.552; Oric.TJ, 
para.284; Limaj.TJ, para.517; Strugar.TJ, para.349; Blaskic.TJ, para.285; Furundzija.TJ, para.233. 
7 0 8 ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.807. 
7 0 9 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para. 127; Brdanin.AJ, para.484; Simic.AJ, para.86; Krstic.AJ, para. 140; Vasiljevic.AJ, 
paras. 102, 142; Krnojelac.AJ, para.51; Aleksovski.AJ, para. 163; Tadic.AJ, para.229; Mrksic.TJ, para.556; 
Limaj.TJ, para.518; Strugar.TJ, para.350; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.727; Brdanin.TJ, para.272; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.63; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.7l; Krnojelac.TJ, para.90; Kvocka.TJ, para.253; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.392; Blaskic.TJ, para.283; Furundzija.TJ, para.249; Delalic.TJ, para.328. 
7 1 0 Kvocka.TJ, para.255; Blaskic.TJ, para.286. This view would appear to result from an unfortunate echo of 
the general mens rea standard for all modes of liability, and should not be considered properly to be an 
additional element. 
7 1 1 Blaskic.AJ, para.49. 
7 1 2 Oric.TJ, para.288. 
7 1 3 C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., p.311. 
7 1 4 ¥n392.supra. 
7 1 5 Haradinaj.TJ, para.145; Oric.TJ, para.288; Limaj.TJ, para.518; Strugar.TJ, para.350; Brdanin.TJ, para.272; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.63; Kvocka.TJ, para.255; Blaskic.TJ, para.287; Furundzija.TJ, para.246. Also 
METTRAUX.(2005) .op .c i t . , p.286. 
7 1 6 Seromba.AJ, para.44; Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, paras. 127, 221-222; Brdanin.AJ, para.484; Vasiljevic.AJ, 
para. 102; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.399; Aleksovski.AJ, para. 163; Tadic.AJ, para.229; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, 
para.782; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.71; Kunarac.TJ, para.392; Kupreskic.TJ, para.772. 
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this discrepancy, and preferred (without reasoning) the latter approach. 7 1 7 On the other 
hand, the Appeals Chamber was content in both Blaskic1]iand Simic1 [ 9 to approve the two 
formulations without attempting to reconcile them. Most recently, the Mrksic Trial Chamber 
took the Appeals Chamber's lead and sat itself f irmly on the fence, saying: 
While it has been held that it need not be shown that the aider and abettor was aware of the 
specific crime that was intended or committed, provided that he was aware that one of a number of 
crimes would probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, the Appeals 
Chamber recently confirmed that this ruling does not extend the definition of mens rea of aiding 
and abetting.720 
The SCSL Appeals Chamber chose to endorse the wider approach on the basis of the 
Blaskic and Simic precedents,721 even though they too leave the question unresolved. 
In any event, the accused is not required to share the direct perpetrator's mens rea or a 
common plan. 7 2 3 Indeed, their subjective motivation is irrelevant. 7 2 4 They must however be 
aware of the "essential elements" of the crime ultimately committed, 7 2 5 including any 
special intent. 7 2 6 It is not necessary that the aider and abettor and direct perpetrator share a 
common plan. 
7 1 7 Simic. TJ, para.163. 
7 1 8 Blaskic.AJ, paras.45-46, 50. Latterly, this decision has been interpreted restrictively to suggest that it only 
affirms the "specific crime" standard: Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para.222. 
7 1 9 Simic.AJ, para.86. The Appeals Chamber here seemed to draw a semantic distinction between knowledge 
of the "specific crime" of the perpetrator (which the aider and abettor must have) and the "precise crime" 
(which the aider and abettor need not have). 
7 2 0 Mrksic.TJ, \>a™.5S6. 
7 2 1 Brima.AJ, para.243; also Fofana/Kondewa.TJ, para.231; Brima.TJ, para.776. 
7 2 2 Simic.AJ, para.86; Krnojelac.AJ, para.51; Aleksovski.AJ, para.162; Mrksic.TJ, para.556; Limaj.TJ, para.518; 
Strugar.TJ, para.350; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.727; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.71; Krnojelac.TJ, para.90; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.392. 
7 2 3 Simic. TJ, para.162; Delalic.TJ, para.328. 
7 2 4 E.g., mutatis mutandis, Krnojelac.AJ, paras. 100, 102; Kunarac.AJ, paras. 103, 153; Jelisic.AJ, para.49. 
7 2 5 Krnojelac.AJ, para.51; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.400; Aleksovski.AJ, para.162; Haradinaj.TJ, para. 145; 
Mrksic.TJ, para.556; Oric.TJ, para.288; Limaj.TJ, para.518; Strugar.TJ, para.350; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, 
para.727; Brdanin.TJ, para.273; Simic.TJ, para.163; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.63; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.71; 
Krnojelac.TJ, para.90; Kvocka.TJ, para.255; Kunarac.TJ, para.392. 
7 2 6 Seromba.AJ, paras.56, 65; Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para.127; Simic.AJ, para.86; Krstic.AJ, para.140; 
Vasiljevic.AJ, para. 142; Krnojelac.AJ, paras.51-52; Mrksic.TJ, para.556; Limaj.TJ, para.518; 
Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, paras.727, 779, 782; Brdanin.TJ, para.273; Simic.TJ, para.164; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, 
para.63; Vasiljevic.TJ, para.71; Krnojelac.TJ, para.90; Kvocka.TJ, para.262. They are not required, however, 
to share this intent: Furundzija.TJ, para.252. 
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It has been suggested that an aider and abettor may "graduate" into a perpetrator within a 
JCE. 7 2 7 The permeable nature of the distinction between an aider and abettor and JCE 
member was highlighted as early as 1998: in Delalic, it was noted that where a common 
criminal purpose exists, to which an individual "knowingly" makes a direct and substantial 
contribution, that individual may "[depending upon the facts" be held responsible "either" 
as a direct perpetrator or aider and abettor. 7 2 8 The key determinant between the two modes 
is "intent to perpetrate the crime or to pursue the joint criminal purpose". 7 2 9 In 
circumstances where an individual is involved with the activities of a JCE but shared intent 
cannot be proved, it 
...may be inferred from knowledge of the criminal enterprise and continued participation... 
Eventually, an aider or abettor... may become a co-perpetrator, even without physically 
committing crimes, if their participation lasts for an extensive period or becomes more directly 
involved in maintaining the functioning of the enterprise.7 3 0 
On its face, this reasoning is curious: when an aider and abettor performs the same daily act 
of assistance over a year, the character of their behaviour per se is not obviously different at 
the end of the period than the beginning. I f the graduation doctrine is applied, however, the 
relative culpability of the same action markedly increases. This approach might be justified 
on the pragmatic basis that a prolonged contribution to the JCE assumes greater importance 
to it, or on the basis of the evidential assumption that an individual cannot act in the 
knowledge of the criminal intent for such a long period without sharing it. Neither argument 
necessarily relates to the personal culpability of the individual concerned, however: the 
doctrine should be used with caution. There is at least some evidence of this approach, in 
the observation that "[t]he level of participation necessary to render someone a participant 
in a joint criminal enterprise is less than the level [ . . . ] necessary to graduate an aider or 
abettor to a co-perpetrator of that enterprise".7 3 1 
u l Kvocka.TJ, para.273. 
7 2 8 Delalic. TJ, para.328. 
7 2 9 Krnojelac.AJ, para.511 Kvocka.TJ, para.285. In Furundzija, it was initially held, misleadingly, that "intent 
to participate" is the key determinant between the two modes, a formula unfortunately reminiscent of the 
general mens rea standard for modes of liability: Furundzija.TJ, para.249; c.f. Tadic.TJ, para.674. However, 
the Trial Chamber's meaning in Furundzija was at least partly clarified by the example given: Furundzija.TJ, 
para.252. 
7 3 0 Kvocka.TJ, para.284. 
7 3 1 Kvocka.TJ, para.287. 
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The ICC Statute provides for liability for any who "[f]or the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of... a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission". 7 3 2 Although 
basically similar to the law on knowing assistance under the ICTY/R, it is nuanced in two 
respects. As Cryer notes, the material element is apparently rather broader while the mental 
element is restrained by the additional purposive requirement. As such, he concludes that 
the liability is slightly narrowed. 7 3 3 This is likely correct, not least as the broadening of the 
material element is more or less illusory: any material contribution less than one with a 
qualitatively substantial effect (the ICTY/R standard) might be soundly argued not to 
amount to an act of "assistance" at a l l . 7 3 4 Ambos considers that the additional mental 
element under the ICC Statute must have been deliberately intended to contradict the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY/R 7 3 5 and, as such, may not be circumvented via Article 21. 
Nonetheless, i f it were posited that the ICTY/R in fact applied a dolus eventualis standard to 
aiding and abetting, rather than mere knowledge stricto sensu, the difference between the 
true scope of the liabilities might seem rather smaller. 
' R U L E 1 Yi: A S U P E R I O R ' S L I A B I L I T Y F O R S U B O R D I N A T E S 
Superior (or command) responsibility is a protean term. A superior may be held 
responsible—like anyone else—for participation in an act which violates international law, 
either as 'perpetrator' or 'accomplice'. However, it is also established that a superior may be 
indirectly responsible for offences committed by subordinates,736 even without 
'participating' in their acts. This indirect liability is justified as a device to acknowledge and 
enforce the particular responsibilities assumed by an individual trusted to command the 
actions o f others. It is in this latter sense that the term "superior responsibility" has acquired 
independent legal meaning. 
12 ICC Statute, Art.25(3)(c). 
1 3 CRYER ET AL.(2007).op.cit., p.312; CRYER.(2001).op.cit., p.23. Also VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p.93. 
1 4 Further AMBOS.(forthcoming).op.cit., mns.21-22; ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.799-801. 
5 Ibid., mn.23. 
6 HENQUET.(2002).op.cit., p.806. 
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The theory underpinning superior responsibility is, however, in some doubt. One view links 
it directly with the complicity concept, 7 3 7 another considers it a sui generis mode of liability 
outside the scope of complicity (often described as "imputed" 7 3 8 responsibility), 7 3 9 and a 
third considers it to be an independent offence o f omission. 7 4 0 Certainly, it is true to say 
that the elements which define the nexus between the superior's conduct and the criminal 
consequence (knowledge and causation) appear to be characterised in a way which 
distinguish superior responsibility from complicity. For this reason, the second model 
described here presents a clear challenge to conventional understandings of the principle of 
culpability, 7 4 1 to which the answers are not altogether convincing. 7 4 2 It remains an open 
question, however, whether the distinction between the first and second models—and thus 
the problem of culpability—is not more apparent than real. 
The ICTY/R are best considered—at least formally—as committed to the second model. 
This approach is reflected in the fact that convictions are subject to those for perpetration of 
or complicity in the crime itself. 7 4 3 In such circumstances, superior responsibility may be an 
aggravating factor—and, indeed, should be in order to best characterise the qualities of the 
offence committed 7 4 4—but not an independent head of l iabi l i ty . 7 4 5 
7 3 7 E.g., von Leeb (NMT), cited in 12 L R T W C 1, 74-75; Halilovic.TJ, para.43. Further 
DAMASKA.(2001) .op.c i t . , p.456; 'The contemporary law of superior responsibility,' B A N T E K A S , I . , 1999, 
p.577; Wu & K.ANG.(1997).op.cit., p.284; 'Command responsibility in international humanitarian law,' G R E E N , 
L . C . , 1995, pp.356-361. 
7 3 8 'Command responsibility of non-military superiors in the [ I C C ] , ' V E T T E R , G . R . , 2000, pp.92, 97-99; 
DAMASKA.(2001) .op.c i t . , p.461; BANTEKAS.(1999) .op .c i t . , p.577; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.369; Report of the 
Secretary-General, para.56. 
7 3 9 E.g. Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal, para. 16; per Judge Shahabuddeen, paras.32-33; 
Oric.TJ, paras.292-293; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras.74-75; Halilovic.TJ, paras.38-39. This distinction 
is not necessarily imperilled by the fact that both accessory and superior responsibilities are instances of 
derivative liability: V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003) .op .c i t . , p.200, fh.333; 'Criminal liability for the acts of 
subordinates—the doctrine of command responsibility and its analogues in United States law,' Wu, T., & 
K A N G . . Y . , 1997, pp.279, 290. 
7 4 0 E.g., DARCY.(2007).op.cit . , p.385; C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., pp.328-330; JlA.(2004).op.cit., pp. 13, 32-
33; SCHABAS.(2003).op.cit., p. 1030. 
7 4 1 DAMASKA.(2001) .op.c i t . , p.461. C.f. Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 192. 
7 4 2 E.g., REID.(2005).op.cit., p.824; also B A N T E K A S . ( l 9 9 9 ) . o p . c i t . , pp.594-595. 
7 4 3 HENQUET.(2002) .op.c i t . , pp.826-827, 829; BANTEKAS.(1999) .op .c i t . , p.595. 
7 4 4 HENQUET.(2002) .op.c i t . , pp.827-832. 
7 4 5 E.g., Galic.AJ, para. 186; Naletilic/Martinovic.AJ, para.368; Kvocka.AJ, para. 104; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, 
paras.34-35; Blaskic.AJ, paras.91-92; Oric.TJ, para.343; Brdanin.TJ, para.285; Stakic.TJ, paras.464-466; 
Krnojelac.TJ, para. 173; Krstic.TJ, para.605. C.f. Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.836, 843; Blaskic.TJ, Disposition; 
Musema.TJ, paras.901-906; Kayishema/Ruzindana, paras.554-555, 558-559, 562-563, 568-569. With regard 
to the likely practice of the I C C , see 'Causality, a separate element of the doctrine of superior responsibility as 
expressed in Article 28 Rome Statute?' TRlhTTERER, O., 2002, pp. 187-188. 
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As Ambos implies, there is good reason to acknowledge aspects of multiple models. 
There is a risk, however, that the tensions which have underlaid superior responsibility at 
the ICTY/R wi l l be laid bare at the ICC. In particular, it is appropriate to ask whether 
Article 28 still represents a mode of liability at all, or whether it has become a discrete 
offence in its own right. 
The second key controversy relating to superior responsibility revolves around the extent to 
which it reflects a requirement for militarily responsible command. In other words, beyond 
punishing certain behaviour by a superior when presented with a criminal act, does it also 
establish liability for a generally incompetent superior? The latter concept is broadly 
captured by the term 'dereliction of duty', although unfortunately there is some variation in 
the manner in which it is applied. Superior responsibility clearly has a necessary 
relationship with military discipline, 7 4 7 and so there are arguments for both positions. 
Although it is the author's conclusion that superior responsibility and dereliction of duty 
should be kept distinct, the following pages illustrate that the opposite is beginning to 
appear increasingly likely, at least at the ICC. 
Despite comment to the contrary, 7 4 8 it can be stated preliminarily that none of the models of 
superior responsibility is a form of vicarious liability: the fact of responsibility is predicated 
not on the breach of duty by another, but by the superior themselves.7 4 9 However, it cannot 
be denied, at least under the second model, that the gravity of the offence with which the 
superior is charged is determined by the third party. 
The concept of superior responsibility 
Although it has been suggested that the modern conception of superior responsibility (a 
knowing or otherwise culpable failure to prevent or punish crimes carried out by 
'Superior responsibility,' A M B O S , K.., in C A S S E S E E T AL.(2002).op.cit., p.824. 
7 4 7 Bagilishema.AJ, paras.35-36; 'Article 28: responsibility of commanders and other superiors,' FENRICK, 
W.J., in TRIFFTERER.(2008 forthcoming).op.cit., mns.1-2; SCHABAS.(2003).op.cit., pp.1026, 1028. 
7 4 8 VETTER.(2002).op.cit., p.99; 'The evolution and scope of command responsibility,' LlPPMAN, M , 2000, 
p. 139. 
7 4 9 RElD.(2005).op.cit., p.822; LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cit., pp.162-163; B A N T E K A S . ( 1999).op.cit., p.577; 
Krnojelac.AJ, para. 171; Delalic.AJ, para.239. 
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subordinates) is well established in the core instruments of modern international 
humanitarian law, 7 5 0 this may be something of an overstatement.751 It is true, however, that 
the basic concept has ancient origins. 7 5 2 One of the earliest references to the principle in its 
modern form (i.e., comprised of functional/cognitive/operational elements 7 5 3) dates from 
1919, identifying that a charge for violations o f the laws or customs of war may lie against 
...all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may 
have been, without distinction of rank, including the heads of states, who ordered, or, with 
knowledge thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to 
prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war . . . 7 5 4 
A number of countries enacted legislation shortly after the second World War with a similar 
purpose. 7 5 5 Related doctrines seem to have been applied (more or less intelligibly) in cases 
tried by a range of states, arguably including Brandt,156 Hisakasu,751 Holstein75S Masao,759 
Sakai760 and Meyer.761 Although the accused in question was acquitted, a doctrine of 
"culpable negligence" of a person in authority was also considered by a British court. 7 6 2 A 
similar notion was included in the context of the charge of being "concerned in the ki l l ing" 
in the unreported case of Seeger76i However, as discussed earlier, it is clear that the line in 
the early case law between superior responsibility and complicity concepts, either through 
7 5 0 U K M I N I S T R Y O K DEFENCE.(2005) .op.c i t . , p.438, mn. 16.36, fn.169. Also Hadzihasanovic Command 
Responsibility1 Appeal, para. 17; Halilovic. TJ, para.40. 
7 5 1 De/o//c.77,para.335. 
7 5 2 Henry's Laws and Shakespeare's Wars, M E R O N , T., 1993, p. 149; De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, 
G R O T I U S , H., trans. K E L S E Y , F.W., 1925, Bk. 2, p.523. Also 'Command responsibility for war crimes,' P A R K S , 
W.H., 1973, pp.3-14. 
7 5 3 V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.135. 
7 5 4 'Report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference,' C O M M I S S I O N O N T H E R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y O F T H E 
A U T H O R S O F T H E W A R A N D O N E N F O R C E M E N T O F P E N A L T I E S , reprinted in [1920] \4AJIL 95, 121. 
7 5 5 Law on the Suppression of War Crimes, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2 August 1947, Art.3, cited in 
P A R K S (1973) op.cit., p.18; Law of 24 October 1946, China, Art.9, cited at 14 LRTWC 158; Ordinance 
Concerning the Suppression of War Crimes, France, 28 August 1944, Art.4, cited at 4 LRTWC 87; 
Extraordinary Penal Law Decree, Netherlands, 22 December 1943, Art.27(a)(3), cited at 11 LRTWC 100. 
7 5 6 Brandt (NMT), pp.193-194, 198. Also Flick (NMT), cited in 9 LRTWC 1, 54. 
7 5 7 Hisakasu (US), 1946, pp.78-79. 
7 5 8 Holstein (France), 1947, pp.26, 32. 
7 5 9 Masao (Australia), 1947, pp.58-60. 
7 6 0 Sakai (China), 1946, pp. 1-2. 
7 6 1 Meyer (Canada), 1945, pp.99, 107-109. 
7 6 2 Schonfeld (UK) , 1946, pp.70-71. Also Student (UK) , 1946, pp. 89, 118, in which the accused was acquitted 
of being "responsible" for various law of war violations. 
7 6 3 Seeger (UK) , 1946, unreported, cited at 4 LRTWC 88. 
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participation in a common plan or ordering, seems to have been rather blurred. Certainly, 
it was observed in 1949, on behalf of the UN War Crimes Commission, that "the doctrine is 
not easy to lay down, either legally or morally" and that "[t]he principles governing this 
sphere o f law have not yet crystallised". 7 6 5 Nonetheless, by 1971, the military judge in U.S. 
v. Medina, a prosecution resulting from the My Lai incident, was able to give a definition of 
superior responsibility that is substantially similar to that used by the ICTY/R. 7 6 6 1 67 states 
ratified the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which requires military 
commanders "to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress" breaches of the Conventions. 7 6 7 
Even states who are not party to the Protocol have independently manifested their largely 
similar interpretations of the principle. 7 6 8 The U N Security Council expressly provided for 
superior responsibility in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, 7 6 9 and the parties to the Rome 
Conference included such a measure in the ICC Statute.110 For these reasons, perhaps of all 
the modes of liability, superior responsibility (of some kind) enjoys the soundest 
independent basis in customary international law, being established at the latest by 1993. 7 7 1 
There is a caveat, however. Although the basic concept of superior responsibility has been 
clearly recognised for some long time, its precise definition (the meaning of and relationship 
between the three elements) remained contested:7 7 2 as Triffterer observes, the pre-1993 
authorities illustrate "a more pragmatic than theoretical approach".7 7 3 The debate at the ICC 
conference over the wording of the provision, but not its existence, bears testament to this 
fact. 7 7 4 This is not of great moment as far as the principle of legality is concerned—the 
7 6 4 E.g., Alstoetter (NMT), as cited in 6 LRTWC 1, 87. 
7 6 5 1 5 LRTWC 62. 
7 6 6 U.S. v. Medina (US), 1971, unreported, cited in 'Superior orders and command responsibility,' G R E E N , 
L.C.,2003,pp.356-357. 
7 6 7 API, Art.87. Also Art.86(2). 
7 6 8 E.g., Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, 1983, available 
online courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. 
7 6 9 ICTY Statute, Art.7(3); ICTR Statute, Art.6(3); also SCSL Statute, Art.6(3). 
7 7 0 ICC Statute, Art.28. 
7 7 1 V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p. 177; AMBOS.(2002).op.cit. , p.825. Unlike J C E or indirect co-perpetration, 
the only challenge to the basic principle of superior responsibility has been to its application in internal armed 
conflict: Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal. The reference to the sound "statutory basis" of the 
doctrine is not itself significant (beyond providing further evidence of its customary status) as the statutes are 
not (at least for the I C T Y f l l ) determinative of substantive law but only of jurisdiction: DARCY.(2007).op.cit., 
p.387. 
7 7 2 Ibid., p. 161; HENQUET.(2002) .op.ci t . , p.814; AMBOS.(2002).op.cit. , pp.846-847; DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., 
pp.485-486, 489^90, 492-493. 
7 " TRlFFTERER.(2002).op.cit., p. 181; also Wu & K A N G . ( 1997).op.cit., pp.286-287. 
7 7 4 TRlFFTERER.(2002).op.cit., p. 187. 
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popular notion is more than sufficient for to give potential defendants the relevant degree of 
notice—but some of the questions, particularly with regard to the required mens rea,715 are 
significant as a matter of law. 
It has been suggested that the first significant exploration of command responsibility took 
place in Yamashita.776 At the USSC, Chief Justice Stone for the majority held that 
international law imposed "an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within [the 
accused's] power and appropriate in the circumstances". In a teleological interpretation of 
the laws of war, it was held that this principle extended to the imposition of personal 
responsibility on commanders who, by their breach of duty, thus 'permitted' their 
subordinates to commit crimes. 7 7 7 In effect, liability was upheld on the basis of the 
superior's dereliction of those unspecified duties which were consonant with his role and 
rank. However, as Justice Murphy, dissenting, noted: 
[Petitioner was rushed to trial under an improper charge.. In all this needless and unseemly haste 
there was no serious attempt to charge or to prove that he committed a recognized violation of the 
laws of war. He was not charged with personally participating in the acts of atrocity or with 
ordering or condoning their commission. Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to 
him. It was simply alleged that he unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as 
commander.. , 7 7 8 
Most damning was Justice Murphy's emphasis on the disrupted communication and general 
chaos suffered by the Japanese army at the time of the relevant offences: the defendant had 
neither effective control over, nor information about, many of his subordinates.7 7 9 Parks 
suggests that the dissent was not in fact directed at the standard of responsibility applied, but 
780 
on the factual conclusions drawn from the evidence. He further suggests that the decision 
did not evince a strict liability doctrine. 7 8 1 However, it is clear that the first instance decision 
7 7 5 E.g., Wu & KANG.(1997).op.cit., pp.278, 297. 
7 7 6 Yamashita (US), 1945, p.l etseq. Also U K MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.(2005).op.cit., p.438, mn. 16.36.1; 
JlA.(2004).op.cit., pp.6, 8-10, 12; VAN SLIEDREGT.(2002).op.cit., p. 120; AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., pp.825-827; 
LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cit., p. 142. 
7 7 7 In re Yamashita (US), 1946, pp. 14-16. 
7 7 8 Ibid., pp.27-28. Also Yamashita (US), 1945, pp.3-4, 19-33. 
7 7 9 In re Yamashita (US), 1946, pp.34-36. 
7 8 0 PARKS.(1973).op.cit., p.35; also AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., p.828. 
7 8 1 Ibid., p.37. 
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was ambiguous as to the basis for liability, and Chief Justice Stone certainly did not bring 
the question of the defendant's knowledge front and centre in the majority decision on 
appeal. It must be concluded, therefore, that Yamashita has come to be seen as a precedent 
for a strict liability variant of a 'dereliction of duty' offence, 7 8 3 whatever its 'true' meaning. 
As such, its relevance to the modern law of superior responsibility is relatively l imited. 7 8 4 
In Pohl, the N M T seemed to apply the reasoning in Yamashita, holding that "[t]he law of 
war imposes on a military officer in a position of command an affirmative duty to take such 
steps as are within his power and appropriate to the circumstances to control those under his 
command". However, in choosing to acquit a defendant on the basis of the inadequacy of 
his knowledge o f the crimes committed, it acknowledged a different conception of the form 
of responsibility. 7 8 5 Similarly, in Milch, the N M T considered that the controlling legal 
questions to be answered on the facts included the extent of the defendant's participation, 
the extent to which he had directed the criminal acts, the extent of his knowledge, the extent 
786 
of his control, and the actions he in fact undertook. Although this approach possibly 
illustrates the confusion between superior responsibility and complicity, it clearly suggested 
a requirement that the defendant had both knowledge and effective control before a failure 
to act could be rendered criminal . 7 8 7 
Other key decisions introduced new variations in the relation between the predicate 
elements for liability. The von Leeb and List trials, for example, stressed the importance of 
knowledge, although developing the notion of constructive knowledge in order to meet the 
•700 
standard. The NMT in these cases also appears to have retreated from Milch in adopting a 
formal, rather than actual, standard in assessing the authority of the accused;7 8 9 an approach 
with significant drawbacks 7 9 0 and one clearly rejected by successor tribunals. 7 9 1 Similarly, 
Toyoda completed the circle back to a Yamashita-\ike notion of dereliction of duty, in 
niIbid., pp.30-31. 
7 8 3 E.g., REID.(2005).op.cit., p.818; VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., p. 123; LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cil„ p. l44;Wu 
& KANG.(1997).op.cit„ p.279. 
7 8 4 AMBOS.(2002).op.cit„ p.830. C.f. VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.123, 128. 
7 8 5 Pohl (NMT), pp.1011-1012. 
7 8 6 Milch (NMT), p.774. 
7 8 7 Ibid, pp.776-777, 779. 
7 8 8 List (NMT), cited in 8 LRTWC 34, 70-71; von Leeb (NMT), cited in 12 LRTWC 1, 77, 79, 112. 
7 8 9 List (NMT), cited in 8 LRTWC 34, 89; von Leeb (NMT), cited in 12 LRTWC 1, 77, 110-111. 
7 9 0 BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., pp.578, 580, 594. 
791 Vn.191.infra. 
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holding that knowledge was a necessary element—but that a superior's dereliction of duty 
in not being adequately informed was also culpable ("knew, or should by the exercise of 
ordinary diligence have learned"). 7 9 2 This reasoning has remained a source of controversy 
for both the ICTY/R and the ICC. 
It should be clear, therefore, that the pre-1993 jurisprudence permits a certain latitude for 
judicial interpretation. Despite the considerable advances made by the ICTY/R, it is striking 
that the same areas of contention, highlighted in this very brief review of the post-WWII 
decisions, remain to trouble the relationship between the ICTY/R and the ICC. 
Superior responsibility at the I C T Y / R 
The three-pronged test for superior responsibility applicable at the ICTY/R clearly reflects 
the doctrine's functional, cognitive and operational elements. As with the other attribution 
doctrines, the ICTY/R's major contribution is the systematic and reasoned consideration it 
has given to the minutiae of the concept. From their jurisprudence, the following principles 
may be discerned. 
The superior-subordinate relationship 
Inherent in the notion of superior responsibility is the existence of a superior/subordinate 
relationship between the accused and the physical perpetrators of the relevant offences. 7 9 3 
The terminology clearly indicates that there must be some formal or informal difference in 
status between the 'superior' and 'subordinate', 7 9 4 and thus the subordinates must at least be 
a defined class. 7 9 5 The relationship does not have to be formal or de jure;796 indeed, it may 
" U.S. v. Toyoda (US), unreported, cited in Haliovic.TJ, para.47, fn.726. 
7 9 3 Halilovic.AJ, para.59; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.827; Aleksovski.AJ, para.72; Mrksic.TJ, para.558; 
Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.76; Limaj.TJ, paras.520-521; Halilovic.TJ, para.56; Strugar.TJ, paras.358-
359; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.790; Brdanin.TJ, paras.275, 370; Galic.TJ, para. 173; Stakic.TJ, para.457; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.65; Krnojelac.TJ, para.92; Kvocka.TJ, paras.313-314; Krstic.TJ, para.604; 
Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.401; Kunarac.TJ, paras.395-396; Blaskic.TJ, para.294; Aleksovski.TJ, paras.69, 72; 
Delalic. TJ, para.346. 
7 9 4 Halilovic.AJ, para.59; Delalic.AJ, para.303; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.76; Halilovic.TJ, para.60; 
Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.791; Brdanin.TJ, para.276; Stakic.TJ, para.459; Krnojelac.TJ, para.93; 
Kordic/Cerkez. TJ, para.408. 
7 9 5 Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, para.287; Oric.TJ, para.311; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.90. 
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only be proved by showing that the superior actually manifested "effective control" over the 
subordinate.7 9 7 For this reason, relative 7 9 8 de jure authority is not a conclusive 
determinant, 7 9 9 although it may establish a strong basis for judicial inference. 8 0 0 Certain 
functions—the classic example is the chief of staff 8 0 1 —may be highly important and yet not 
apparently bear command authority; nonetheless, in such circumstances, it is important that 
an objective look is taken at the actual role assumed by the individual. The relationship 
between superior and subordinate should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 8 0 2 Operational 
responsibility may cease at the time of a valid transfer of command {i.e., when another 
individual assumes all the duties of the superior), although there are obvious circumstances 
(such as promotion within the unit, formation or army) when that responsibility may be 
retained. The temporary or ad hoc nature o f subordination is not a bar to superior 
responsibility, providing that the necessary elements exist at the relevant time. 
Command structure is not directly relevant to superior responsibility. Multiple individuals in 
the chain of command may bear superior responsibility for the criminal offence of a 
subordinate.8 0 4 The superior is not required per se to be geographically proximate to the 
relevant subordinates,805 although the greater the distance, the more difficult it may be to 
7 9 6 Halilovic.AJ, paras.59, 210; Bagili.shema.AJ, paras.50, 61; Delalic.AJ, paras. 193, 197, 251; Mrksic. TJ, 
para.560; Oric.TJ, paras.309-310; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.78; Limaj.TJ, para.522; Halilovic.TJ, 
para.60; Strugar.TJ, para.362; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.791; Brdanin.TJ, para.276; Stakic.TJ, para.459; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, paras.67, 69; Krnojelac.TJ, para.93; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.405—406; Kunarac.TJ, 
paras.396-397; Blaskic.TJ, paras.300, 302; Aleksovski.TJ, para.76; Delalic.TJ, para.354. 
9 7 Brima.AJ, para.257; Halilovic.AJ, para.59; Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, paras.302-303; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, 
para.840; Blaskic.AJ, para.67; Bagilishema.AJ, paras.50, 56, 61; Delalic.AJ, paras. 195-197, 251; Mrksic. TJ, 
para.560; Oric. TJ, para.311; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, paras.77, 79; Limaj. TJ, para.522; Halilovic. TJ, 
para.58; Strugar.TJ, para.360; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.791; Brdanin.TJ, paras.276, 372; Galic.TJ, para. 173; 
Stakic.TJ, para.459; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.67; Krnojelac.TJ, para.93; Kvocka.TJ, para.315; 
Kordic/Cerkez. TJ, para.406; Kunarac. TJ, para.396; Blaskic. TJ, paras.300-301,335; Aleksovski. TJ, para.76; 
Delalic.TJ, paras.370-378. 
7 9 8 There is no 'seniority threshold' for command responsibility: the key factor is the relative difference in 
status between superior and subordinate, not their significance in the hierarchy as a whole: Oric.TJ, para.312; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.398. 
7 9 9 E.g, Kvocka.AJ, paras. 144, 382; Delalic.AJ, para.299; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.413, 418; Delalic.TJ, 
paras.806, 809. 
8 0 0 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.AJ, para.21, c.f. paras.191-193; Delalic.AJ, para.197; Galic.TJ, para.173. 
8 0 1 E.g., Halilovic.AJ, paras.212-214. Further List (NMT), cited in 8 L R T W C 34, 89-90; von Leeb (NMT), 
cited in 12 L R T W C 1,112-118; c.f. Hisakasu (US), 1946, p.79. 
8 0 2 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, para.84. 
8 0 3 Mrksic.TJ, para.560; Oric.TJ, para.310; Limaj.TJ, para.522; Halilovic.TJ, para.61; Strugar.TJ, para.362; 
Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.411; Kunarac.TJ, para.399. 
8114 Mrksic.TJ, para.560; Oric.TJ, para.313; Limaj.TJ, para.522; Halilovic.TJ, paras.61-62; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.69; Krnojelac.TJ, para.93; Blaskic.TJ, para.303; Aleksovski.TJ, para.106. 
805 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.828. 
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demonstrate 'effective control'. Superior-subordinate relationships are not necessarily 
807 808 
direct or immediate, or confined to the 'proper' (i.e., doctrinally correct) operation of 
the chain of command. 8 0 9 Although a superior may delegate aspects o f their authority to 
subordinates, s/he cannot delegate the relevant legal responsibility without effectively 
detaching them to another unit or formation altogether.8 1 0 Where authority is shared in a 
'flatter' hierarchical structure, the court must consider the power actually devolved to an 
individual, "taking into account the cumulative effect o f [their] various functions." 8 1 1 
Superior responsibility is not limited to members of military or paramilitary 
812 
organisations. In principle, any civilian may be in a position to exercise the powers (and 
bear the responsibility) of a superior, even though they may do so in a different way from 
the standard military paradigm. 8 1 3 For this reason, in practical terms, proving the status of a 
civilian superior may often prove difficult. Nonetheless, the only determinant of this form of 
responsibility is compliance with the three major limbs of the test. 8 1 4 
A superior has effective control i f they have the material ability to prevent or punish the 
'commission' 8 1 5 of offences by subordinates.816 A key indicium of effective control, for 
either serving member of the armed forces or civilian, is the practical capacity o f the 
m b Halilovic. TJ, para.66. 
8 0 7 Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.828; Blaskic.AJ, para.67; Delalic.AJ, para.252; One. 77, paras.310-311; 
Brdanin.TJ, para.276; Stakic.TJ, para.459. 
8 0 8 Halilovic.TJ, para.63; Stntgar.TJ, paras.361, 363-366. 
8 0 9 BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., pp.580-582, 584; c.f. Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.416. On parallel chains of 
command, VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.155-156. 
8 1 0 VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp. 156-157; AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., p.859; BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., p.585, 
fh.126. 
8 1 1 Brdanin.TJ, para.277. Also Oric.TJ, para.313. 
8 1 2 Brima.AJ, para.257; Bagilishema.AJ, para.51; Delalic.AJ, paras. 195-196, 240; Aleksovski.AJ, para.76; 
Oric.TJ, para.308; Brdanin.TJ, para.281; Stakic.TJ, paras.459, 462; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.68; 
Kvocka.TJ, para.315; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.407; Aleksovski.TJ, para.75; Delalic.TJ, paras.356-363. 
8 1 3 Bagilishema.AJ, paras.52, 55; Brdanin.TJ, para.281. 
8 1 4 Bagilishema.AJ, paras.50, 55; Oric.TJ, para.320; Brdanin.TJ, paras.281-283; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, 
para.68; Krnojelac.TJ, para.94; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.414-415, 435, 446. C.f. Delalic.AJ, para.240, where 
the Appeals Chamber consciously left open the question as to whether a civilian form of superior 
responsibility is identical to that of the military. 
8 1 5 'Commission' is used as a term of art: a superior may be held responsible for the engagement of 
subordinates in criminal activity through any mode of liability: Blagojevic/Jokic.AJ, paras.280-282; Oric.TJ, 
paras.295-305. 
8 1 6 Brima.AJ, paras.257, 289; Halilovic.AJ, paras.59, 175; Delalic.AJ, paras. 192, 198, 254, 256; Aleksovski.AJ, 
para.76; Mrksic.TJ, para.560; Oric.TJ, para.311; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.77; Limaj.TJ, para.522; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.58; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.791; Brdanin.TJ, paras.276, 374; Stakic.TJ, para.459; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.67; Krnojelac.TJ, para.93; Kvocka.TJ, para.315; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.406; 
Kunarac.TJ, para.396; Blaskic.TJ, para.335 (c.f. para.300). 
110 
Q I -1 
superior to induce compliance with their instructions. This generally requires something 
more than "substantial influence" upon an individual's actions, unless the term is 'read up' 
to such an extent that it means effective control anyway. 8 1 8 'Effective control' outside the 
context of a superior/subordinate relationship is not sufficient to found superior 
819 
responsibility. The possible indicators are numerous; their recognition is more a question 
of evidence than substantive l a w 8 2 0 and they must be assessed in all the circumstances.821 
Traditional forms o f disciplinary power may also frequently be a useful indicator, although 
generally only applicable in the context of a formal hierachy. 8 2 2 Powers of enforcement may 
be direct, potentially including the use of force, 8 2 3 or indirect, such as by submitting reports 
to the competent authorities. 8 2 4 However, given that, in principle, any individual may make 
a report, it is suggested that an accused in this circumstance would have to possess sufficient 
status as to make their report likely to be acted upon. This conforms with the observation in 
Kvocka that the action of the accused must represent an "important step". 8 2 5 
Mens rea: know, or have reason to know 
The accused must know of their own position of authority in the prevailing circumstances 
and to the relevant extent. 8 2 6 The accused must also have known or had reason to know that 
the criminal act had been, or would be, committed. 8 2 7 Command responsibility is not strict 
8 1 7 Blaskic.TJ, para.302; Aleksovski.TJ, para.78. 
8 1 8 Brima.AJ, para.289; Delalic.AJ, paras.257-266, 300; Oric. TJ, para.311; Halilovic. TJ, para.59; 
Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.791; Stakic.TJ, para.459; Naletilic/Marlinovic.TJ, para.68; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, 
para.415. E.g., Brdanin.TJ, para.376. C.f. Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.81, which implied that the test in 
respect of military commanders of occupied territory may differ. Respectfully, this cannot be correct. VAN 
SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp. 147-149; c.f. BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., p.586. 
8 1 9 Halilovic.AJ, para.210. 
8 2 0 Blaskic.AJ, para.69; Mrksic.TJ, para.561; Oric.TJ, para.312; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.82; 
Halilovic. TJ, para.58. 
8 2 1 Halilovic.AJ, paras.204, 207. 
8 2 2 Aleksovski.TJ, para.78. 
8 2 3 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras.85-88. 
*2* Blaskic.AJ, para.68; Blaskic.TJ, para.302. 
8 2 5 Kvocka.TJ, para.316. Also Halilovic.AJ, para. 194; Halilovic.TJ, para. 100. 
8 2 6 0/7c.77,para.316. 
8 2 7 Halilovic.AJ, para.59; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.827; Delalic.AJ, para.222; Aleksovski.AJ, para.72; Mrksic.TJ, 
paras.558, 562; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.91; Limaj.TJ, paras.520, 523; Halilovic.TJ, paras.56, 64; 
Strugar.TJ, paras.358, 367; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, paras.790, 792; Brdanin.TJ, paras.275, 278; Galic.TJ, 
para. 173; Stakic.TJ, para.457; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.65; Krnojelac.TJ, para.92; Kvocka.TJ, paras.313-
314; Krslic.TJ, para.604; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.401, 425; Kunarac.TJ, para.395; Blaskic.TJ, para.294; 
Aleksovski.TJ, paras.69, 72; Delalic.TJ, para.346. 
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liability, and knowledge cannot merely be presumed, although it may be proved 
circumstantially in conformity with the ICTY/R's general practice. 8 3 0 A superior may 
possess the required mens rea either where they have actual knowledge of the fact of past or 
imminent crimes, or where they possess information which would at the least place a 
reasonable person in their role on notice of the need to investigate further. 8 3 1 
The fact of possession of the information is sufficient; it does not neet to be shown that the 
B n 9 1 1 
accused was actually acquainted with its contents. The extent of this "constructive" or 
"imputed" 8 3 4 knowledge is limited to the information in fact available to the superior; 8 3 5 it 
need not be conclusive 8 3 6 but must show a present and real r i sk 8 3 7 that unlawful acts are 
being, or w i l l be, committed by subordinates.838 It must also give notice of the particular 
offence with which the accused is charged: in the case of torture, for example, " i t is not 
enough that an accused has sufficient information about beatings... he must also have 
information—albeit general—which alerts him to the risk of beatings being inflicted for one 
of the [prohibited] purposes".8 3 9 Although this finding is hard to reconcile with the general 
tone of some of the other jurisprudence on point , 8 4 0 the underlying reasoning is hard to 
8 2 8 Delalic.AJ, para.239; Mrksic.TJ, para.562; Oric.TJ, para.318; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.92; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.65; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.792; Brdanin.TJ, para.278; Stakic.TJ, para.460; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.70; Delalic.TJ, para.383. 
8 2 9 Mrksic.TJ, para.563; Oric.TJ, para.319; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.94; Limaj.TJ, para.524; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.66; Strugar.TJ, para.368; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.71; Blaskic.TJ, para.307; 
Aleksvoski.TJ, para.80; Delalic.TJ, para.386. 
8 3 0 E.g, Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.834. 
8 3 1 Blaskic.AJ, para.62; Delalic.AJ, paras.228-235, 241; Mrksic.TJ, para.564; Oric.TJ, para.322; 
Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras.92, 95; Halilovic.TJ, para.65; Strugar.TJ, paras.369-370; 
Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.792; Stakic.TJ, para.460; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.75; Krnojelac.TJ, para.94; 
Kvocka. TJ, paras.317-318; Kordic/Cerkez. TJ, para.435; Delalic. TJ, para.383; API, Art.86(2). 
8 3 2 Delalic.AJ, paras.238-239; Mrksic.TJ, para.564; Oric TJ, para.322; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.75. 
8 3 3 Brdanin.TJ, para.278; AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., p.865, citing to 'Command responsibility for war crimes,' 
HESSLER,C.A„ 1973, pp. 1278-1279, 1298-1299. C . / BANTEKAS.(l999).op.cit., pp.587-588; W u & 
KANG.(1997).op.cit., pp.285-286. 
8 3 4 Oric.TJ, para.321. 
8 3 5 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.95; Strugar.TJ, para.369. 
8 3 6 Mrksic.TJ, para.564; Oric.TJ, para.322; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.97; Limaj.TJ, para.525; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.68; Strugar.TJ, para.369; Delalic.TJ, para.393. 
8 3 7 Halilovic.TJ, paras.65, 68; Brdanin.TJ, para.278. Other formulations have required the "general possibility" 
(Delalic.AJ, para.238) or "likelihood" (Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.437). Whether these standards should be 
considered to be essentially the same is an open question: Halilovic.TJ, para.68; Strugar.TJ, para.370; 
AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., p.835. 
8 3 8 Bagilishema.AJ, para.42; Delalic.AJ, paras.235, 238; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, para. 119; Strugar. TJ, 
para.417. 
3 9 Krnojelac.AJ, paras.155, 166, 171. Also Oric.TJ, para.323; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.98. 
8 4 0 E.g, Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.97; Galic.TJ, para. 175; Bagilishema.AJ, para.42. C.f. Limaj.TJ, 
para.525; Strugar.TJ, para.369. 
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dispute: as a result, we are left with the odd formulation that "[although the information 
may be general in nature, it must be sufficiently specific to demand further clarification." 8 4 1 
Knowledge of the prior commission of crimes by an identified and discrete group of 
subordinates may be sufficient to give notice of future crimes. 8 4 2 In any event, however, 
such knowledge would also require the commander to intervene in order to punish the 
subordinates in question, which is likely also to have a preventative function. 8 4 3 
Superior position may be a significant factor in adducing proof of knowledge, although this 
must be assessed in the relevant factual context. 8 4 4 Similarly, participation in a well-
organized, formal hierarchy with established reporting systems may be significant. 8 4 5 
Relative physical proximity between the superior and the offending subordinate(s) may also 
be important, as is the fact o f repeat offending, the numbers involved, and the operational 
tempo. 8 4 6 The existence o f different 'levels' of command in a military hierarchy 
(political/strategic/operational/tactical847) is not dispositive, however, of the extent of the 
accused's knowledge: 8 4 8 the levels do not act as 'glass floors' to shield those above from 
liability. Given that both forms of mens rea may largely depend on circumstantial proof, the 
court should take care to assess whether the requisite standard was met in the particular 
circumstances prevalent in the case.8 4 9 Constructive knowledge, in particular, may require a 
"finely balanced assessment". 
8 4 1 Oric.TJ, para.322. C.f. Galic.AJ, para. 184. 
8 4 2 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.AJ, paras.30-31; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 118. 
8 4 3 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, paras. 128-136, 160-164, 168-169. 
8 4 4 Blaskic.AJ, paras.56-57; Oric.TJ, para.319; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.71; Blaskic.TJ, para.308; 
Aleksovski.TJ, para.80. 
8 4 5 Oric.TJ, para.320; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.94; Halilovic.TJ, para.66; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, 
para.792; Galic.TJ, para. 174; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.428. Citing this principle, it bas been considered 
(Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.94; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.73) that "the standard of proof is higher" 
when considering the responsibility of de facto superiors in informal structures. This is obviously incorrect. 
The standard of proof remains the same, but a greater quantity of evidence may be required to meet the 
necessary standard. 
8 4 6 Mrksic.TJ, para.563; Oric.TJ, para.319; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.94; Limaj.TJ, para.524; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.66; Strugar.TJ, para.368; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.792; Stakic.TJ, para.460; 
Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.72; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.427; Blaskic.TJ, para.307; Aleksovski.TJ, para.80. 
8 4 7 Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.419; BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., pp.578-579. 
8 4 8 Fn.808 supra. 
8 4 9 Krnojelac.AJ, para. 156; Delalic.AJ, para.239; Mrksic.TJ, para.562; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 101; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.70. 
s s o Strugar.TJ, para.417. 
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The Trial Chamber in Blaskic had adopted a different interpretation of the alternative mental 
standard, much closer to the 'dereliction of duty' concept apparent in post-WWII cases, 
implying that a commander's failure to exercise due diligence in the fulfilment of their 
duties (which, crucially, includes awareness of the acts of subordinates) was sufficient for 
851 852 
conviction. This view comes impermissibly close to a strict liability model, and was 
rejected—quite r ight ly 8 5 3 —by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Delalic.*54 It must be 
acknowledged, however, that the subtlety of the distinctions in play renders the line a 
narrow one. 8 5 5 Similarly, the prohibition of a superior's ' w i l f u l blindness' (which, correctly 
understood, is itself a form of knowledge, 8 5 6 as it depends upon the recognition of the fact to 
which the actor wishes to remain b l ind 8 5 7 ) has occasionally—but wrongly—led to 
statements which could be taken to suggest a dereliction of duty approach. 8 5 8 Although the 
reasoning behind the stricter approach is understandable in the context of a military 
command structure, it is nonetheless dubious when applied to a doctrine which pertains to 
all sorts of superiors, de jure and de facto. To this end, the Appeals Chamber correctly 
pointed out the distinction between the dereliction of duty offence which may exist under 
national military discipline and the mode of liability in I C L . 8 5 9 The doctrine of superior 
responsibility is not, and should not be, a mandate for 'responsible' (i.e., professionally-
approved) command; an international equivalent for the common municipal substantive 
'dereliction of duty to supervise' offence is in principle feasible, but is not presently law. 8 6 0 
Damaska considers that superior responsibility begins to depart from municipal law 
principles—and thus a traditional understanding of the principle of culpability—when a 
8 5 1 Blaskic.TJ, paras.314-332; Bagilishema.TJ, para.46. Further, Oric.TJ, paras.317, 325; Report of the 
Secretary-General, para.56. 
8 5 2 Delalic.AJ, para.226. 
8 5 3 DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit„ pp.480^81. 
8 5 4 Delalic.AJ, paras.238-240. Also Blaskic.AJ, paras.62-64; Mrksic.TJ, para.564; Oric.TJ, para.322; 
Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.96; Limaj.TJ, para.525; Halilovic.TJ, para.69; Strugar.TJ, para.369; 
Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.432. With respect to negligence, Bagilishema.AJ, para.35; Halilovic.TJ, para.71. 
8 5 5 E.g., BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., pp.590, c.f. 593-594. 
8 5 6 DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit„ p.462. 
8 5 7 AMBOS.(2002).op.cit„ p.865. 
8 5 8 E.g., Stakic.TJ, para.460. C.f. Mrksic.TJ, para.564; Oric.TJ, para.322; Halilovic.TJ, para.69; 
Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.792; Brdanin.TJ, para.278. Further,PlRAGOFF/ROBlNSON.(forthcoming).op.cit., 
mn.26; VAN SLlEDR£GT.(2003).op.cit., p.44; SCHABAS (2003) op.cit., pp. 1029-1030, citing to Glanville 
Williams; ESER.(2002).op.cit., pp.931-932; LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cit., p. 160. 
8 5 9 Delalic.AJ, para.226. Also Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility' Appeal, para.22; Halilovic TJ, 
para.40. 
8 6 0 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp. 173-174. 
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superior attracts liability for "consciously disregarding] a perceived risk of subordinate 
delinquency", a standard which he describes as a "possibility" about which the superior is 
"reckless".8 6 1 Although the ICTY/R have not been clear precisely about what level of 
awareness constitutes a 'present and real risk', it is by no means certain that Damaska's 
assessment in 2001 remains consistent with modern jurisprudence. Certainly, the Blaskic 
standard, which he also criticised, is now no more; and the recent interpretive trend 
(Delalic—Brdanin—Halilovic) with respect to the risk at which the superior has reason to 
know might be argued to be coming even closer to 'true' constructive knowledge. Further, 
the clear statement that the language of negligence is "unhelpful" 8 6 3 also suggests that the 
ICTY/R inclines at least to a model of advertent recklnessness. 
Perhaps along these lines, it has been suggested that the requirement of knowledge for 
superior responsibility might be construed to conform with the general mens rea 
requirement under the rule on complicity: dolus eventualism Bantekas also uses this 
terminology, despite confusing its meaning with that of second-degree dolus directusS6S 
Although imposing what amounts to an intent standard upon superior responsibility 
conflicts with much incidental academic and judicial comment, there is no real reason why 
such an approach would be impracticable. Indeed, given that the volitional element is 
almost always inferred from the fact of the actor's knowledge and corresponding 
action/inaction anyway, 8 6 6 it seems hard to deny the feasibility of this concept for superior 
responsibility. 8 6 7 
This reasoning is of some interest, not least as it suggests that the only serious distinction 
between superior responsibility and complicity-based modes of liability before the ICTY/R 
is the absence of a minimal material requirement expressed in terms of causation. 8 6 8 It is 
8 6 1 DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., pp.463^164. 
8 6 2 AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., p.835. 
8 6 3 Bagilishema.AJ, para.35; Blaskic AJ, para.63; c.f. Oric.TJ, para.324. 
8 6 4 METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., pp.305-306, fn.48. 
8 6 5 BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., p.590. 
8 6 6 DAMASKA.(200l).op.cit., p.462. Also 'The doctrine of command responsibility revisited,' JlA, B.B., 2004, 
pp. 13, 32; Musema. TJ, para. 131; Akayesu. TJ, para.489. 
8 < ? 7 VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp.186-187. 
8 6 8 /6/rf.,pp.32-33. 
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perhaps no surprise, therefore, that the issue of causation in superior responsibility is 
attracting increasing consideration. 8 6 9 
Actus reus: failure to prevent or punish 
The relevant actus reus, rooted in the other two elements, lies in the superior's failure to 
take reasonable measures to prevent the relevant offence(s) 8 7 0 or punish the 
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perpetrator(s). These two aspects of the general responsibility to suppress criminal acts 
represent distinct legal obligations but their legal characterisation is largely consistent. 
Determination of what counts as "reasonable" is a factual question to be resolved by the 
court in the light of all the circumstances.8 7 4 As such, it is not precisely a question of 
substantive law. 8 7 5 Evidently, it is not reasonable for the superior to choose not to prevent 
the commission of a crime but to punish it afterwards: 8 7 6 their form of action must be 
dictated by the point at which they have the requisite knowledge. 8 7 7 On this basis, it was 
suggested that individuals who assume command after the relevant incident but who come 
to learn about it in timely fashion are equally required to take the necessary steps.8 7 8 This 
has been disapproved by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, 8 7 9 provoking mixed reactions. 8 8 0 
Pp. I l8-120.i>?/ra. 869 
8 7 0 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, para. 185. 
8 7 1 Halilovic.AJ, para.59; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.827; Blaskic.AJ, para.85; Aleksovski.AJ, para.72; Mrksic.TJ, 
para.558; Limaj.TJ, para.520; Halilovic.TJ, para.56; Strugar.TJ, para.358; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.790; 
Brdanin.TJ, para.275; Galic.TJ, para.173; Stakic.TJ, para.457; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.65; Krnojelac.TJ, 
para.92; Kvocka. TJ, paras.313-314; Krstic.TJ, para.604; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.401, 441; Kunarac.TJ, 
para.395; Blaskic.TJ, para.294; Aleksovski.TJ, paras.69, 72; Delalic.TJ, para.346. 
7 2 Blaskic.AJ, para.83; Mrksic.TJ, para.566; Oric.TJ, para.326; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.125; 
Halilovic.TJ, paras.72, 93-94; Strugar.TJ, para.372. 
8 7 3 Oric.TJ, para.336. 
8 7 4 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.AJ, paras.33, 151; Halilovic.AJ, paras.63-64; Blaskic.AJ, para.417; Mrksic.TJ, 
para.565; Oric.TJ, paras.329-330; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras. 123-124, 155, 177; Limaj.TJ, para.528; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.74; Strugar.TJ, paras.372, 374; Galic.TJ, para. 176; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.77; 
Aleksovski.TJ, para.81; Delalic.TJ, para.394. 
8 7 5 Blaskic.AJ, para.72; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 124; Halilovic.TJ, para.74; Brdanin.TJ, para.279. 
8 7 6 Mrksic.TJ, para.566; Oric.TJ, para.326; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 126; Limaj.TJ, para.527; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.72; Strugar.TJ, para.373; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.793; Brdanin.TJ, para.279; Stakic.TJ, 
para.461; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.444; Blaskic.TJ, para.336. 
8 7 7 Mrksic.TJ, para.566; Oric.TJ, para.326; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras. 125-126; Limaj.TJ, para.527; 
Halilovic.TJ, para.72; Stntgar.TJ, para.373; Kvocka.TJ, para.317. 
8 7 8 Kordic/Cerkez. TJ, para.446. 
8 7 9 Hadzihasanovic Command Responsibility Appeal, paras.44-56; c.f. per Judge Hunt; per Judge 
Shahabuddeen. Also Halilovic.AJ, para.67. 
8 8 0 Oric.TJ, para.335; METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p.30l. C.f. VAN Sl_lEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp. 167-172. 
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Certainly, the consequent liability gap which may potentially result for crimes perpetrated 
or coming to light at times of transition has not been resolved. 8 8 1 
It is clear that the superior is not required to perform the impossible 8 8 2 but it has been 
suggested that they should use "every means" available to them. 8 8 3 In particular, reliance on 
"non-assertive orders" is not a valid defence. 8 8 4 Thus, the obligation does not extend only to 
their de jure powers but includes all those avenues which it was materially possible for them 
to pursue. 8 8 5 The timely initiation of an investigation when required and the submission of a 
report to authorities competent to take direct remedial action may, for example, be almost 
univerally required. Other measures taken should be specific, and reasonably suited to the 
i l l they are intended to remedy. 8 8 7 
The requirement to prevent the commission of international crimes has a general aspect,8 8 8 
as well as the specific obligation when the superior understands that a criminal act is 
imminent. Although this conceptual distinction has been disapproved for litigation 
purposes,8 8 9 it does help illustrate the distinction between responsible command and 
command responsibility. The general aspect, which is part and parcel of responsible 
command, entails the provision of effective training and education for subordinates, 
maintenance of an efficient command structure, maintenance of discipline, and so on. 
International criminal liability does not attach to a failure to meet this general obligation per 
se, although it may be a relevant circumstance in assessing the superior's responsibility on 
the facts. 8 9 0 
8 8 1 E.g., Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras. 194-199. 
8 8 2 Oric.TJ, para.329; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 122; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.793; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.279; Stakic.TJ, para.461; Krnojelac.TJ, para.95; Delalic.TJ, para.395. 
8 3 Blaskic.AJ, para.72; Mrksic.TJ, para.568; Halilovic.TJ, paras.73, 100; Stakic.TJ, para.461; Krnojelac.TJ, 
para.95; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.445. Also BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., pp.591-592. 
8 8 4 BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., p.585. 
8 8 5 Mrksic. TJ, para.565; Oric. TJ, paras.329, 331; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, paras. 122, 170; Limaj. TJ, 
para.526; Halilovic.TJ, para.73; Strugar.TJ, paras.372, 378; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.793; Brdanin.TJ, 
para.279; Galic.TJ, para. 176; Stakic.TJ, para.461; Naletilic/Martinovic.TJ, para.76; Krnojelac.TJ, para.95; 
Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, paras.442-443; Delalic.TJ, para.395. 
8 8 6 Halilovic.AJ, para. 182; Mrksic.TJ, para.564; Oric.TJ, para.336; Limaj.TJ, para.529; Halilovic.TJ, paras.97, 
100; Strugar.TJ, para.376; Blagojevic/Jokic.TJ, para.793; Brdanin.TJ, para.279; Stakic.TJ, para.461; 
Blaskic.TJ, para.335. 
8 8 7 Oric.TJ, para.329; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para. 155. 
8 8 8 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura. TJ, paras. 143-151; Halilovic. TJ, paras.81-87. 
8 8 9 Halilovic.AJ, paras.61-64. 
8 9 0 Mrksic.TJ, para.567; Oric.TJ, para.330; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, para.144; Halilovic.TJ, para.88. 
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There is no requirement that the superior's failure causes the commission of a particular 
on | 
offence, although in the context of a 'failure to prevent' a causal link may be a natural, 
incidental result. 8 9 2 Although not enshrined as a formal element of superior responsibility 
before the ICTY/R, the general relevance of the concept of causation remains hard to 
Superior responsibility before the I C C 
Superior responsibility under Article 28 of the ICC Statute is different from the ICTY/R 
doctrine in some notable respects,894 relating especially to mens rea, causation and the 
distinction between military and non-military superiors. With regard to other issues (such as 
the meaning of effective control, actual knowledge, and the nature of "necessary and 
reasonable measures"), however, there is good reason to believe that the ICC's approach 
wi l l be similar to that of the ICTY/R. 8 9 5 As van Sliedregt observes, the ICC provision 
should be understood, to the greatest extent possible, in the light of the ICTY/R's 
jurisprudence. 8 9 6 
Perhaps the most radical innovation in Article 28 is the formal recognition of a causation 
requirement for superior responsibility, contradicting the findings of the ICTY/R. 8 9 7 In the 
case of both military and non-military superiors, responsibility lies only where crimes are 
committeed "as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly". As Damaska 
points out, the absence of a causal connection between the superior's conduct and the 
criminal act for a supposed mode of liability, rather than a discrete substantive offence, 
stretches the culpability principle to breaking point : 8 9 8 the intention behind this innovation is 
thus clear. However, whereas the requirement is easily explicable in the context of a 
8 9 1 Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.AJ, paras.38, 40; Kordic/Cerkez.AJ, para.832; Blaskic.AJ, para.77; Oric.TJ, 
para.338; Hadzihasanovic/Kubura.TJ, paras.188, 191; Halilovic.TJ, paras.77-78; Brdanin.TJ, para.280; 
Kordic/Cerkez. TJ, para.447; Delalic. TJ, para.398. 
8 9 2 Blaskic.TJ, para.339; LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cit., p. 161; BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., p.593. 
8 9 3 METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit., p.310. 
8 9 4 REID.(2005).op.cit., p.822; DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., p.457. 
8 9 5 FENRlCK.(forthcoming).op.cit., mns.7-8, 10, 12-18, 80, 23-25. 
8 9 6 V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit. , p. 143. 
8 9 7 CRYER.(2001).op.cit., pp.28-29. 
8 9 8 DAMASKA.(2001).op.cit., pp.468^70. 
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superior's knowing failure to prevent crimes, it seems impossible with regard to the failure 
to punish. In the absence of a prior agreement of immunity from punishment, how can the 
superior's failure to act after the crime causally affect the criminal consequence?899 
The best solution to this paradox seems to be the recognition that the causal requirement 
indicates a new contextual element to the mode of liability. An individual wi l l only be held 
responsible if, with the proper mens rea, they fail to prevent or punish the crimes of 
subordinates within their control. However, in addition, it also seems necessary to prove 
before the ICC that the superior's general deficient approach to their command had a real 
influence on the subordinates' disorderly behaviour. As van Sliedregt suggests, the causal 
link is analogous more to the minimum material standard for complicity (that the accused's 
conduct 'substantially' contributed to the criminal consequence) than the 'special' causation 
requirement for procurement liability: it represents a threshold standard to preserve the 
"reasonable attribution" of criminal responsibility rather than a defining characteristic of the 
mode o f l iabi l i ty . 9 0 0 This interpretation is persuasive, broadly consistent with other 
authoritative interpretations.9 0 1 Nonetheless, two effects of this development require 
comment. First, Article 28 has now re-introduced questions of 'responsible' command into 
I C L : 9 0 2 as Fenrick notes, the ICC w i l l now likely inquire into the superior's general control 
of their subordinates (including the provision of relevant training and reporting systems, 
maintenance of discipline, and non-passive command) 9 0 3 in a way that was not common 
before the ICTY/R. These factors, although of some relevance to an assessment of the 
failure to prevent, still tended to be of little more than academic note. In practical terms, any 
failure to prevent case is likely to automatically meet the failure of control threshold test: at 
the very least, the superior's culpable failure to prevent is ipso facto evidence of 
irresponsibly passive command. With regard to failure to punish, however, prosecutions 
may become marginally more difficult: i f a superior is running an otherwise 'responsible' 
command but neglects to punish an isolated incident of criminality, it is difficult to predict 
the likely verdict. Nonetheless, in most cases of superior responsibility, the tests under the 
8 9 9 C R Y E R E T AL.(2007).op.cit., p.327; c.f. V E T T E R . ( 2 0 0 0 ) . o p . c i t , p. 115. 
9 0 0 V A N SLIEDREGT. (2003) .op . c i t . , p. 175. 
9 0 1 E.g., TRlFFTERER.(2002).op.cit., pp.192, 1 9 7 - 2 0 5 , who views the superior's failure to control as a trigger 
for potential liability which can then be averted by appropriate action at the proper times. He also plainly sees 
this approach as reinforcing the culpability principle. Also C R Y E R ET AL.(2007).op.cit. , p.328. 
9 0 2 AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., pp.851, 8 6 0 . 
9 0 3 FENRlCK.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.9, also mn.19. 
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ICTY/R and the ICC seem likely to reach similar conclusions. The introduction of the 
causal requirement is thus more significant for its second implication: in attempting to meet 
the principle of culpability in this way, it raises the strong possibility that superior 
responsibility should no longer be considered a sui generis mode of liability but instead 
simply another complicity doctrine. As observed in Halilovic, the requirement for a causal 
link alters "the very nature o f the liability imposed". 9 0 4 Given the approach that the ICTY/R 
has taken to the mens rea requirement, a conceptual realignment of superior responsibility 
with complicity principles has in fact been a lurking possibility for some time. 
Strengthening the causal link brings that possibility one step closer. 
It is ironic, therefore, that at the same time, Article 28 seems to introduce a much less 
demanding approach to mens rea in certain respects. The distinction in standards applicable 
to military and non-military superiors is the most instantly apparent novelty in Article 28. 
The development is, in part, a cosmetic one, highlighting the particular need for care in 
assessing the actual powers of civilian superiors already reflected in the ICTY/R case-
law. 9 0 5 Nonetheless, the distinction is largely superfluous and can lead to a problematic 
confusion of thought. 9 0 6 In particular, the opportunity taken to introduce separate mental 
standards, although with an understandable rationale, 9 0 7 represents an unfortunate blow to 
the culpability principle. For military superiors, under the ICC, it need only be proved that 
they "knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known" of crimes 
committed or threatened by forces under their control. 9 0 8 It is very difficult to interpret this 
standard as anything other than a negligence standard, similar to that applied in the Blaskic 
trial and subsequently rejected by the ICTY/R . 9 0 9 Such an approach is unhelpful in a 
m , > Halilovic.TJ, para.78. 
9 0 5 E.g., Bagilishema.AJ, para.52; Kordic/Cerkez.TJ, para.840; Akayesu.TJ, para.491. Also 
AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., pp.849-850, 858; Wu & K.ANG.(1997).op.cit., p.295. 
9 0 6 V A N SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit. , pp. 191-192; VETTER.(2000).op.cit. , pp.127, 141. Litigation over the 
definition of those "effectively acting as a military commander" is also likely to flourish as a result. 
Potentially, there is a certain irony in permitting groups with less rigorous disciplinary standards than 
traditional militaries to benefit from this fact by asserting their 'non-military' status in a criminal trial. 
FENRICK.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.5; V A N SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit., pp. 181-182. 
9 0 7 SCHABAS.(2004).op.cit., p. 107. 
9 0 8 For non-military superiors, the formulation is more similar to that reached in the I C T Y / R jurisprudence 
"knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated," that subordinates were committing or 
threatening crimes. 
9 0 9 FENRlCK.(forthcoming).op.cit., mn.l 1; DARCY.(2007).op.cit., p.391; AMBOS.(2006).op.cit., p.672; VAN 
SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit. , pp.185-186; AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., pp.864-869; ESER.(2002).op.cit., p.903; 
TRlFFTERER.(2002).op.cit., p.192, fn.40; CRYER.(2001).op.cit., p.28. 
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criminal context—even for members of the military—as the circumstances of armed 
struggle mean that there is always a risk that criminal acts may occur. 9 1 0 
The argument has been made that the "should have known" formulation may not be as 
distant from the ICTY/R standard as it appears. Vetter suggests that the ICTY in Delalic, 
referring to Article 28 in passing, unintentionally created a "mythical" should have known 
standard, unqualified by the phrase "owing to the circumstances at the t ime". 9 " He implies 
that this myth has remained a persistent influence on attitudes to Article 28. It is certainly 
indisputable that the phrase "should have known" considered alone is a negligence concept; 
the import of the qualifying phrase, on the other hand, is ambiguous. It could be construed 
as a minor modification to the objective standard imposed or, as has also been suggested, it 
could represent a term of art along the lines of "had reason to know". Bantekas seems to 
support this view, arguing that the phrase has been taken out of context. He refers back to 
the ICRC, influential on the drafting of the provision, who stated that "widespread and 
publicly notorious, numerous, geographically and temporarily spanned breaches 'should be 
taken into consideration in reaching a presumption that the persons responsible could not be 
ignorant of them. '" 9 1 2 The implication of this statement would be to convert the phrase 
"owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known" from a negligence standard to 
a legal/evidentiary principle: as appropriate, the ICC wi l l infer knowledge (i.e., a 
constructive knowledge standard) from the circumstances. This is not strictly an objective 
approach, since it is directed to proving what the accused 'must have' subjectively known. 
Such an interpretation would certainly resolve much of the conflict with the ICTY/R, 
avoiding the use of a pure negligence approach, and would be welcomed. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that this interpretation rather strains the plain text. Ambos' gloom 
at this prospect is reflected in his conclusion that the only appropriate way forward from 
Article 28 is to transform it into a substantive criminal offence of 'failure of proper 
supervision'. 9 1 3 Van Sliedregt goes so far as to suggest that this is precisely what Article 28 
has created.9 1 4 
9 1 0 METTRAUX.(2005).op.cit, pp.305-306. 
9 1 1 VETTER.(2000).op.cit.,p.l22. C.f. VAN SLlEDREGT.(2003).op.cit , p.161. 
9 1 2 BANTEKAS.(1999).op.cit., p.589; also AMBOS.(2002).op.cit., p.838, fn.106; LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cit., pp. 163-
164. 
9 1 3 AMBOS.(2002).op.cit„ p.871. 
9 1 4 VAN SLIEDREGT.(2003).op.cit. , pp.190-191, 197. 
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It has also been suggested that the mental standard for civilians under the ICC regime is 
slightly more relaxed than under the jurisprudence of the ICTY/R. 9 1 5 Given the ambiguity in 
the ICTY/R jurisprudence on the extent to which the accused must be aware of the 'present 
and real risk' of criminal action by subordinates, it is difficult to draw a f i rm conclusion as 
to parity with the "consciously disregarding information which clearly indicates" standard. 
It seems likely, however, that any difference between the two standards is reducing in line 
with the ICTY/R's gradual trend away from the hard line in Blaskic.916 
In conclusion, it is hard to determine the extent to which the rule on superior responsibility 
has truly developed. The ICTY/R's most notable achievement in this context has certainly 
been the development of the doctrine of effective control, the very touchstone of liability. 
This is soundly consolidated, and of undoubted legal influence. Both the ICC and the 
ICTY/R also seem to betray a concern with the culpability principle, and the need to 
strengthen the link between the superior and the criminal consequence. The ICC's rather 
more sophisticated theory of causation is an interesting step in that direction. The 
divergence of opinion with regard to the appropriate mental standard, however, is a 
symptom of a profound unresolved ambiguity about the purpose of the doctrine, in a way 
that the difference of opinion as to mechanisms of co-perpetration is not. Ironically, 
although this mode of liability has the soundest pre-1993 basis in customary law by far, this 
is the only doctrine considered in this study whose future shape still seems uncertain. 
Further—and perhaps not accidentally—it should be observed that the doctrine in which the 
ICC Statute is most prescriptive (and thus leaves least room for application of other sources 
of l aw 9 1 7 ) is also the one which is likely to be in the greatest tension with the law of the 
ICTY/R. 
9 1 5 VETTER.(2000).op.cit., p.93; LlPPMAN.(2000).op.cit., p. 165. 
9 1 6 AMBOS.(2007).op.cit., p. 179. 
9 1 7 TRlFFTERER.(2002).op.cit., pp.186, 189. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
It is clear that in engaging with the attribution of responsibility, one braves murky waters. 
Despite his own preference for pragmatism, Ambos expresses a wish that in the 
development of the general part of the law some of the basic questions might be tackled 
before attention is paid to the specifics. 9 1 8 At the same time, it is clear that ICL has never 
been—and is still not—amenable to such a premeditated approach, growing not according 
to a particular design but by evolution. In that context, the relative success and security of 
the law developed is striking. 
Perhaps a necessary consequence of its dynamism, the extent to which the principle of 
legality has been interpreted down in the context of 'hard cases', both by international 
criminal courts but also by international human rights organs, is still something of a shock. 
Although most people do ordinarily rely on moral instinct to warn of potential criminality, 
the gap between the rational, positive law idea implied by the best-established test (relying 
on "foreseeability" and "accessibility") and its instinctive, almost natural law-based reality 
is striking. This state of affairs has not done injustice, yet the apparent lack of substance to a 
cherished ideal remains disturbing. 
A brief examination of the ICTY/R's approach to customary law and the other formal 
sources has revealed a major issue for future study: the uncertainty that exists both with 
regard to the obligations that in fact bound the ICTY/R in discerning and applying the law 
and, reflexively, with regard to the status to be afforded to the body of law so developed. In 
particular, it might be asked whether the time has come to reconsider the attitude to 
international judicial decisions, traditionally derived from Article 38(1 )(d) of the ICJ 
Statute. 
In the meantime, it is hoped that the very conservative approach taken in this paper to 
identifying norms which are independently established in customary law wi l l help to 
illustrate that the difficulties endemic to the doctrine of sources do not detract from the 
quality and breadth of the legal reasoning which has developed. 
9 1 8 AMBOS.(2006).op.cit., p.673. 
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In that context, can we say that the various attribution doctrines now amount to a body of 
'rules'? Cautiously, yes. Whereas little structure could be inferred from the collection of 
pre-1993 authorities, the ICTY/R's most significant contribution has been the elucidation of 
a unified body of consistent principles. They are reasonably determinate, precise, and 
widely recognised. Although their substance may or may not survive unchanged, they 
provide a common basis for the international community to engage with ICL, in a way that 
it could not before. In Hart's terms, the doctrines for the attribution of responsibility under 
ICL can now be said to be truly "general" in their application. Perhaps the greatest indicator 
of this success is that a study of this size, with a reasonable aspiration to 
comprehensiveness, is viable at all. 
In substantive terms, it seems safe to say that the rules on direct perpetration, procurement, 
and knowing assistance are clearly defined. Although the approaches of the ICTY/R and 
ICC in these respects are not quite identical, they are sufficiently close that a radical 
upheaval would be astonishing. Similarly, despite the confusion caused by the sudden 
advent and exit of control-based perpetration at the ICTY/R, the various co-perpetration 
doctrines are also well-established. The existence of two models for co-perpetration does 
not detract from this status, as both are based on a common understanding of their general 
purpose and function. In the short-term, they have the potential to be used complementarily; 
in the long-term, the event that one supercedes the other wi l l not alter the general body of 
legal principles within which they both operate. 
Despite its long pedigree, the doctrine of superior responsibility is beset by the most 
ambiguities and seems to be least secure. The existence of the basic principle is undoubted, 
but the possibility of a fairly radical shift in emphasis (towards or away from the culpability 
principle) in the early years of the ICC's operations is not out of the question. The effect of 
such a re-orientation on the status of the law on point established by the ICTY, given the 
number of parties to the ICC Statute, bears consideration. 
Analysis of the various attribution doctrines has indicated various opportunities where the 
law could be consolidated and simplified. The ripest opportunity for development, 
interestingly, appears to be the body of law relating to basic standards of culpability, the 
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minimum material and mental standards which could potentially underpin all the forms of 
liability. Although at present the status o f such a rule is only arguable, the resonance 
between the approach taken by the ICTY/R and available to the ICC is sufficient to render 
them an interesting prospect. In the context of increasing national interest in conducting 
trials which purport to draw on aspects of the (international) law of war, such a rule might 
be of some interest. 
It remains to conclude that the future of ICL—at least foreseeably—is the ICC. It must be 
recalled that, as a treaty body, the approach it takes is not necessarily dispositive of the 
content of general international law, either drawn from custom or general principles. On the 
other hand, as a representative of the majority of the international community, its influence 
cannot be ignored. As illustrated in detail here, the law developed by the ICTY/R is highly 
relevant to the questions which arise under the framework of the ICC Statute. Thus, in both 
the doctrines it adopts, and the method of its reasoning, it is likely that it wi l l be the true 
arbiter of the extent of the ICTY/R's contribution in this field. 
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